An evaluation of means of inquiry into the biological evolution of consciousness by Wilcke, Juliane Charlotte
An Evaluation of
Means of Inquiry Into the
Biological Evolution of Consciousness
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology






Goswinde, Immanuel, & Wurt

There probably is no more important quest in all science
than the attempt to understand those very particular events
in evolution by which brains worked out that special trick
that has enabled them to add to the cosmic scheme of
things: color, sound, pain, pleasure, and all the other facets
of [conscious] mental experience.
(Nobel laureate Roger Sperry, 1964, p. 3)
Determining the best way (“method”) to get what we want
is the task of methodology.
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How can the biological evolution and functions of consciousness be studied? The pur-
pose of this thesis was to determine not only what means of inquiry are available to
do so but also how good they are or, more specifically, how promising they are with
respect to the research goal of giving a scientifically respectable evolutionary explan-
ation of consciousness. Because no suitable or easily adaptable evaluation system or
set of evaluative criteria was available, I constructed a systematic tool for evaluating
the promise of means of inquiry. The evaluation tool has three dimensions—relevance,
efficacy, and practicality—with two criteria each, which are assessed independently
(except for the relevance criteria) and synthesised into dimensional and promise scores.
This tool served to evaluate, and advise on, 23 means of inquiry that have been used
in the investigation of the evolution of consciousness, including its adaptation status
and evolutionary functions.
The core of the thesis is formed by the evaluation tool and its application. After
establishing the need for an evaluation of means of inquiry in this area and presenting
the evaluation tool constructed for this purpose, I apply the tool to arguments that
consciousness is an evolutionary adaptation, to general reasoning strategies, and to
evolutionary strategies. This thesis core is preceded by a contextual introduction to
consciousness and evolutionary theory and by the dismissal of some sceptical positions.
It is followed by a comparative review of the evaluation results and an evaluation of
the evaluation tool. The main contributions of this research consist of the promise
evaluation tool for means of inquiry, which is underpinned by a new evaluative theory
and available for use by other researchers; and, through the tool’s application, an
improved understanding of means of inquiry and recommendations about which of





We [humans] are conscious.
Why? Why am I, are we conscious?
(J. C. Wilcke, personal communication,
before February 20, 2003)
Consciousness is important. It is important, for instance, to each of us and to psy-
chology as a discipline. The importance of consciousness leads to the questions of
how and why it came to be in the first place. These questions address the biological
evolution and potential functions of consciousness, which we can only investigate if
we have appropriate means of inquiry. It is not clear that this is currently the case, as
even the more developed hypotheses about the evolution and functions of conscious-
ness are frequently based on insufficient evidence. To help advance research in the
area, this doctoral thesis evaluates means of inquiry and recommends which ones are
most promising for increasing our knowledge about the biological evolution of con-
sciousness. Before giving an overview of the structure of the thesis, I explain in more
detail why the topic is significant, what problem the research project addresses, and
how the thesis contributes to its solution.
Brief rationale for this thesis. Consciousness is important to us individually be-
cause it is our experience of the world and of ourselves in it. Consciousness is essential
to who we are. Without consciousness humans are not only unaware of anything, but
also inactive: People who are in a dreamless sleep or coma normally neither obtain nor
consume food and drink; they do not protect themselves, interact socially, or have sex.
And although many bodily functions are unaffected by the absence of consciousness,
prolonged unconsciousness without intervention leads to death within a few weeks at
most. This is not to say that consciousness is a prerequisite for human existence in
principle; there may well be ways to make us survive and reproduce without con-
sciousness. It is just that we cannot live our lives naturally without consciousness.
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Introduction
The personal centrality of consciousness makes the topic very relevant, yet its study
difficult.
Consciousness is also important to psychology. Over 130 years ago, when psycho-
logy became established as an independent empirical discipline, psychology was the
scientific study of conscious experience. Although the scope of psychology has ex-
panded and now includes all mind and behaviour, consciousness has been repeatedly
deemed its defining domain. The influential psychologist George Miller, for instance,
explained in an interview that he took consciousness to be “the constitutive problem
of psychology” (Baars, 1986, p. 220). One reason for this view is that an understand-
ing of consciousness is needed to understand unconscious mental processes, either or
both of which are involved in all mental phenomena and therefore essential to their
explanation (Searle, 1998). Another reason is that consciousness could help to in-
tegrate psychological theories from diverse research areas (Banks & Farber, 2003):
It makes a difference in perception, learning, memory, thinking, attention, emotion,
volition, motor control, and attitudes; and corresponding mental contents appear
unified in consciousness. Despite the varied treatment of consciousness as a research
topic in its own right, it has been an “ever-present concern for everyone thinking
about the human mind” (Gu¨zeldere, 1995a, p. 36). This is not surprising because we
tend to consciously experience the stream-of-consciousness I as that part of us that
is perceiving, thinking, feeling, and acting, to the exclusion of unconscious processes.
Psychology cannot exist without consciousness (Marcel, 1988; Roback, 1952), if only
because much of psychology is performed by conscious psychologists and relies on
conscious reporting of conscious contents, both in research and practice. Conscious-
ness is thus not the only topic in modern psychology, but it matters fundamentally
to several aspects and research areas of the science of mind and behaviour.
Given the importance of consciousness to individual human beings and its signific-
ance within psychology, it seems natural to ask why consciousness exists. Assuming
that inanimate matter on the early Earth was not conscious, consciousness must have
arisen since then during chemical or, more likely, biological evolution. The questions
of where consciousness has come from, and why, have become more pressing in the
last few decades with the discovery of an increasing number of unconscious mental
processes and behaviours previously thought to be tied to consciousness (Dennett,
1987; Frith & Rees, 2007). In a recent survey of the top 25 big questions facing
science over the next quarter-century, the journal Science noted that, “ultimately,
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scientists would like to understand not just the biological basis of consciousness but
also why it exists. What selection pressure led to its development, and how many of
our fellow creatures share it?” (G. Miller, 2005, p. 79). An evolutionary approach to
consciousness is necessary to answer such questions and may additionally be useful for
deciding between philosophical theories of consciousness (Bechtel & Richardson, 1983;
Carruthers, 2000). Moreover, knowledge of the relevant functions of consciousness is
likely to have implications for psychotherapy, neuropsychology, medicine, ethics, and
law (Haynes, Roth, Schwegler, & Stadler, 1998). One major route, then, to find-
ing out why we have conscious experiences is to study the phylogenetic origin and
evolutionary history of consciousness, including potential evolutionary functions.
What stands out about the literature on the evolution and functions of conscious-
ness is that, by and large, it consists of many diverse hypotheses, the majority of
which are insufficiently supported. This literature has been characterised as “surpris-
ingly barren” (Gu¨zeldere, 1995b, p. 131) with still only “little understanding about
how it [consciousness] may have evolved through time” (Nielsen & Day, 1999, p. 95).
It appears that authors recognise the importance of the topic and, hence, feel their
accounts of consciousness would be incomplete without some comments on the topic,
but find it either too obvious or too difficult, and not their main purpose anyway.
Of course there are exceptions, and fortunately the situation has begun to improve:
Several recent publications dedicated to the topic have used theoretical and empirical
arguments to make progress on discovering how and why consciousness evolved (e.g.,
Cabanac, Cabanac, & Parent, 2009; Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2007a, 2007b; Merker,
2005; Morsella, 2005). More interest in the evolution and functions of consciousness,
together with a growing number of researchers prepared to tackle the topic seriously,
set the course for the evidence-based development of associated hypotheses.
So how can willing researchers investigate the biological evolution of consciousness?
In order to add to our limited knowledge in this area and to solve some of the prob-
lems apparent in the literature, we need to know how we can obtain support for, or
against, hypotheses about evolutionarily relevant functions of consciousness or other
aspects of its evolution. There are three main reasons why means of inquiry deserve
special attention in the present context. To begin with, some aspects of the study of
consciousness are methodologically difficult (Banks & Farber, 2003; Velmans, 1993;
Wright, 2007). Another reason is that it is simply not obvious in this emerging in-
terdisciplinary research area which strategies and methods are best for studying the
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evolution of consciousness. An even more important reason for focusing on means of
inquiry is that those means that have been employed so far differ greatly in their use-
fulness. Considering the increasing research interest in the evolution and functions of
consciousness, it is timely to examine the available means of inquiry and to determine
their value systematically. This doctoral thesis presents just that: an evaluation of
means of inquiry into the biological evolution of consciousness.
Means of inquiry and methodology. Because means of inquiry are central to the
present project, it is worth explaining what they are and which ones are evaluated
here. Means of inquiry is a broad term, encompassing many different procedures and
tools that are employed by researchers to attain those research objectives, at different
levels of generality, that are directly related to learning more about the phenomena
under investigation (i.e., excluding research objectives such as the dissemination of
findings and enabling conditions, e.g., time, funding, and ethics approval). Examples
of means of inquiry are general research approaches, research designs, research meth-
ods for data collection and analysis, technical instruments, and certain cognitive pro-
cesses. Given the current state of the literature on the evolution and functions of
consciousness, the evaluation reported in this thesis was designed to concentrate on
research strategies, research methods, and arguments.
The thesis is thus in research methodology, the study of research methods or, more
generally, the study of means of inquiry. It is not concerned with general accounts of
scientific method, such as the hypothetico-deductive and inductive theories of method.
Instead, the thesis is concerned with the evaluation of more context-specific means
of inquiry themselves. The evaluation is underpinned by a broader account of sci-
entific method than the aforementioned ones, namely the abductive theory of sci-
entific method (Haig, 2005). One of the major strengths of this theory is that it
accommodates means of inquiry used in both the detection of empirical phenom-
ena and the construction of explanatory theories, all means of which contribute to
scientific progress.
Within the present context the thesis performs the three major tasks of methodo-
logy (Nickles, 1987b, 1989): It describes, criticises, and advises on means of inquiry
into the evolution of consciousness, with an emphasis on their evaluation. Methodo-
logy can inform crucial research decisions in this way, such as the choice of particular
means of inquiry for a given research problem. The means of inquiry that we use
not only determine to what extent a chosen research goal may be reached and enable
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us to do so; they also determine to what extent the resulting claims about empirical
phenomena are justified on the basis of having been acquired by reliable processes
(Goldman, 1979; Haig, 2005). Textbooks typically instruct their readers to match the
research method to the research question. Yet additional guidance is required because
different methods can result in different answers to the same research question, a prob-
lem known to psychologists as method variance (D. T. Campbell & Fiske, 1959), and
because there are many other factors that influence method choices (Golden, 1976;
Kulka, 1981). This thesis provides new systematic information on means of inquiry in
the present context and, on that basis, recommends which of them are most promising
for contributing substantially to an evolutionary explanation of consciousness.
A clarification of the scope and focus of the thesis is in order here. The thesis is not
a complete survey of means of inquiry that have been, or could be, used to investigate
the evolution or functions of consciousness; however, it does cover a wide range of
means of inquiry as representative examples. Similarly, the thesis is not intended as
an exhaustive review of suggested functions of consciousness or related evolutionary
hypotheses, although it does cite many of the corresponding references. (Fortunately,
readers interested in the former topic can consult two recent overviews: A. K. Seth,
2009, and Van Gulick, 2009.) This is because the focus of the thesis is on the evalu-
ation of means of inquiry, not on the content of hypotheses about the evolution and
functions of consciousness. In particular, the thesis evaluates the promise of means
of inquiry with respect to the research goal of giving a scientifically respectable evol-
utionary explanation of consciousness, using a tool constructed specifically for this
purpose.
The construction of an evaluation tool for means of inquiry was necessary because
I could not find any evaluation system in the literature that was either suitable for
the present research project or that could easily be adapted to it. Because this thesis
is about the first stage of an evaluation tool’s construction in a new content area (i.e.,
the evaluation of means of inquiry for a particular research goal), I treated this project
as an exercise in evaluation rather than in psychometrics. That is, attention to the
foundations of evaluation was deemed of higher priority at this stage of research than a
strong focus on psychometric virtues such as test validity and reliability. Psychometric
considerations will become more important once the tool has proved practical and
worthy of such development. The tool’s construction in the thesis was therefore
guided by the logic of evaluation and corresponding methodological resources.
5
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The main contributions of this research stem from the construction and application
of the evaluation tool for means of inquiry. Both of these components, the tool and
its application, contribute knowledge for instrumental and conceptual use (Cousins &
Shulha, 2006; Rich, 1977), so-called knowledge for action and knowledge for under-
standing. The evaluation tool is based on a new evaluative theory of the promise of
means of inquiry in the present context, itself intended as a significant contribution
to the meagre literature on the evaluation of research methods. The tool is available
for use by other researchers either here or, after adaptation of the instructions in a
context-specific dimension, in other areas. Its application in this thesis leads to a
better understanding of the means of inquiry in the present context, which has the
potential to improve their future use and to inform their development. Last but not
least, the resulting recommendations on the promise of means of inquiry, if followed,
can facilitate progress in research on the evolution and functions of consciousness. In
sum, this thesis contributes instrumental knowledge in the form of a method evalu-
ation tool and as recommendations on means of inquiry into the biological evolution of
consciousness; it also contributes conceptual knowledge, namely, an evaluative theory
and an improved understanding of means of inquiry.
How this thesis is structured. I first give an overview of each chapter’s role in the
thesis and then describe individual chapters in more detail. The core of the thesis,
which spans four chapters, is formed by the evaluation tool for means of inquiry and
its application to research into the biological evolution of consciousness. Chapter 2
establishes the need for an evaluation of means of inquiry in this area and presents the
evaluation tool constructed for this purpose. The tool is then applied to means that
have been used to study the evolution and functions of consciousness, in particular: to
arguments that consciousness is an evolutionary adaptation in Chapter 3, to general
reasoning strategies in Chapter 4, and to evolutionary methods in Chapter 5. This
thesis core is preceded by a contextual introduction to consciousness and evolutionary
theory and by the dismissal of some sceptical positions in Chapter 1. The core is
followed by a comparative review of the evaluation results, some suggestions from
evolutionary psychology, an evaluation of the evaluation tool, and conclusions drawn
from the research in Chapter 6.
Chapter 1 begins with the question of what consciousness is. Some knowledge of
the subject matter is needed to avoid misunderstandings and to understand the meth-
odological challenges faced when studying its biological evolution. It is also needed
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directly in the evaluation of means of inquiry, namely, for determining which aspect of
the research goal a means addresses. The other ingredient of the means’ research goal
is evolution, so the chapter discusses evolutionary explanations next. This chapter
section serves to establish common ground on what evolution is taken to involve and
what evolutionary explanations should look like. In order to allow for the possibility
that consciousness is functional, the following section rejects epiphenomenalism, the
view that mental events do not influence physical events. The chapter also dismisses
other doubts about research on the biological evolution of consciousness, including in-
essentialism, cognitive closure, and culture as an alternative source of consciousness.
Chapter 1 thus functions to clear the way for the method evaluation tool and its
application by providing the necessary background and dealing with general doubts
about the research programme.
Before Chapter 2 introduces the evaluation tool for means of inquiry, problems in
the literature on the biological evolution and functions of consciousness are identified.
As already mentioned, current hypotheses tend to be inadequately supported, but
there are other problems too. The following chapter section explains how an evalu-
ation of the promise of means of inquiry can help to solve some of the methodological
difficulties evident in the literature. The construction of the evaluation tool is then
described, including its three evaluation dimensions, the choice of evaluation criteria,
and the scoring scale. The chapter also specifies the tool’s rubrics, which are used to
assess each means of inquiry on the criteria, and its synthesis procedure for arriving
at dimension and promise scores. The description of the evaluation tool, itself an out-
come of the research project, acts as the method section for the evaluation of means
of inquiry.
The three results chapters report the application of the evaluation tool to means
of inquiry that have been used to study the evolution or functions of consciousness.
Chapter 3 deals with means employed to support the hypothesis that consciousness
is an evolutionary adaptation, independent of the function it may have. Ten argu-
ments are evaluated, some of which are based on subjective experience, others on
casual evolutionary reasons; the most promising ones are from evolutionary biology.
Chapter 4 is devoted to the evaluation of common general strategies in the present
context, such as input from introspection and folk psychology and also more abstract
reasoning strategies. Contrastive analysis (Baars, 1988) for determining the functions
of consciousness is assessed in this chapter, as is the related strategy of excluding un-
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consciously performed functions. The final of the evaluation chapters, Chapter 5,
turns to methods with a clearer evolutionary focus. It first evaluates the natural
method (Flanagan, 1992), including its use for generating and developing “deflation-
ary evolutionary explanations” (Polger, 2007, p. 83). Because most of the remaining
strategies take long-term developments of consciousness into account, comparative
methods, indicators from brain evolution, and other such means of inquiry promise
to contribute much to an evolutionary explanation of consciousness.
The concluding chapter of the thesis, Chapter 6, begins with a comparative review
of the evaluated means of inquiry and their promise. The following section considers
what we can learn from the field of evolutionary psychology for better understanding
and improving research on the biological evolution of consciousness. In addition to
points such as the importance of alternative hypotheses and realistic expectations, it
mentions means of inquiry that have not yet been used in the present context. The
chapter then evaluates the evaluation tool, with a focus on difficulties that became
apparent during its application and solutions to them. It ends with an overview
of the major contributions of the research reported here and lists recommendations
for future research in the hope of making progress toward a scientifically respectable
evolutionary explanation of consciousness.
8
1 Approaching consciousness confidently
from evolutionary biology
Even if “consciousness is the biggest mystery” (Chalmers, 1996, p. xi), we need to
engage with it to find out whether we can increase our understanding of it. Before
looking at how we can study consciousness, it is worth getting a better idea of what
it is we are dealing with: What may researchers have in mind when they use the term
consciousness, and are there different kinds of consciousness? Because later chapters
evaluate means of inquiry into the biological evolution of consciousness, we should
also determine whether it is at all reasonable to approach consciousness within an
evolutionary framework: Are there any serious indications that biological evolution
is not relevant to the study of consciousness or that such an approach is unlikely
to succeed? Overall, this chapter introduces what we are getting ourselves into and
provides the necessary background for the thesis.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the definition of consciousness and a de-
scription of important distinctions, before specifying the main assumptions that this
thesis makes about consciousness. Note that the study of consciousness and associated
methodological worries are not addressed in detail until the following chapter. In the
second section of the present chapter, I give a brief overview of evolutionary theory,
touch on what an evolutionary explanation of consciousness might have to involve,
and clarify my view of evolutionary psychology. I then consider arguments for and
against epiphenomenalism, which is in this context the philosophical theory that con-
sciousness does not affect any physical events and, hence, cannot have a function. The
last section of the chapter deals with three additional concerns: that consciousness is
not necessary in principle for any of the functions it may perform, that consciousness
is predominantly a social product, and that understanding consciousness is beyond
our cognitive abilities.
9
1 Approaching consciousness confidently from evolutionary biology
1.1 Consciousness in this thesis
The answer to the question “What in the world can consciousness be?” (Dennett,
1987, p. 160) is often treated as either very obvious or very difficult. On the one
hand, conscious experience seems “the most familiar thing in the world” (Chalmers,
1996, p. 3), which is presumably why Sigmund Freud (1933) commented that “what
is meant by ‘conscious’, we need not discuss; it is beyond all doubt” (p. 94). Some
psychology dictionaries, on the other hand, assert that a definition of consciousness is
impossible (Sutherland, 1989), or advise psychologists to leave the term’s description
to philosophers (Moulin, 2006). Both of these attitudes toward consciousness leave
us, at least for now, without an explication of the term.
We do, in fact, not need a precise definition of consciousness in order to increase
our knowledge of it. Analytic definitions, which aim to identify the essence of a
concept, tend to come late in scientific investigations, not early (P. S. Churchland,
1988; Searle, 1998; Weiskrantz, 1988). This is an old insight: Aristotle regarded such
definitions as the aim of knowledge generation (Popper, 1945), and logicians in the
middle ages assigned them to the final step in the progress of knowledge, a view that
was largely borne out by the middle of the 19th century (Whewell, 1840). What is
more, Karl Popper (1945) argued at this university that science, instead of overbur-
dening its terms with precise meaning, concentrates on the precision of its theories
and only introduces explicit definitions as shorthand labels. Accordingly, Crick and
Koch (1990) dismissed attempts at formally defining consciousness as premature until
we know much more about it.
What we do need, if we want to study the same phenomenon, is a common under-
standing of the term consciousness. I doubt that it is sufficient to state that “everyone
has a rough idea of what is meant by consciousness” (Crick & Koch, 1990, p. 264) and
to leave it at that. People do not agree on what consciousness is (Kemp & Strongman,
1994), and not even researchers in the same discipline may mean the same thing when
they use the term consciousness (Chalmers, 1995; Gu¨zeldere, 1995a). To provide a
useful starting point, I quote two descriptions of consciousness. Both give synonyms,
followed either by conditions of occurrence: “states of sentience or awareness that
typically begin when we wake from dreamless sleep and continue through the day
until we fall asleep again, die, go into a coma, or otherwise become ‘unconscious’ ”
(Searle, 1998, p. 24); or by contents of consciousness: “inner experience . . . what it
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feels like to be oneself, to have sensations, thoughts, moods, desires, subjective reas-
ons for one’s actions” (Humphrey, 1987b, para. 3). These aspects may be combined
by describing consciousness as “the normal mental condition of the waking state of
humans, characterized by the experience of perceptions, thoughts, feelings, awareness
of the external world, and often in humans (but not necessarily in other animals)
self-awareness” (Colman, 2009). As a first approximation, then, consciousness can be
described as an organism’s awareness of the environment and probably, at least at a
very basic level, of itself in it.
Distinctions within consciousness. The identification and examination of various
concepts and aspects of consciousness have helped to improve our understanding of
both the construct and the phenomenon itself. In line with this, Carruthers (2000)
called the distinction of several notions of the term “one of the real advances made in
recent years” (p. 254). Furthermore, distinguishing different kinds of consciousness
facilitates phylogenetic approaches by changing the focus from human consciousness
in its entirety to the question of which species have which kinds of consciousness
(Rensink, 2009). I briefly describe the most relevant concepts and aspects of con-
sciousness below. The purpose of this description is not merely to clarify the uses
of terms in the literature: Which aspect of consciousness a means of inquiry serves
to address is important for the means’s evaluation in this thesis. For example, the
addressed aspect matters when assessing the potential contribution of a means to the
research ideal, that is, to explaining the biological evolution of all aspects of conscious-
ness in all organisms. Note that some concepts of consciousness are closely associated
with particular theories of consciousness, the description of which would take us too
far afield without leading to a coherent framework. I therefore adopt the authors’ own
terms for consciousness and its aspects in the thesis and comment only on seemingly
unusual usage.
A breakthrough in the study of consciousness was the realisation that we could
compare conscious and unconscious mental events (Baars, 1997a, 2003b). Yet this
dichotomy turns out to be a simplification too. For instance, instead of two different
types of mental processing, we may usefully distinguish at least three: subliminal, pre-
conscious, and conscious (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006),
or nonconscious, conscious, and metaconscious (Schooler, 2002). Aside from men-
tal processes, organisms can also have different levels of consciousness at different
times, spanning unconscious, sleeping, drowsy, relaxed, and alert states. Moreover,
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consciousness could vary along one or more continua rather than consist of discrete
levels. Suggested dimensions include, for example, clearness of experience (Ramsøy
& Overgaard, 2004), richness of content and degree of influence (Dennett, 1995b),
and strength, stability, and distinctiveness of representations (Cleeremans & Jime´nez,
2002). Whether consciousness and its aspects are indeed continuous or discrete is
still under investigation (e.g., Christensen, Ramsøy, Lund, Madsen, & Rowe, 2006;
Dupoux, de Gardelle, & Kouider, 2008; Overgaard, Rote, Mouridsen, & Ramsøy,
2006; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004). And, as illustrated by the example of cooling water
turning into ice (Cleeremans, 2005), these two possibilities do not exclude each other.
There are not only different levels of consciousness but also many different contents
of consciousness. We can be conscious of perceptions, thoughts, emotions, memories,
mental imagery, and so forth (more precisely, we can be conscious of their objects and
of having or doing them); and each of these categories has many subcategories in turn.
Taking perception as an example, there are visual and auditory experiences, tastes,
smells, touches, pains, experiences of temperature and the location of body parts,
and several other types of perceptions. Even these subcategories may divide further,
for instance, into sweet, bitter, sour, salty, and umami tastes. Experiences can thus
differ between categories, but they can also differ considerably within a single category.
The sweetness of a banana, for example, is very unlike that of its foam-candy version.
Another factor that contributes to the great variety of conscious contents is that a
particular conscious experience normally consists of a combination of experiences from
different categories. While reading these sentences you may be aware of my phrases
on paper or a computer monitor and of your understanding of them, as well as of
associated thoughts, emotional reactions, and distracting sounds in the background.
Tononi and Edelman (1998) characterised conscious experience accordingly as both
integrated and differentiated from billions of other possible conscious states.
The worth of distinguishing between these two aspects of consciousness, levels and
contents, is well accepted (e.g., Laureys, 2005; A. K. Seth, 2009). When one of
them is constant or otherwise not of interest, it is reasonable to focus on the other
aspect. This is what Searle (1998) and Humphrey (1987b) did in their descriptions of
consciousness quoted above. However, in other situations it may be more appropriate
to consider both aspects. For instance, altered states of consciousness, which include
mental states during dreaming, meditation, hypnosis, psychosis, coma, orgasm, and
those influenced by psychoactive drugs, are likely to differ in their level and in their
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contents of consciousness. With these two basic aspects of consciousness explained,
we now turn to three further distinctions, which reappear later in this thesis.
First, Rosenthal (1986, 1993, 2009) has argued that the following three concepts of
consciousness need to be distinguished because they refer to distinct phenomena. The
first concept is creature consciousness, which denotes an organism’s being awake and
responsive to sensory stimulation. The second concept, transitive consciousness, refers
to an organism’s being conscious of something, either by perceiving it or by thinking
about it. (It is called transitive because the phrase to be conscious of takes a direct
object.) These perceptions and thoughts may themselves be conscious or not, leading
to the introduction of a third concept: state consciousness, which denotes a mental
state’s being conscious, as opposed to unconscious, and is the subject of much recent
research and debate. An organism is conscious of such mental states—in a way that
depends on the particular theory—with or without a deliberate introspective focus
on them. If the phenomena corresponding to these three concepts of consciousness
have different evolutionary functions, including none, as Rosenthal (2008) maintained,
their distinction is clearly relevant to this thesis.
Second, the most widely known (and disputed) distinction is that between phenom-
enal and access consciousness, which are part of Block’s (1995) conceptual quartet.
He describes phenomenal consciousness as experience, which occurs, for example,
when humans see, hear, or feel, but also when they think or want. What is specific to
phenomenally conscious states is that “there is something it is like to be” (Nagel, 1974,
p. 436) in them. A state is access conscious, in contrast, if its content is “poised for
free use in reasoning or in rational control of action” (Block, 1995, p. 238). The best
indicator of access consciousness is often reportability. Block’s other two concepts are
self-consciousness and monitoring consciousness, both of which apply to organisms
rather than mental states. Animals are self-conscious if they have a self-concept and
can use it in thinking about themselves, as suggested by, for instance, mirror self-
recognition. Monitoring consciousness, which is also called reflective consciousness,
may be a form of inner perception, internal scanning, or higher-order thought. These
distinctions are important here, as Block’s discussion of them aims to expose faulty
reasoning about the functions of consciousness.
Third, primary consciousness differs from higher-order consciousness (G. M. Edel-
man, 1989, 2003; G. M. Edelman & Tononi, 2000). An animal with primary con-
sciousness has the ability to generate a multimodal phenomenal scene in the present,
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which integrates perception, motor acts, and memory. Higher-order consciousness
requires primary consciousness, as well as semantic capability and, for its most de-
veloped form, linguistic capability. It allows the explicit construction of scenes in the
past and the future, and it comes with a sense of self (self-consciousness) and con-
sciousness of being conscious (reflective consciousness). This means that only animals
with higher-order consciousness can report their conscious experiences. The distinc-
tion between primary and higher-order consciousness is supported by the existence
of related terms, such as sensory awareness and meta-consciousness, and similar dis-
tinctions (e.g., Damasio, 1998; Dennett, 1987; Ehrlich, 2000; Johnson-Laird, 1988;
Macphail, 1998; O’Hear, 1997). What matters here is that, if primary consciousness
is a prerequisite for higher-order consciousness, it probably arose earlier in biological
evolution, and that, if both have evolutionary functions, we can expect these to differ.
By now it should not come as a surprise that consciousness is frequently considered
an umbrella term (e.g., Gillett, 1988; Van Gulick, 2009), which covers “a rag-bag of
sundry effects” (P. S. Churchland, 1988, p. 281) or refers to a “heterogeneous hodge-
podge” (Flanagan, 1991, p. 361). Does this indicate that consciousness is not one
thing but many? To begin with, it is important to remember that all phenomena
subsumed under the term consciousness have in common that they are experienced
consciously (Flanagan, 1991). Yet this shared property may reflect our particular
intuitions more than any real commonality in the phenomena of interest. This pos-
sibility is suggested by the late emergence of the term consciousness with its present
range of meanings in English, in the 17th century, and by the lack of a corresponding
term in ancient Greek and in Chinese (Wilkes, 1988). It is additionally supported
by the general tendency of folk theories to categorise phenomena by appearances,
combined with the common recategorisation of these phenomena once a better sci-
entific understanding of them has been achieved (P. S. Churchland, 1988). We should
certainly be aware of the possibility defended by Wilkes (1984, 1988) that not all
conscious phenomena are linked in a scientifically interesting way. However, I agree
with P. S. Churchland (1988) and Van Gulick (2009) that we simply do not know
whether consciousness will turn out to be a scientifically meaningful term.
Let us turn to what the heterogeneity of consciousness means for research on the
biological evolution and potential functions of consciousness. As already pointed out
for the three main distinctions above, each kind of conscious phenomenon is likely
to have its own evolutionary history and functional role, if any (Carruthers, 2000;
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Flanagan, 1995a; Polger & Flanagan, 2002; Van Gulick, 2009). Consequently, the
research goal of giving an evolutionary explanation of consciousness requires us to
focus on precisely those kinds of consciousness that are evolutionarily significant.
This is difficult because we do not know the relevant demarcations of consciousness
yet, but we can make educated guesses, specify what kind of consciousness we are
addressing (Van Gulick, 2009), and expect the demarcation to become clearer as we
learn more about the neural bases, functions, and evolution of consciousness (Cartmill,
2000; Frith & Rees, 2007; Polger & Flanagan, 2002). Because these research areas are
strongly interrelated, we should not defer investigating the evolution of consciousness
for lack of a definitive classification, but rather let progress in each research area
inform the others. Determining what kinds of consciousness figured in its evolution
is part of answering the research question about the evolution of consciousness.
Assumptions, limitations, and conventions. To clarify my approach in this thesis, I
outline below its basic assumptions about consciousness within a scientific framework.
Because these points seem sufficiently uncontroversial, at least among the majority
of scientists working on consciousness, I do not argue for them in detail. In addition,
I point out related topics that are not covered in the thesis and introduce some
conventions.
• Scientific realism. Science aims to construct true theories of observable and
unobservable phenomena. These phenomena exist in the real world, whether
or not researchers study them. Science is frequently successful in advancing
towards (approximately) true knowledge about the investigated phenomena.
• Consciousness realism. When we speak of consciousness, we are referring to
an existing phenomenon; consciousness is not merely a belief, a way of speaking,
a social construction, or a theoretical tool without a real-world referent. While
our knowledge about consciousness is limited and tentative, consciousness real-
ism is a working assumption. Modifications of the concept and its subcategories
are to be expected with scientific progress. For example, some seemingly import-
ant features of consciousness, such as the stream of consciousness (Blackmore,
2002; Dennett, 1991) and conscious will (Wegner, 2002), might be illusions
(which nevertheless could have played a significant role in evolution).
• Excluded aspects of consciousness. To limit the scope of the thesis, I
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put aside the social sense of consciousness, which concerns feelings and beliefs
shared by a group, as illustrated by public, national, class, and feminist con-
sciousness. This exclusion is consistent with a focus on psychological rather than
sociological explanations, yet it does not apply to social functions of individual
consciousness. In part, I also exclude altered states of consciousness. Although
dreaming, for example, could have evolved separately (e.g., Panksepp, 1998;
Revonsuo, 2000; Snyder, 1966) and may well give hints about normal waking
consciousness (Hobson, 2009; Revonsuo, 2006), concentrating on altered states
seems an unlikely first approach to the biological evolution and functions of
consciousness. In practice, I did not search for means of inquiry in this area (de-
scriptions of their application often fail to mention consciousness), but neither
did I ignore them when relevant.
• Methodological naturalism. Taking a scientific approach to consciousness,
including its biological evolution and potential functions, means investigating it
in accordance with scientific method (see Haig, 2005, for a recent comprehensive
account of scientific method), and thereby seeking natural, as opposed to spir-
itual or supernatural, explanations of consciousness. Naturalism also extends
to means of inquiry (Laudan, 1987; Nickles, 1987b), which are to be evaluated
scientifically in terms of their support.
• Bases of consciousness. Consciousness is generated by biological processes
in the brain, which depend on the organism’s genetic makeup in combination
with its environment, on all relevant time scales. Our conscious experience, for
example, typically reflects the relative significance of sight to the human species
(Crick & Koch, 1998; Revonsuo, 2006), and also that of interactions with the
environment, particularly of a social nature (Donald, 2001; Mead, 1934). Note
that the acceptance of this point is not a requirement for the consideration of
means of inquiry, or instances of their application, in the thesis; instead, this
point helps to explain the position from which I evaluate them.
• No consciousness epiphenomenalism. Asking about the biological evolu-
tion of consciousness would be far less interesting if we adopted epiphenomenal-
ism about consciousness, that is, if we excluded the possibility that consciousness
has physical effects (see section 1.3). Consciousness could have evolved under
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epiphenomenalism, but it could not have influenced its possessors’ fitness, which
I consider an empirical question.
• Other conscious minds. I shelve the philosophical problem of other minds as
it applies to consciousness: How we can know that others have conscious men-
tal states? Such scepticism is effectively ignored by natural scientists (Velmans,
2007), psychologists (Allen & Bekoff, 1997), physicians (Baars, 2005; Marcel,
1988), and, in almost all circumstances, human beings in general (Dennett, 1987;
Hyslop, 2010). Section 3.4 comments on the practical problem of determining
whether other animals are conscious. In this context it is worth noting that
creature consciousness, unlike animal consciousness, does not require the organ-
ism to have conscious mental states (Rosenthal, 1986, 2009). The corresponding
evolutionary question, namely, why certain organisms are sometimes awake and
responsive and at other times dormant or comatose (reviewed by Mignot, 2008;
Nicolau, Akaaˆrir, Gamund´ı, Gonza´lez, & Rial, 2000; Rechtschaffen, 1998; Siegel,
2005), is not dealt with in this thesis.
• Conventions. For better readability, I often speak of consciousness when I
mean consciousness or one or more of its concepts or aspects. Similarly, the
term the function/s of consciousness and similar terms should be understood
as placeholders for one or more of the potential functions of consciousness,
allowing for the possibility that consciousness has none. To describe someone or
something that is not conscious, whether temporarily or permanently, I prefer
the term unconscious to nonconscious. And, as already noted, I generally use
the authors’ own terms for consciousness. Moreover, I tend to write about
evolution in the past without wanting to imply that it has stopped.
In addition to this list of assumptions and exclusions, my approach can be char-
acterised by pointing to an unusual feature for a theoretical thesis on consciousness.
Instead of being concerned with philosophical considerations, it addresses a practical
question about scientific research, namely, which means of inquiry should we use if
we want to learn more about the evolution of consciousness? Indeed, my role in much
of this project is more like that of an engineer who evaluates potential solutions to
a design problem than that of a philosopher who argues for a particular position. I
believe that the present project is best served not by support for my preferred view
17
1 Approaching consciousness confidently from evolutionary biology
but by the basic framework outlined so far, which comprises a research goal and a
commitment to science and which aims to include, rather than exclude prematurely,
possibly promising means of inquiry in the evaluation.
To conclude this section, our evolutionary question about consciousness is complic-
ated by the fact that consciousness appears to consist of a number of heterogeneous
phenomena. It will be crucial to identify, and to find evolutionary explanations for,
those (one or more) aspects of consciousness that form evolutionarily relevant units by
separating at an appropriate level of description. With a shared understanding of con-
sciousness in place (for the purpose of this thesis), I now turn to essential background
material on evolutionary explanations of mind. Both of these first two sections have
the same objective: to establish a common denominator in disputed areas of research
and thus to prevent misunderstandings in the remainder of the thesis.
1.2 Evolution: A natural approach to mind
When Charles Darwin (1859) laid the foundation of evolutionary biology in his book
On the Origin of Species, he predicted that “psychology will be based on a new
foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity
by gradation” (p. 488). In the 150 years since then, there have been a very large
number of empirical discoveries in evolutionary biology, numerous controversies, and
significant theoretical developments such as the evolutionary or modern synthesis.
Looking back, Ernst Mayr (2001/2002) commented: “What is most impressive is the
robustness of the original Darwinian paradigm” (p. 265). While not everyone agrees
with him on the robustness, it is at least the current textbook view (e.g., Freeman &
Herron, 2007; Futuyma, 2005; Ridley, 2004). This section begins with a brief review of
mechanisms in evolution, then discusses adaptation explanations, and finally explains
the evolutionary psychology approach adopted in this thesis.
Evolutionary mechanisms and explanations. Biological evolution can be defined
as “change in the properties of groups of organisms [populations] over the course of
generations” (Futuyma, 2005, p. 2). As the main, but not the only, mechanism of such
descent with modification, Darwin and Wallace (1858) each proposed natural selec-
tion. Natural selection is a statistical process by which a population becomes better
adapted, or remains well adapted, to its current environment as follows. Individuals
in a population vary in their phenotypes, that is, in the sum totals of their morpholo-
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gical, physiological, behavioural, and other observable properties. Those phenotypes
that render their possessors better adapted to the environment are associated with a
higher probability of survival and reproductive success (i.e., fitness). Natural selection
works by eliminating—through nonconception or early death—some less well adapted
individuals in each generation (Broad, 1925; Mayr, 1996). This nonrandom elimina-
tion process has an effect on the distribution of properties in future generations only
if the advantageous properties are heritable to some degree, that is, if better adapted
parents and their offspring tend to resemble each other in the relevant properties.
In sum, natural selection results in adaptive evolution when phenotypic variation in
a population is tied to differences in fitness and passed on to offspring over many
generations.
Other processes besides natural selection are important in evolution, including those
that produce the phenotypic variation required for evolution by natural selection.
Phenotypic properties under cumulative selection are typically passed on from parent
to offspring via the parent’s genotype (i.e., its set of genes). Genotypic variation is
produced by the process of mutation, which introduces changes in an individual’s
genetic material, and by recombination of parental genes in the offspring’s genotype
in sexually reproducing species. Examples of other evolutionary mechanisms include
gene flow and genetic drift, that is, movement of genes between populations and
random fluctuations in the frequency of alleles (i.e., alternate forms of a gene) within
a population, respectively. Environmental factors, of course, also play a major role in
evolution—think of geographic differences, interspecies competition, climate change,
and natural catastrophes. Taken together, this selection of processes illustrates both
the complexity of evolution and the involvement of randomness at many points.
Many properties of organisms are fascinating because of their complexity and re-
markable adaptedness for living in the possessor’s environment, giving the appearance
of purposeful design. Well-known examples include wings for flying, eyes for seeing,
echolocation for “seeing” in the dark, camouflage for being less visible, and flowers
for attracting pollinators. Darwin (1859) explained such biological adaptations as
the result of evolution by natural selection. In fact, “natural selection is the only
mechanism known to cause the evolution of adaptations” (Futuyma, 2005, pp. 247–
248). Adaptations can accordingly be defined as properties of organisms that have
been favoured by nonelimination over many generations because they increased the
fitness of their possessors relative to that of nonpossessors. Identifying and explaining
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adaptations is still a main objective of evolutionary biology (e.g., Alcock, 2005; Free-
man & Herron, 2007; Griffiths, 1996; Mayr, 1983; Reeve & Sherman, 1993; Ridley,
2004; Zuk, 2002). The general fascination with adaptations and their special role in
evolutionary biology are likely to show in evolutionary hypotheses; and indeed, most
evolutionary hypotheses about consciousness do regard it as an adaptation.
While many adaptations are impressive in their adaptedness, “natural selection will
not produce absolute perfection” (Darwin, 1859, p. 202). This is because the evolution
of adaptations is constrained in many ways. For a start, natural selection makes a
generation of organisms better adapted, on average, to the environment in which their
parents lived and, hence, is not forward-looking. What is more, natural selection can
only work with the variation that exists in a population: A fitter heritable phenotype
may not appear for a long time and may then be eliminated by chance. Other genetic
constraints stem from, for instance, interactions between genes (i.e., epistasis) and,
more generally, the existence of groups of genes. Relatedly, developmental constraints
arise from the nature of the developmental system, that is, from the interdependence
of processes in an organism’s development. Biological structures are, of course, also
subject to general physical constraints (e.g., the maximum body size of insects is de-
termined by limits on gas diffusion rates in their respiratory system; Futuyma, 2005).
Additionally, trade-offs are often necessary, for example, in the face of competing ad-
aptive demands (e.g., attracting mates vs. avoiding predators) and pleiotropy (i.e., a
single gene affecting multiple phenotypic properties). Consciousness should therefore
not be assumed to be a perfect adaptive solution, though it could be optimal given
the constraints and trade-offs in force.
Because anyone interested in the evolution of consciousness will struggle to sidestep
adaptation hypotheses, it is instructive to ask what explanations of adaptations ideally
look like. A complete adaptation explanation includes the following components
(Brandon, 1990): (a) evidence that natural selection has occurred, for example, from
observations in natural populations, experiments, or fossil records; (b) an ecological
explanation of better adaptedness, that is, of why natural selection has occurred;
(c) evidence for heritability, ideally with reference to genotypes; (d) information about
the population structure, that is, about patterns of gene flow and of selective envir-
onments; (e) phylogenetic information on trait polarity, that is, on what has evolved
from what. However, because the required historical evidence is difficult to come by,
“even nearly complete adaptation explanations are going to be rare in evolutionary
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biology” (Brandon, 1990, p. 177). We have to make do with the most plausible in-
complete explanations that agree with general scientific knowledge and hope to move
them closer to the ideal by obtaining additional support. Thus, we will not know with
a high degree of certainty whether and how consciousness came to be an adaptation,
but we might show how evolutionary mechanisms could have produced consciousness.
To recapitulate, what are some of the possibilities to be taken into account when
constructing an initial evolutionary explanation of consciousness? First of all, mech-
anisms other than natural selection, such as genetic drift, gene flow, and environ-
mental factors, could be partially or fully responsible for the evolution of conscious-
ness, which makes it essential to consider such alternate explanations (see Polger &
Flanagan, 2002, p. 24, for an admittedly improbable story of its evolution by ge-
netic drift). Further, if consciousness has been tied to another trait, it could be a
by-product of that trait’s evolution. And although consciousness seems derived from
unconsciousness, other scenarios are possible (e.g., Sheets-Johnstone, 1998). If we sus-
pect consciousness to be an adaptation, we should examine its potential heritability
and adaptedness, among other things (see Brandon’s, 1990, components of adapta-
tion explanation above). Moreover, new adaptations can evolve in different ways: by
intensification of a trait’s initial function or by a trait’s, or a combination of traits’,
acquisition of a new ecological role.1 Giving an evolutionary explanation of conscious-
ness is an ambitious goal, with the above possibilities applying to each evolutionarily
relevant kind of consciousness in every independent lineage over an extended period
of time.
Evolutionary psychology—broadly construed. So far in this section I have simply
assumed that evolutionary theory applies to consciousness as it applies to other com-
ponents of organisms, in line with Darwin’s introductory quotation about evolutionary
explanations of mind. My main reason for doing so was that biological evolution, and
its applicability to all organisms, is nowadays considered a scientific fact (Freeman
& Herron, 2007; Futuyma, 2005; Mayr, 2001/2002; National Academy of Sciences
& Institute of Medicine, 2008). Many scientists also agree that “our psychological
capacities are evolved traits . . . subject to natural selection as much . . . as our gait,
1While the succession of these evolutionary changes is of great interest, additional related termin-
ology such as exaptation (Gould & Vrba, 1982) and spandrel (Gould & Lewontin, 1979) is confusing
(Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998; Dennett, 1995a; Reeve & Sherman, 1993)
and not necessary here, as long as we remember that being adaptive is not the same as being an
adaptation (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999).
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dentition, or posture” (R. C. Richardson, 2007, p. 9). Although some mental abilities
and behaviours have not been around long enough to have been shaped by biological
evolution, evolutionary theory does apply to minds: Not only are minds based on
evolved brains, minds are crucial for generating behaviours, which make up an im-
portant part of phenotypes. I discuss the role of culture in section 1.4 and potential
differences between evolutionary explanations of consciousness and other mental traits
in section 2.1. Still, only evolution can afford a scientific explanation of the historical
emergence and development of consciousness.
Different approaches have been adopted to study human behaviour and the human
mind from an evolutionary perspective. The three major approaches currently in use
are human behavioural ecology, evolutionary psychology (narrowly construed), and
gene–culture coevolution (Gangestad & Simpson, 2007b; Smith, 2000). To study the
evolution of consciousness, human behavioural ecologists would require knowledge
about consciousness-specific behaviours that vary as a function of the environment,
whereas gene–culture coevolutionists would need to know which components of con-
sciousness are transmitted genetically and which culturally. Evolutionary psycholo-
gists seem better positioned, not just because their approach is the dominant one
(Laland & Brown, 2002), but because they seek to explain psychological mechan-
isms. Such a cognitive level of explanation fits well with our construct of interest,
consciousness. While the different approaches should ideally make complementary
contributions, evolutionary psychology appears, at least at first, particularly suited
for investigating the evolution of consciousness.
The term evolutionary psychology has come to designate a specific scientific para-
digm within the field of inquiry with the same name (Buller, 2005; hence the qualific-
ation narrowly construed in the previous paragraph). Although often overlooked, this
paradigm–field distinction has been acknowledged by the introduction of new labels
for the paradigm such as “inclusive fitness evolutionary psychology” (Caporael, 2001,
p. 608), “ ‘Santa Barbara school’ ” (Laland & Brown, 2002, p. 154), “ ‘Evolutionary
Psychology’ (capitalized)” (Buller, 2005, p. 12), and “standard evolutionary psycho-
logy model” (Moore, 2006, p. 285). Evolutionary psychologists working within the
paradigm construct hypotheses about psychological mechanisms in humans as adapt-
ations to human ancestral environments. Key assumptions of the paradigm are thus
that the human mind consists of many functionally specialised information-processing
devices, and that these mental programs have been designed by natural selection to
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solve adaptive problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors (see Buss, 1995; Tooby
& Cosmides, 1992, 2005). The paradigm has been, on the one hand, advertised as the
integrative framework for psychology (e.g., Buss, 1995, 2005; Goetz & Shackelford,
2006; Pinker, 2005; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, 2005) and, on the other hand, heavily
criticised (e.g., Buller, 2005; Panksepp & Panksepp, 2000; R. C. Richardson, 2007;
Rose & Rose, 2000). The arguments need not be rehearsed here as the above remarks
on the paradigm mainly serve to clarify the evolutionary psychology approach from
which I distance myself.
Yet this thesis, an evaluation of the promise of means of inquiry for giving an
evolutionary explanation of consciousness, is clearly placed within evolutionary psy-
chology—broadly construed. By analogy to the definition of psychology as the study
of mind and behaviour, evolutionary psychology, the field of inquiry, can be defined as
“the evolutionary study of mind and behavior” (Caporael, 2001, p. 608), that is, “the
study of how mind and behavior have evolved” (Heyes, 2000, p. 3). Means of inquiry
in this thesis and the resulting evolutionary explanations are thus not bound by the
controversial assumptions of the evolutionary psychology paradigm. The paradigm’s
focus on human ancestry, for instance, would be limiting for the following reason:
How did human consciousness evolve? This is a question that psycholo-
gists love to ask. The answer is actually quite simple: from animal con-
sciousness! . . . it is quite certain that human consciousness did not arise
full-fledged with the human species, but is only the most highly evolved
end point of a long evolutionary history. (Mayr, 2001/2002, p. 282)
We therefore need a more complete “evolutionary psychology ‘in the round’ ” (Heyes,
2000, p. 3) for investigating the evolution of consciousness in humans and other or-
ganisms.
The present section heading called evolution, or rather evolutionary studies, a nat-
ural approach to mind. Evolution is, of course, an important part of the natural world,
and so is the mind, at least as studied scientifically. Asking where such a natural phe-
nomenon came from and how it was shaped by natural processes over time seems
a natural question—in several senses of the word. For example, the evolutionary
question seems more natural than, say, questions relating mind to computer meta-
phors, artificial intelligence, or current Western culture. Answers to other natural
questions, such as how the brain generates the mind, will strengthen the evolution-
23
1 Approaching consciousness confidently from evolutionary biology
ary account of mind by adding knowledge at a different level of explanation. Here I
have provided a brief evolutionary background in order to give a taste of what might
be involved in an evolutionary explanation of consciousness, the research goal in the
evaluation of means of inquiry. It is neither necessary to restrict these means to a
single evolutionary approach, nor is it wise to do so. In the remainder of the chapter,
I discuss objections to evolutionary explanations of consciousness that consider such
explanations insignificant or even impossible, not just difficult.
1.3 Epiphenomenalist worries addressed
What if it could be shown that consciousness has no influence whatsoever on any part
of the physical world? If consciousness had no such effects, then we would know, for
instance, that consciousness does not affect the fitness of its possessors. We could
still ask how it evolved, but not find out. Consequently, if epiphenomenalism about
consciousness were true, there would be no point in evaluating means of inquiry into
the biological evolution of consciousness. Somewhat reminiscent of the significance
attributed to unconscious mental processes in the study of consciousness (e.g., Baars,
2003b; Frith & Rees, 2007; Gu¨zeldere, 1995a), Humphrey (1987a) suggested that “the
realization that consciousness might be useless was . . . something of a breakthrough”
(p. 378). However, he continued, “it is a naughty idea which has, I think, had a good
run, and now should be dismissed” (p. 378). Let us see whether this thesis-endangering
possibility—that consciousness makes no difference at all—can be dismissed.
The easiest way to make consciousness epiphenomenal is by defining it so. The
object of this manoeuvre is typically phenomenal consciousness in one form or another.
For example, Chalmers (1997) argued that the strong empirical correlation between
phenomenal and access consciousness means that any function can be ascribed to the
latter. A similar move has been performed in an evolutionary context:
So does consciousness in this third sense of sentience . . . have an adaptive
function? . . . I think the answer has to be no, simply because it’s defined
in such a way that it has no causal consequences . . . Anything that does
have causal consequences we peel off or distill out and assimilate to the
. . . information access problem of consciousness. (Pinker, 2004)
Defining consciousness as incapable of influencing anything (sometimes with the ex-
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ception of other epiphenomenal mental events) is effectively defining it as not scien-
tifically investigable and, hence, violates methodological naturalism. Allowing con-
sciousness to have physical effects but defining it as functionless still pre-empts the
empirical investigation of its function/s. Evolutionary studies of consciousness best
avoid epiphenomenal definitions of consciousness altogether.
As an aside, consciousness epiphenomenalism is fostered by a highly influential in-
tuition, termed the segregationist intuition (Gu¨zeldere, 1997; essentialist intuition in
Gu¨zeldere, 1995a, 1995b). According to this intuition, the following two pretheoretic
characterisations of consciousness are mutually exclusive: “ ‘Consciousness is as con-
sciousness does’ versus ‘Consciousness is as consciousness seems’ ” (Gu¨zeldere, 1997,
p. 11). This apparent dichotomy between the causal and the phenomenal character-
isation of consciousness is closely related to the third- versus first-person perspective,
and underlies such distinctions as access versus phenomenal consciousness and easy
versus hard problems of consciousness, as well as several other debates (see Gu¨zeldere,
1997). In keeping with the segregationist intuition, epiphenomenalists consider con-
sciousness as fundamentally phenomenal and therefore essentially noncausal. This
intuition needs to be replaced by a more integrative view, as Gu¨zeldere (1997) ar-
gued, in order to resolve many of the debates on consciousness.
Varieties of epiphenomenalism. Among the varieties of consciousness epiphenom-
enalism to be differentiated, strict metaphysical epiphenomenalism (Polger & Flana-
gan, 2002) is the standard philosophical sense of the term already introduced: While
mental events are caused by physical events, “no mental event plays any part in the
causation of any bodily event” (Broad, 1925, p. 118). This variety of epiphenomen-
alism originated when mental properties were generally believed to be nonphysical,
a kind of mind–body dualism. Its rationale is that, given dualism, mental events
cannot have any physical effects because every physical event has a sufficient phys-
ical cause and is not overdetermined (Polger & Flanagan, 2002; Robb & Heil, 2009;
Robinson, 2009; cf. “the Master Argument for Consciousness Epiphenomenalism,”
Graham, 1998, p. 229). An overview of some of the theoretical and empirical support
for and against epiphenomenalism is given in the next subsection. Note that in speak-
ing of mental events I have presented the most general version of strict metaphysical
epiphenomenalism; such epiphenomenalism about consciousness, or one or more of its
concepts or aspects, is of more concern here.
A second variety of epiphenomenalism about consciousness, called causal role epi-
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phenomenalism (Polger & Flanagan, 2002), allows consciousness to have physical
effects, but no causal role function in conscious organisms. Something has a causal
role function if it is capable of producing effects that help explain a capacity of its
containing system (see Cummins, 1975, p. 762, for a formal statement). As regards
consciousness, a particular capacity of conscious organisms or of one of their com-
ponents (e.g., fitness; Buller, 1998) might be explained, in part, by the capacity of
consciousness to produce certain effects (or, if seen as an activity or behaviour, by
the organism’s capacity to engage in consciousness). Causal role epiphenomenalists
deny that consciousness has any such important effects, thereby using the term epi-
phenomenon more or less in its original medical sense of secondary symptom. To
illustrate, the most famous analogy of epiphenomenal consciousness (actually given
for strict metaphysical epiphenomenalism; N. Campbell, 2001; Polger & Flanagan,
2002) compares consciousness to “the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of
a locomotive engine [and which] is without influence upon its machinery” (Huxley,
1874/1882, p. 236). Causal role epiphenomenalists about consciousness thus claim
that none of the effects that consciousness has contribute causally to any of the ca-
pacities of conscious organisms.
The least restrictive variety of epiphenomenalism is called etiological epiphenomen-
alism (Polger & Flanagan, 2002; termed biological epiphenomenalism by Revonsuo,
2006). Etiological epiphenomenalists about consciousness maintain only that con-
sciousness has no etiological function, that is, that consciousness is not a biological
adaptation (historically defined, as in the previous section; Amundson & Lauder,
1994). The etiological function of a trait can be thought of as a causal role func-
tion for which the trait has been naturally selected over evolutionary time (cf. Buller,
1998; Griffiths, 1993). Despite differences in generality between etiological and causal
role functions, their distinction brings to mind Mayr’s (1961) distinction between
evolutionary and functional biology and Tinbergen’s (1963) distinction of biological
questions about evolution, survival value, causation, and ontogeny. While proximate
explanations will be needed for a complete explanation of why we are conscious, the
overall research goal here is ultimate explanations of consciousness. Etiological epi-
phenomenalism about consciousness is directly relevant to this goal and opposite to
the research strategy evaluated in Chapter 3, which aims to show that consciousness
is an adaptation.
Pros and cons, theoretically oriented. To start looking at arguments for and
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against epiphenomenalism, let an intriguing creature enter the scene: the philo-
sophical zombie. Philosophical zombies are imaginary creatures that are behaviour-
ally identical to human beings—many of them are also functionally or even physic-
ally identical to us (Gu¨zeldere, 1995c; Polger, 2000b)—but they lack consciousness,
nowadays commonly phenomenal consciousness. The contentious issue about philo-
sophical zombies is whether they are not only logically but metaphysically or even
naturally possible (Flanagan & Polger, 1995; see Polger, 2000a, for a systematic over-
view of identity vs. possibility combinations). Some researchers have answered this
question based on their preferred philosophical theory of consciousness in order to
explore the theory’s consequences (Polger, 2000a). More often, the conceivability or
inconceivability of zombies is used as an independent argument for or against such a
theory (see Kirk, 2009, for a collection of arguments about their conceivability and
inferred possibility). To give an early example, Stout (1931) argued against epiphen-
omenalism that “there can be no doubt that this [physically identical zombie world]
is primaˆ facie incredible to Common Sense [the convergence of lay and expert views]”
(p. 139). If such a physical zombie world were naturally possible, our consciousness
would not make any (physical) difference. But this possibility conflicts with my as-
sumption, shared by epiphenomenalists, that consciousness is generated by neural
processes in accordance with causal laws (see section 1.1), whether in our or in phys-
ically identical zombie brains. We can thus at least put aside the threat of strict
metaphysical epiphenomenalism from physically identical zombies.
As the following theoretical arguments for epiphenomenalism indicate, it is typically
only defended when all alternatives appear even less attractive (Pauen, Staudacher,
& Walter, 2006). The first argument has already been sketched as the rationale for
strict metaphysical epiphenomenalism: The causal irrelevance of the mental in the
physical world results from considering the mental—whether its substance or some
of its properties—as radically different from the physical, while accepting that all
physical events can be explained by physical causes alone. Several other difficulties
for explaining how mental events could play a causal role in behaviour also lend sup-
port to epiphenomenalism, including externalism (i.e., the theory that mental content
depends on conditions external to the individual) and a denial of appropriate mental–
physical laws (see Robinson, 2009, and Walter, 2007, for summaries). Furthermore,
epiphenomenalists can argue that it is more plausible that the complex neural events
that cause sensations also cause the complex neural events required for behaviour
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than that the latter events are caused by simple sensations (Robinson, 2009). Al-
though it seems to us that our mental life matters for what we do, arguments for
epiphenomenalism suggest that it is far from clear that this is the case.
To say that “epiphenomenalism has had few friends” (Walter, 2007, section 5,
para. 1) is an understatement, but have opponents been able to disarm it? (See
Robinson, 2009, and Walter, 2007, for summaries of the following arguments and
replies.) What may be the most persuasive argument, namely that epiphenomenalism
is counterintuitive if not absurd, does not detract from its potential truth. Nor does
naively insisting on introspective evidence work, because introspection does not allow
us to distinguish whether the mental event itself or its physical cause led to the
internally or externally observed effect. Further, epiphenomenalists can infer the
existence of other minds from similar behaviour, not via assumed similar mental
causes of behaviour, but via assumed similar physical causes of behaviour and mental
events. They can similarly argue that natural selection could not have favoured the
mind but its neural causes and that the mind would then have evolved as a by-
product of these neural causes of fitness-enhancing behaviour. The most powerful
argument against epiphenomenalism questions how epiphenomenalists can know of
mental events if these events have no physical effects and, hence, cannot cause such
knowledge. Epiphenomenalists might reply, for example, that knowledge about mental
events is caused by their physical causes or that we are directly acquainted with our
experiences. As this selection of arguments against epiphenomenalism shows, the
theory is fairly resistant to theoretical attacks.
Pros and cons, empirically oriented. Empirical evidence bearing on epiphenom-
enalism about consciousness normally concerns whether consciousness has any causal
role function, not whether it is a biological adaptation or has any physical effects at
all. Many researchers have deemed a study of voluntary action by Libet, Gleason,
Wright, and Pearl (1983) “An Experiment in Epiphenomenalism” (Flanagan, 1992,
p. 136). In this classic study, participants reported becoming aware of their intention
to spontaneously perform a given motor act on average 343 ms after motor areas in
their brains had already started preparing the movement. The perceived epiphen-
omenalist threat derives from, in the words of the study’s title, “The Unconscious
Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act.”2 However, the finding that consciousness of
2The study has been widely criticised (e.g., commentaries following Libet, 1985), but also replicated
(Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; Sirigu et al., 2004; Trevena & Miller, 2002); and
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the intention to initiate an action followed neural preparations should not surprise us
if we assume that consciousness emerges from brain processes. More importantly, it
does not mean that consciousness makes no difference to behaviour overall.
A more comprehensive defence of consciousness epiphenomenalism was presented
by Velmans (1991). Based on a review of the experimental literature on various
cognitive domains, he concluded that consciousness is epiphenomenal (from a third-
person perspective) because it performs none of the many functions claimed for it.
One reason for this is that cognitive processes such as perception and learning can
occur unconsciously; another that we frequently become aware only of the results
of mental processing. To explain why consciousness accompanies some mental pro-
cesses some of the time and even appears necessary for them, Velmans suggested
that “consciousness nearly always results from focal-attentive processing” (p. 651),
which is what influences subsequent processing. Note, in passing, that this reflects
the segregationist intuition: Causal and noncausal aspects are being kept separate
by having focal-attentive processing do all the work. Given the numerous points of
criticism raised (e.g., in the commentaries following Velmans, 1991), to which I cannot
do justice here, Velmans’s conclusion should be regarded as a controversial hypothesis
for further research.
Other empirical evidence that has been enlisted as support for or against epiphen-
omenalism comes from the structure and neural bases of consciousness and from
neurological deficits. According to Flanagan (1992), “the biggest problem the epi-
phenomenalist faces is explaining how . . . any feature as common, well-structured,
and multimodal as phenomenal consciousness could . . . [not have] interesting and
important causal effects in other parts of the neural network” (p. 150). Because the
neural bases of consciousness are distributed widely in a highly connected brain, they
are likely to affect subsequent processing and to endow consciousness with causal role
function/s (Baars, 2003a; Flanagan, 1992). Moreover, neurological deficits in which
some of these neural bases are disrupted tend to be associated with more or less
severe changes in psychological functioning and behaviour. Patients with blindsight,
a well-known example, report seeing nothing in areas of blindness caused by dam-
age to their primary visual cortices, yet they are able to respond to certain visual
stimuli presented to their blind fields. This ability has been taken to support the
the conscious experience of volition has become an active research area in neuroscience (see Haggard,
2005, 2008, and Hallett, 2007, for reviews).
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insignificance (P. S. Churchland, 1983) and causal irrelevance (Velmans, 1991) of con-
sciousness. However, blindsight patients do not normally initiate voluntary actions
based on visual information from their blind fields, indicating a potential function
of consciousness (e.g., Flanagan, 1992; Marcel, 1986, 1988; Van Gulick, 1989; but
see Block, 1995; de Gelder et al., 2008; Stoerig, 2010). Other means of inquiry for
identifying the (evolutionary or nonevolutionary) function/s of consciousness, evalu-
ated in Chapters 4 and 5, may help to make further empirical inroads into the area
of epiphenomenalist contention.
In conclusion, epiphenomenalism about consciousness cannot be easily dismissed
(Flanagan, 1992; Pauen et al., 2006; A. K. Seth, 2009; Van Gulick, 2009). Intuitions
and metaphysical commitments often determine the position taken on any of the vari-
eties of epiphenomenalism. While metaphysical epiphenomenalism about conscious-
ness is (probably) not empirically testable (Pockett, 2004), scientists could settle for
an explanation of the evolution of the neural causes of consciousness and their effects.
Note that I assumed no consciousness epiphenomenalism in section 1.1 merely to
avoid a premature exclusion of the possibility that consciousness has physical effects.
Causal role and etiological epiphenomenalism about consciousness should be treated
as empirical questions (Flanagan, 1992); examples of relevant studies have been given
above, and “there is plenty of other evidence relevant to EP [epiphenomenalism]”
(A. K. Seth, 2009, p. 282). In so far as these two varieties of epiphenomenalism
matter to the evaluation of means of inquiry, they are taken up again in Chapter 3
on the adaptation status of consciousness and Chapters 4 and 5 on its evolutionary
function/s and history. In addition, we reencounter zombies when we consider three
other potential obstacles to evolutionary explanations of consciousness in the next
subsection. Ultimately, and in agreement with Flanagan (1992), epiphenomenalism is
a healthy reminder that we cannot take for granted that consciousness is functional
and important.
1.4 Other doubts about the approach dismissed
There are, of course, further reasons for disagreeing with the suggestion that “the phe-
nomena of consciousness may best be approached through examining its evolutionary
significance” (Bechtel & Richardson, 1983, p. 389). First of all, there are other im-
portant approaches to consciousness, and there is no need to claim primacy of the
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evolutionary approach when the different approaches can, in fact, usefully complement
each other. The evolutionary approach is certainly not the most straightforward ap-
proach to consciousness and has frequently misled theorising about its nature (Polger,
2007). Before examining difficulties of its application in the next chapter, it is worth
dealing with the following objections: First, consciousness is not necessary for any
of our mental abilities or behaviours because they can in principle be carried out
unconsciously. Second, biological evolution is irrelevant to explanations of conscious-
ness because consciousness is too recent a product of culture. Third, it is impossible
for humans to understand consciousness due to our cognitive limitations. Addressing
these objections in turn, I argue that none of them foredoom the current project to
failure.
Conscious inessentialism. Conscious inessentialism is the view that any mental
activity can in principle be performed unconsciously, even if it is accompanied by
consciousness in us (Flanagan, 1991, 1992). This view of consciousness as inessential
to intelligent mentality became plausible with the emergence and development of cog-
nitivism and artificial intelligence. It is expressed in statements such as Fodor’s (2004)
that, “as far as anybody knows, anything that our conscious minds do they could do
just as well if they weren’t conscious” (p. 31). And here we already reencounter
philosophical zombies: If everything we do could in principle be done without con-
sciousness, behavioural zombies are logically and metaphysically possible (Flanagan,
1991; Flanagan & Polger, 1995). Thus, in the most commonly used words, conscious
inessentialists hold that consciousness is simply not necessary for any of our mental
abilities or behaviours.
Conscious inessentialism has worried many consciousness researchers because it
seems to imply epiphenomenalism. For example, Dennett (1987) described the worry
created by cognitive psychologists’ theorising about unconscious mental processes
by asking, “What is consciousness for, if perfectly unconscious, indeed subject-less,
information processing is in principle capable of achieving all the ends for which con-
scious minds were supposed to exist?” (p. 162). Similar reasoning has been employed
in an evolutionary context (e.g., Blackmore, 2001; Hameroff, 1999; O’Hear, 1997). In
fact, both zombie arguments and some of the empirical arguments for epiphenomen-
alism in the previous section (e.g., Velmans’s, 1991, inferences from implicit learning
and blindsight) reason from the assertion that consciousness is not required for par-
ticular abilities to the conclusion that consciousness is not causally involved in them.
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However, epiphenomenalism does not follow from inessentialism: Even if there are
unconscious ways of producing our behaviours, consciousness—when present—could
still affect their generation in us (Dretske, 1997; Polger, 2007; Searle, 1998; A. K. Seth,
2009). (The empirical arguments, which are not deductive, tend to suffer more from
differences between the compared conscious and unconscious behaviours.) In gen-
eral, then, conscious inessentialism gives much less reason than commonly assumed
to question potential causal role function/s of consciousness in us.
When claiming that consciousness is necessary (or not necessary) for a particular
ability, researchers may have different kinds of necessity in mind. On the one hand,
there is “the deep metaphysical sense involving possible beings in possible worlds”
(Flanagan, 1991, p. 344). An ability for which consciousness is held to be strictly
necessary cannot be shown by anyone or anything in any way that is not conscious.
This kind of necessity is reflected in Humphrey’s (1987a) challenge: “If that ability
[of using self-knowledge to interpret others] could exist without consciousness, let
someone prove it to me” (p. 381). On the other hand, consciousness might only be
necessary for us—as we have come to be in the actual world—to exercise a particular
ability well under certain conditions. It is such contingent necessity in organisms that
may call for an evolutionary explanation, precisely because organisms’ contingent
properties did not have to arise (Polger, 2007; Polger & Flanagan, 2002; Williams,
1966). When considering suggested function/s of consciousness, we need to be clear
whether consciousness is claimed to be strictly, contingently, or not necessary for a
particular ability.
The claimed necessity requires a proximate explanation, and it affects what evolu-
tionary explanations of consciousness need to account for. If consciousness is strictly
necessary for an evolutionarily significant ability, contrary to conscious inessentialism,
then the evolutionary history of consciousness is (most likely) the same as the ability’s
(Polger, 2002), at least since the time consciousness became necessary for that ability.
So to explain the evolution of consciousness, we would want an evolutionary explan-
ation of the ability for which it is strictly necessary (cf. Blackmore, 2001). Yet strict
necessity is an unlikely claim for biological traits (Polger, 2007; A. K. Seth, 2009),
unless one adopts the functionalist view that whatever does what consciousness does
is consciousness. If consciousness is instead only contingently necessary for an ability
in us, consistent with conscious inessentialism, then we need to explain not only how
the ability evolved but also why consciousness, rather than some other process, came
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to contribute to the ability in our ancestors (Polger, 2002). How current proposals for
the evolution of consciousness fare in providing appropriate evolutionary explanations
is a subject of the next chapter.
In brief, conscious inessentialism does not imply epiphenomenalism, but it does
underscore the fact that “consciousness did not have to evolve” (Flanagan, 1991,
p. 344). This is why, for example, an explanation of what consciousness is good for
should be supplemented by an explanation of why consciousness became associated
with this benefit. Flanagan and Polger (1995) described the worth of inessentialism
for consciousness research as follows:
Recognition that consciousness did not have to be highlights the pressing
questions of why it exists, why it evolved, whether there were competing
zombie hominids who lost out in the struggle to survive, and if there were
not why not? (p. 321)
I suspect that, although consciousness may not be strictly necessary for an ability, it
was the only or best way to achieve that ability when it first arose in our ancestors.
In any case, both epiphenomenalism and inessentialism serve to draw our attention
to problematic assumptions about the function/s and evolution of consciousness.
Culture versus biology. Before looking at two theories of consciousness according
to which it is a cultural product that has not been shaped by biological evolution,
the relationships between culture, biology, and evolution deserve some comments.
Biology and culture have at times been taken to furnish separate or even conflicting
explanations of human mind and behaviour, as in the nature–nurture debate about
determinants of human development. However, biological and cultural explanations
are often complementary, not mutually exclusive. For example, when researchers
describe consciousness either as a product of biology or as one of culture, they are likely
to be pursuing different research questions about different aspects of consciousness.
Besides, culture itself is a biological phenomenon (Alcock, 2005; Buller, 2005; Sterelny
& Griffiths, 1999; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), in the following sense: Human cultures
are created by biological creatures whose cultural behaviours “differ only in degree
of complexity, not in kind” (Buller, 2005, p. 422), from behaviours of other animals
(Byrne et al., 2004; Laland & Hoppitt, 2003; Whiten, Horner, & Marshall-Pescini,
2003). Biological (again in a somewhat narrower sense) and cultural explanations are,
on the whole, more compatible than often portrayed.
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Turning now to evolution, cultural transmission and biological evolution are dis-
tinct, but they do influence each other. How far the analogy between biological and
cultural evolution goes—a contentious issue (Henrich, Boyd, & Richerson, 2008; Hen-
rich & McElreath, 2003; Mesoudi, 2007; Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland, 2006)—is not
central to the interdependence of biological and cultural processes, which is of interest
here. To begin with, our brains have evolved to be highly structured as well as highly
plastic (Gopnik, 2010). The specifics of our so-evolved minds enable culture and its
transmission on the one hand, and guide and constrain them on the other (Laland,
Odling-Smee, & Feldman, 2000; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Cultural activities in turn
affect biological evolution by changing the diversity of phenotypes on which natural
selection acts and by modifying selective environments (Laland, Kendal, & Brown,
2007; Laland et al., 2000). The idea that “humans have coevolved with their culture”
(Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999, p. 19) is also behind the gene–culture coevolutionary ap-
proach to human behaviour. Biological and cultural evolution can interact, with the
details of the coevolution depending on the phenomenon under investigation.
Consciousness was invented by humans as recently as about 1000 b.c., according to
Jaynes’s (1976/2000, 1986) theory of the origin of consciousness. Jaynes (1976/2000)
inferred from archæological artefacts and literary texts such as the Iliad, which gener-
ally lacks terms for consciousness and mental acts, that conscious minds were preceded
by a very different mentality based on hallucinatory voices giving directions. Jaynes
called these earlier minds bicameral to indicate their division into an executive and a
follower part. After bicamerality had broken down for various reasons, consciousness
emerged as a new method for deciding what to do. In Jaynes’s theory, consciousness
is “a metaphor-generated model of the world” (p. 66) that is “learned on the basis
of language and taught to others” (p. 220). As its origin he suggested the positing
of internal causes of behaviour in strangers to explain the bewildering difference of
their behaviours. Jaynes emphasised that “consciousness is chiefly a cultural intro-
duction” (p. 220), but allowed for “a modicum of natural selection” (p. 221) during
the upheavals in the later centuries of the second millennium b.c., when less con-
scious individuals were more habitual or impulsive and incapable of long-term deceit.
Nonetheless, consciousness is pictured mainly as a cultural product.
Our mentality is undoubtedly influenced strongly by social learning and language,
yet other aspects of Jaynes’s (1976/2000) theory are less secure. Here I concentrate
on the two most pertinent points. First, being conscious in Jaynes’s sense means hav-
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ing the concept of consciousness, as Dennett (1986) explained and Jaynes confirmed.
We could thus accept Jaynes’s evolutionary hypothesis for this conceptual kind of
consciousness while disagreeing that it exhausts all of consciousness. Relatedly, con-
sciousness has been described as a model of the world by others too (e.g., Merker, 2005;
Metzinger, 2003; Revonsuo, 2006), but is it really generated through language alone?
Second, Jaynes’s theory seems to rest largely upon reasoning from inessentialism to
epiphenomenalism, though neither of them in full-blown form. Jaynes concluded from
a review like Velmans’s (1991) that consciousness is not necessary for many of our
activities and urged the possibility of “human beings who did most of the things we
do—speak, understand, perceive, solve problems—but who were without conscious-
ness” (i.e., our near-zombie ancestors with bicameral minds; Jaynes, 1986, p. 131).
Because this thesis is about the biological evolution of consciousness, only Jaynes’s
(1976/2000) means for constructing the natural-selection hypothesis are relevant, not
those for studying the cultural evolution of consciousness. Studying cultural changes
in consciousness over the past few millennia, albeit not the focus here, is another
interesting project.
Similar hypotheses about the recency and culture-dependence of consciousness have
been advanced by Dennett (1991): “Human consciousness (1) is too recent an innov-
ation to be hard-wired into the innate machinery, [and] (2) is largely a product of
cultural evolution that gets imparted to brains in early training” (p. 219). The first
point is shaky in light of evidence that natural selection can cause significant genetic
change in a short time (e.g., S. P. Carroll, Hendry, Reznick, & Fox, 2007; Kingsolver
& Pfennig, 2007). The second point may be granted for some aspects of conscious-
ness, including the aforementioned conceptual consciousness, but not for other fea-
tures and kinds of consciousness such as phenomenal and access consciousness (Block,
1993, 1995; Flanagan, 1992). Dennett’s proposal, including a third point, has been la-
belled “very contentious” (Flanagan, 1992, p. 84). The disagreement appears to stem,
in part, from differences in emphasis of primary versus language-dependent aspects
of consciousness. In the spirit of the latter—but without completely neglecting the
former—Dennett stated that “the sort of consciousness such [languageless] animals
enjoy is dramatically truncated, compared to ours” (p. 447), which has been shaped
by both cultural and biological evolution. Human consciousness is a cultural product
to some degree; yet this is not in conflict with the research goal against which means
of inquiry are evaluated here, namely, discovering the biological origin and history of
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consciousness.
Cognitive closure. The final threat to the present project addressed in this chapter
is the new-mysterian view that “consciousness, despite being a natural phenomenon,
will never be understood” (Flanagan, 1992, p. 9). Instead of blaming the nature of
consciousness for the topic’s perceived difficulty, new mysterians claim that our cognit-
ive limitations are at fault. In McGinn’s (1991) words, it is “our own incurable cognit-
ive poverty” (p. 43) that precludes us in principle from explaining how consciousness
arises from the brain, forever leaving us with “a vertiginous sense of ultimate mys-
tery” (p. 7). In the concluding paragraph of his How the Mind Works, Pinker (1997)
commented that “if these conjectures are correct, our psyche would present us with
the ultimate tease. The most undeniable thing there is, our own awareness, would
be forever beyond our conceptual grasp” (p. 565). In short, new mysterians say that
human minds are cognitively closed with respect to the link between consciousness
and the brain—we cannot hope to ever achieve “closure” on consciousness.
After a chapter-long critique of McGinn’s (1989, 1991) main arguments for new
mysterianism, Flanagan (1992) concluded that, although the view is coherent, the
arguments for it are unconvincing. To give an example not discussed by Flanagan,
new mysterianism is motivated by the persistent failure to solve the mind–body prob-
lem (McGinn, 1989; Pinker, 1997); yet ignorance itself is not particularly informative
(P. S. Churchland, 1996), and scientific progress has made many formerly mysterious
phenomena much better understood (P. S. Churchland, 1988; Polger & Flanagan,
1999; Searle, 1993, 1998). Possibly the strongest objection to new mysterianism is
that we should not set higher standards on (scientific) explanations of consciousness
than on other explanations by requiring the former to “provide a fully satisfying [em-
phasis added] account of consciousness” (McGinn, 1991, p. 28), “a solution that feels
satisfactory above and beyond . . . [being] true” (Pinker, 2004; see Flanagan, 1992;
Polger & Flanagan, 1999; Vaneechoutte, 2000; Wright, 2007). The apparent irrecon-
cilability of first- and third-person perspectives drives McGinn’s (1989) argument for
new mysterianism (Flanagan, 1992), which is yet another sign of the segregationist
intuition (Gu¨zeldere, 1995b). Until there is much stronger support for cognitive clos-
ure, I think it is best to treat it as an empirical hypothesis, as in fact Pinker (1997,
2004) does. I therefore endorse Flanagan’s recommendation to get on with research
rather than to rely on new mysterianism being accurate.
Let us consider what cognitive closure, if found to be true, would mean for evolu-
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tionary explanations of consciousness. To start with, the computational and neural
aspects of consciousness and their evolution are “perfectly tractable” (Pinker, 1997,
p. 563) under new mysterianism. As McGinn (1989) acknowledged, “the brain has
physical properties we can grasp, and variations in these correlate with changes in
consciousness” (p. 364). However, he maintained that we will never be able to answer
the question “How did evolution convert the water of biological tissue into the wine
of consciousness?” (McGinn, 1999, p. 13). That is, any account of the evolution of
consciousness will be an account of the evolution of its neural bases, without a full ex-
planation of how these bases create consciousness. Carruthers’s (2000) conclusion that
such accounts will not be “accounts of the evolution of [phenomenal] p-consciousness
as such” (p. 256) is too harsh because evolutionary explanations address ultimate,
not proximate, questions. New mysterianism denies (us) the possibility of a complete
explanation of consciousness, but not that of its evolutionary explanation.
None of the three objections in this section deal a fatal blow to evolutionary ex-
planations of consciousness; rather, they contribute to the present project by pointing
to areas in need of research attention. First, conscious inessentialism, which does not
entail epiphenomenalism, made us realise that care is required when consciousness is
said to be necessary for an ability: Strict necessity makes evolutionary explanations
redundant, whereas contingent necessity calls for the consideration of alternatives.
Second, cultural influences on the evolution of human consciousness, though interest-
ing, are outside the scope of the present project, as opposed to the biological origins
of these cultural aspects of consciousness. Third, cognitive closure as advanced by
new mysterians is an empirical possibility, which does not directly affect evolutionary
explanations of consciousness. We have also seen that we should not ask too much of
explanations, such as proximate explanations of evolutionary accounts or satisfaction.
In this section we have cleared some of the ground for evolutionary explanations of
consciousness by removing alleged obstacles and clarifying the present project.
Conclusion
This chapter introduced the two core components of the research goal against which
means of inquiry are evaluated in subsequent chapters: consciousness and biological
evolution. Starting from a basic understanding of consciousness as an organism’s
awareness of the environment and of itself in it, we found that an essential task in the
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evolutionary study of consciousness is determining its evolutionarily relevant units. A
brief sketch of evolutionary theory showed that researchers who are constructing evol-
utionary explanations of consciousness should consider details of the trait’s emergence
and development over time, and other mechanisms besides natural selection. Means
for investigating one such potential factor in the evolution of human consciousness
in particular, namely culture, are not included in the evaluation. This first chapter
presented the minimal knowledge of consciousness and evolution needed to appreci-
ate the contribution that means of inquiry make toward the research goal of giving a
scientifically respectable evolutionary explanation of consciousness.
The chapter began with a look at “consciousness . . . the biggest mystery” (Chal-
mers, 1996, p. xi), a theme that reappeared in later sections. New mysterians, for
example, take the long-standing perceived mystery of the connection between con-
sciousness and the brain as indicating that human minds will never understand it.
Such cognitive closure would concern the proximate question of how the brain gener-
ates consciousness, not the ultimate question of how consciousness evolved. Another
reason “why consciousness is so baffling . . . [is that] it seems to be among the chron-
ically unemployed” (Fodor, 2004, p. 31). This brings us back to epiphenomenalism
and inessentialism about consciousness, which make plain that we cannot simply as-
sume consciousness to be functional and necessary in principle for any ability. The
seeming mystery and confusion about consciousness, both the phenomenon and its
concept, result to a considerable extent from the segregationist intuition, which takes
causal and phenomenal characterisations of consciousness to be mutually exclusive
(Gu¨zeldere, 1997). This diagnosis does not instantly remove the mystery, but it offers
an explanation of it and suggests how to approach the problem.
Now that the groundwork has been laid—the two main content areas have been
introduced and four worries about the evolutionary approach to consciousness have
been eased—we can move on: “Once one adopts the view that consciousness is a
natural process that occurs in some kind of creatures, then there is no philosophical
puzzle about how consciousness evolved, just the hard work of evolutionary biology”
(Polger, 2007, p. 82). And this hard work requires means of inquiry, the most prom-
ising ones we have. Note that in order to be able to include many potentially useful
means in the evaluation, I have imposed as few limitations on them as I deem reas-
onable within the scope of the topic. For instance, means of inquiry do not need
to be aligned with narrowly-construed evolutionary psychology. Furthermore, the
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thesis takes a scientific realist perspective and only expects means to contribute to a
natural explanation of consciousness in accordance with scientific method. The next
chapter presents my evaluation tool for means of inquiry into the biological evolution
of consciousness, after explaining why the evaluation is timely and important.
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means of inquiry
Having a better idea of what we want—a scientifically respectable evolutionary ex-
planation of consciousness—does not count for much if we do not know how to get
there. Finding one or more good ways to the research goal is, in turn, likely to be
helped by a better understanding of where we are in relation to the research goal.
This chapter therefore begins with an examination of the current state of the research
literature on the biological evolution of consciousness, where indications of difficulties
in the scientific study of consciousness and its evolution soon become apparent. Yet is
consciousness really particularly difficult to study? And is explaining the evolutionary
origin and function/s of consciousness “the hardest problem in consciousness studies”
(Flanagan & Polger, 1995, p. 313)? Once the problems are clarified as methodological
and mostly not unique, I suggest enabling their solution by evaluating the promise of
means of inquiry in the present context. To be able to implement this suggestion in
the following chapters, I present here an evaluation tool constructed for this purpose.
The first section of the chapter contains the aforementioned characterisation of the
current state of evolutionary explanations of consciousness, followed by an analysis
of the perceived difficulties in studying consciousness. I then explain what benefits
an evaluation of means of inquiry could have as well as why I needed to construct
a suitable evaluation tool. The first half of the chapter thus ends the introductory
materials by providing a rationale for the project. The second half of the chapter
forms the method section of the thesis. After describing the considerations and steps
involved in the construction of the evaluation tool, I introduce the tool for evaluating
the promise of means of inquiry that have been used in or suggested for the study of
the evolution and function/s of consciousness. The tool generates a promise score for
a means by combining weighted criteria scores on three dimensions, which indicate
the means’s relevance, efficacy, and practicality.
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2.1 Current explanations and perceived difficulties
Almost two decades ago, the following characterisation of the literature on the bio-
logical evolution of consciousness was offered by Dennett (1991): “There have been
many theories—well, speculations—about the evolution of human consciousness, be-
ginning with Darwin’s own surmises in The Descent of Man (1871)” (p. 172). Biolo-
gical adaptations have in fact been studied since long before Darwin (Mayr, 1983), but
factors such as the prevalence of mind–body dualism (Crook, 1980) and behaviourism
(Mandler, 1975) impeded the evolutionary study of consciousness. Given the growing
interest in consciousness as a research topic in the last two decades, it is worth inquir-
ing how evolutionary explanations of consciousness have developed since Dennett’s
description: Is his characterisation of the literature on the evolution of consciousness
as consisting of many speculations accurate today? And if it is, are the reasons for
this state of the literature inherent in the study of consciousness and its evolution,
and possibly even insurmountable?
State of evolutionary and functional explanations. The literature on the evol-
ution and function/s of consciousness and, by inference, research on this topic are
in transition, as illustrated by the following assessments and examples. In spite of
“the contemporary fuss and feathers about the nature and function of consciousness”
(Mandler, 2002, p. vii), “on the whole, there is much about the . . . question [of the
function and evolution of consciousness] that remains to be written than what is
already there” (Gu¨zeldere, 1997, p. 36). The relatively recent renewal of interest in
the topic and the unsatisfactory—but improving—state of the corresponding liter-
ature are also reflected, for instance, in evolutionary psychology publications: Con-
sciousness has clearly not been part of mainstream evolutionary psychology (Bering &
Bjorklund, 2007), yet several evolutionary psychology textbooks do cover it in some
detail (e.g., Bridgeman, 2003; Hampton, 2009), and increasingly so (e.g., Gaulin &
McBurney, 2001, 2004; Workman & Reader, 2004, 2008). In addition to a higher pub-
lication rate of journal articles on the topic (e.g., Cabanac et al., 2009; Ginsburg &
Jablonka, 2007a, 2007b; Merker, 2005; Morsella, 2005), edited collections covering the
evolution (Fetzer, 2002; Liljenstro¨m & A˚rhem, 2008; Terrace & Metcalfe, 2005) and
function/s (Ganten, Gerhardt, & Nida-Ru¨melin, 2008) of consciousness have recently
started to appear. Taken together, the literature on the evolution and function/s
of consciousness gives the impression that there is much research still to be done,
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but also that progress can be made and that an increasing number of researchers are
working on the topic.
My analysis of this literature identified a multitude of hypotheses about the evol-
ution and function/s of consciousness, often for particular kinds of consciousness,
and thus agrees with Dennett’s (1991) quotation in this respect. As I have already
described the literature’s current state of transition, I concentrate here on works pub-
lished more than five years ago. Many of the identified hypotheses were difficult to
locate because they tend to be stated in a few sentences somewhere in a publication.
Moreover, individual researchers have only rarely developed their hypotheses further
(Mandler, 2002), nor have others in the field done so (Wilcke, 2003). Among the great
diversity of suggested functions of consciousness, some reappearing themes, such as
integration (Baars, 2002; Morsella, 2005) and behavioural flexibility, have now been
recognised (e.g., Delacour, 1995; A. K. Seth, 2009; Van Gulick, 2009; Wilcke, 2003).
Even so, the overall picture of the literature is one of many isolated hypotheses for
the function/s or evolution of consciousness, which are yet to be explored and, if
promising, developed.
The majority of these hypotheses are insufficiently supported, as authors typic-
ally offer little or no evidence. Dennett (1991) called evolutionary hypotheses about
consciousness speculations, as did Welshon (in press) very recently; Morsella (2003)
complained that there are hardly any serious hypotheses on the function of phenom-
enal consciousness. Of course, evolutionary explanations are essentially historical
narratives (Dennett, 1991; Mayr, 1983), and hypotheses play an important role in
research, but we also need evidence if we want a scientifically respectable evolution-
ary explanation of consciousness.1,2 Furthermore, when authors do provide support
for their hypotheses, they frequently fail to report the means by which this support
was determined (Wilcke, 2003). A significant portion of hypotheses seem to be based
exclusively on the inspection of the author’s own consciousness, which can be prob-
lematic for finding the evolutionary function/s of consciousness, for example, because
“Nature does not tell us what our organs are for” (Barlow, 1980, p. 82; see section 4.1).
The question therefore is, even with the encouraging recent trend in the literature,
1Although evolutionary hypotheses without evidence are sometimes disparagingly labelled just-so
stories, they are only damaging if they are accepted or dismissed prematurely or if they cannot be
investigated scientifically.
2Another common use of evolutionary stories about consciousness is reasoning about philosophical
theories of its nature (Polger, 2007).
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whether the dearth of evidence and the potential difficulties with means of inquiry
are due to the nature of consciousness itself.
Before exploring this question, however, two criticisms levelled against all evolution-
ary explanations of consciousness to date deserve attention. According to Flanagan
and Polger (1995), the problem with existing hypotheses is that they suggest functions
for consciousness that can be performed unconsciously (by us, by computers, or in
principle)—without explaining why conscious organisms nevertheless prevailed over
their unconscious conspecifics. Flanagan and Polger demanded a credible explana-
tion either of the success of conscious organisms that competed with zombies or of
the absence of competing zombies. Yet for zombies to have existed at the same time,
two mechanisms that produce exactly the same behaviours would have had to occur
simultaneously in a biological population, which seems highly unlikely. If conscious
organisms did coexist with behaviourally identical zombies, natural selection could
not have distinguished between them, leaving chance as an explanation for why we
are conscious. Researchers have indeed mostly failed to pay attention to competing
unconscious conspecifics, but neither should this be the sole determinant of the worth
of evolutionary hypotheses nor are zombies the crucial point: If consciousness had a
(nonunique) causal role function, its possessors probably differed behaviourally from
their less conscious conspecifics.
The second criticism concerns an alleged “fundamental flaw in every proposal for an
evolutionary explanation of consciousness” (Polger & Flanagan, 2002, p. 30). Polger
and Flanagan (2002) accused all adaptationist hypotheses about consciousness of ex-
plaining its evolution by claiming that it is necessary for some ability of the organism.
I understand their criticism as being based on the irrelevance of necessity to natural
selection, as Williams (1966) explained: “Selection has nothing to do with what is
necessary or unnecessary, or what is adequate or inadequate, for continued survival.
It deals only with an immediate better-vs.-worse within a system of alternative, and
therefore competing, entities” (p. 31). This criticism applies not only to contingent
necessity, because the relevant ability could have been realised without consciousness,
but also to (biologically unlikely) strict necessity, because the organism could have
managed to survive without the ability. It is difficult to establish which authors of ad-
aptationist hypotheses about consciousness committed this fallacy and which merely
used the term necessary imprecisely. Either way, many of these hypotheses can be
corrected by replacing necessary with advantageous (Williams, 1966), so that con-
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sciousness is claimed to be, for example, advantageous for certain kinds of learning
instead of necessary.
A third criticism is worth mentioning, even though it does not target all evolu-
tionary explanations of consciousness. Polger (2007) pointed out that many theories
of consciousness claim that a specific ability cannot be exercised unconsciously. If
so, an evolutionary explanation of consciousness would not be indicated (over and
above an evolutionary explanation of the ability for which it is strictly necessary;
see section 1.4). Strict necessity may, however, be claimed less often than appears
to be the case. On a more charitable and constructive reading, especially of terms
such as necessary in a nonphilosophical context, many hypotheses simply advance
potential advantages of consciousness in us. For example, in suggesting a method for
identifying the function of phenomenal consciousness, Morsella (2003) assumed that
“phenomenal states can accomplish something that unconscious processes, for some
reason, cannot” (p. 439). Yet he explicitly allowed for the possibility of functional-
zombie brains made of artificial neutral networks and, hence, could not be claiming
strict necessity. Even those hypotheses that do may be modified to claim contingent
necessity, or rather advantageousness, of consciousness for the same abilities.
Particular difficulties scrutinised. Giving a scientifically respectable evolutionary
explanation of consciousness is very difficult. It requires, for example, knowledge of
the evolutionarily relevant units of consciousness and their behavioural effects, along
with criteria for consciousness in other organisms. Providing support for plausible
evolutionary hypotheses about consciousness is further hampered by a lack of direct
fossil records and limited variability within current species, among other things. It
might be possible to infer the presence of consciousness in our ancestors indirectly, for
instance, from prehistoric skulls and artefacts and from present-day animals (Polger
& Flanagan, 1999; Welshon, in press). Similarly, heritability could be implied by
congenital deficits, such as congenital deafness or colour blindness (Polger & Flanagan,
2002) if these left unconscious perception intact. Such difficulties with evolutionary
explanations and their partial solutions are the same for consciousness as for many
other psychological and even biological phenomena (Polger, 2007; Polger & Flanagan,
1999). However, “the task of giving an adaptation explanation for consciousness
inherits those difficulties intrinsic to adaptationist explanation, and complicates them
with all the philosophical and scientific problems attendant to consciousness” (Polger
& Flanagan, 2002, p. 29). Explaining the evolution of consciousness may thus be
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particularly difficult due to difficulties with the study of consciousness.
Consciousness is undoubtedly perceived as being difficult to study by scientific
means: “In much philosophical, psychological and other scientific writing, a scientific
investigation of consciousness has been thought to be difficult, if not impossible”
(Velmans, 1993, p. 82). A somewhat discouraging example of this perception is the
short entry on consciousness in the fourth edition of A Student’s Dictionary of Psycho-
logy (Hayes & Stratton, 2003), which describes consciousness as “extremely difficult
to study” (p. 63). But why is consciousness seen as particularly difficult to invest-
igate scientifically? And is it really? The answer to the latter question depends on
the context in which the question is being asked (e.g., research question, point in
time, academic discipline), the intended meaning of consciousness, and the phenom-
ena with which consciousness is being compared. In the following, I consider some of
the reasons for the perceived difficulty of the scientific study of consciousness, com-
pared with the study of other psychological and especially mental phenomena where
feasible, and check whether the perceived challenges are indeed unique to the study
of consciousness.
Some reasons for the perceived difficulty are historical. Consciousness has at times
been considered not amenable to scientific investigation (e.g., before psychology be-
came an independent empirical discipline) or plain unscientific (e.g., during behaviour-
ism), at other times of central importance (e.g., during introspectionism). This varied
treatment as a potential research topic might itself raise suspicion. For a long time,
“it has been extraordinarily difficult to see it [consciousness] as a variable” (Baars,
2003b, p. 3) and therefore to study it scientifically, maybe because we cannot observe
its absence from the inside. The publication of thousands of studies that compare
more and less conscious processes, however, shows that this obstacle has been largely
overcome (Baars, 2003b). Nonetheless, consciousness has kept reappearing as an un-
solved mystery in many contexts, suggesting that it is special in some way (Gu¨zeldere,
1995b). Furthermore, a lack of research progress might indicate that we will never
understand certain aspects of consciousness, but this is an open question (see sec-
tion 1.4). Although progress may have been slow and unsteady, none of the historical
reasons mean that consciousness is necessarily difficult to investigate today: Even if
consciousness was very difficult to study, as many scientific phenomena have been,
recent conceptual and methodological advances, besides a shift in attitude, could have
changed this.
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Two further sets of reasons for the perceived difficulty have to do with influences on
researchers and their handling of consciousness. First, because consciousness seems
essential to who we are and how we live, it is likely to bias researchers, for instance,
against declaring it useless (see Chapter 3). Relatedly, naive intuitions based on folk
psychology influence the assessment of scientific answers about consciousness (Banks,
1993), and familiarity with their own consciousness may influence the questions re-
searchers ask in the first place. The degree of its subjective significance does set
consciousness apart from other psychological phenomena, but influences from intu-
itions and personal familiarity are also common in their study. Second, Banks and
Farber (2003) viewed consciousness’s referring to a variety of distinct phenomena
as one of two “special methodological challenges for scientific investigation” (p. 3).
Memory, emotion, and attention divide into subtypes too, though which aspect of con-
sciousness is being studied may be specified less commonly (Delacour, 1995), possibly
because the distinctions are not as well-established. However, all of these concerns
can be counteracted by researchers and most of them are not unique to consciousness.
Matters of access to consciousness are generally counted among the most serious dif-
ficulties for its scientific study (e.g., Banks & Farber, 2003; Chalmers, 2004; Gu¨zeldere,
1995b; Mandler, 1975; Overgaard, 2003; Wright, 2007). One major concern is that
researchers cannot directly observe conscious experiences in research participants,
to which the standard response is that scientific observation is often indirect (e.g.,
Baars, 1988; Banks, 1993; Marcel, 1988). Reports on mental processes can be inac-
curate (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and reports on conscious contents incomplete (e.g.,
because of linguistic constraints; Schooler & Fiore, 1997), but the same is true of re-
ports on external phenomena (Marcel, 1988; Velmans, 2007). In any case, the validity
of results from reports can be increased, for example, by suitable reporting conditions
(Ericsson & Simon, 1980) and intersubjective agreement (Velmans, 1993). There is
also the suspicion that a scientific explanation of consciousness “is always doomed to
leave something essential to consciousness out” (Gu¨zeldere, 1995b, p. 116), which is
based on privileged first-person access to consciousness (e.g., Dennett, 1987). Yet we
do not know how much we will be able to explain and should not burden scientific
explanations with unreasonable expectations: Consciousness from the inside is to be
explained, not thereby generated or experienced (G. M. Edelman & Tononi, 2000).
Despite the challenges associated with first-person reports, which are employed in
many areas of psychology, such reports are a vital source of information about con-
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sciousness (see section 4.1).
To sum up, the research literature on the biological evolution and function/s of con-
sciousness is still in its infancy, though first signs of change have recently emerged.
The literature consists largely of many diverse but underdeveloped hypotheses: They
are in urgent need of both empirical and theoretical support as well as more atten-
tion to evolutionary theory. There is no doubt that giving an adequate evolutionary
explanation of consciousness is very difficult. However, my brief examination of why
consciousness itself is perceived as particularly difficult to study suggested that sev-
eral of the reasons are not unique to consciousness or no longer apply. Moreover, the
examination did not uncover any clearly insurmountable obstacles to the study of con-
sciousness. Yet there are difficulties that make its scientific investigation challenging,
and these are mainly methodological in nature (Banks & Farber, 2003; Overgaard,
2003; Velmans, 1993; Wright, 2007). Overall, then, consciousness and its evolution
being difficult to study does not mean that we should not try, only that we should
take particular care that our means of inquiry are fit for purpose.
2.2 Why and how to evaluate means of inquiry
Whether we regard the choices to be made in the research process as problems or
dilemmas, it is advisable to follow McGrath’s (1981) “Rule I: Always face your
methodological problems squarely” (p. 180). Leaving psychological and sociological
factors aside, the identified problems in the research literature on the biological evol-
ution and function/s of consciousness are by and large associated with a failure to use
suitable means of inquiry, as explained below. I therefore propose to evaluate means
of inquiry that have been used (or suggested to be used) in this context, with the
aim of determining which of them are most likely to help advance research and which
of them should best be left alone. Once it is clear which means are available and
what to expect of them, investigating the evolution and function/s of consciousness
should become less difficult. In this section, I first argue that an evaluation of means
can make a significant contribution to research in this area, give a brief for such an
evaluation, and then describe how a literature search turned up the need to construct
an evaluation tool for this purpose.
Benefits of evaluating means. Means of inquiry are central to science—as is evalu-
ation. At the most general level, means of inquiry are the strategies, procedures, and
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tools that researchers use to answer research questions, whether exploratory or con-
firmatory. Consequently, means of inquiry are indispensable to scientific investigation,
which I take to be uncontroversial, though it is rarely brought to mind in everyday
research. Note further that evaluation is pervasive in science, as when researchers
distinguish between good and bad theories, hypotheses, proposals, research designs,
instruments, data, manuscripts, published research, and so on (Scriven, 1972, 1991,
2001). The importance of evaluation in psychology is acknowledged, for example, by
the German Psychological Society’s (2005) recommendation to include a compulsory
course on evaluation in the research methods education of Master’s students (similar
as in the superseded diploma programmes). Both means of inquiry and evaluation
are thus essential components of scientific research.
However, means of inquiry cannot be taken as givens: “Our knowledge about how to
conduct inquiry hangs on the same thread from which dangle our best guesses about
how the world is” (Laudan, 1987, p. 29). That is, methodological statements are on
an equal footing with statements about phenomena under investigation in requiring
support (Laudan, 1984, 1987; promoted in psychology by Proctor & Capaldi, 2001). If
supported as reliable (i.e., tending to produce accurate results), means of inquiry not
only enable us to answer research questions, they play a crucial role in justifying the
relevant statements about phenomena (Goldman, 1979, 1986, 1988). In short, means
of inquiry justify theories (Laudan, 1984; Nickles, 1987a; Rescher, 1977). If means of
inquiry are found to be inadequate, they and their use may be able to be improved, for
instance, by a better understanding of appropriate areas of application (e.g., suitable
conditions for reports on mental processes; Ericsson & Simon, 1980; appropriate uses
of introspection in the evolutionary study of consciousness; see section 4.1). The
evaluation in this thesis assesses the support for means of inquiry; and although it
does not make explicit recommendations for the development of each evaluated means,
it is formative in providing details about means that I hope will be used as a basis
for improving them.
The main purpose of this evaluation is to inform the selection of means of inquiry for
use in particular research projects; it can furthermore inform the assessment of such
choices and their results. It is important to select means of inquiry carefully because
they are more or less useful for answering particular research questions. More specific-
ally, means are, as just indicated, better or worse in themselves, more or less suitable,
and also more or less efficient (Nickles, 1987b). My reason for initiating the present
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project was precisely the observation of large differences in the usefulness of means of
inquiry that have been employed in or suggested for the study of the biological evolu-
tion and function/s of consciousness. Instead of giving sufficiently detailed examples
for this observation here, I refer the reader to the following chapters, in which the
evaluation of means identifies many of their strengths and weaknesses. With the res-
ulting knowledge of relevant characteristics of means of inquiry, researchers ought to
be able to better concentrate their efforts and resources on those means that are best
suited for making progress toward a scientifically respectable evolutionary explanation
of consciousness.
Assistance with the tricky task of selecting the best means of inquiry should be wel-
come, as it is often simply not obvious which means of inquiry should best be used to
address a particular research problem in consciousness studies. This is not surprising
in an emerging multidisciplinary research area that is concerned with a phenomenon
whose study is generally accepted as methodologically difficult. Besides means of
inquiry that are commonly used in the relevant disciplines, there is an increasing
number of means available specifically for studying consciousness, but little meth-
odological consensus (A. K. Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008).
Evolutionary investigations of consciousness additionally require adequate means for
getting at evidence for distant past events, which may be the most foundational issue
in evolutionary behavioural sciences generally (Gangestad & Simpson, 2007a). An
evaluation of available means of inquiry into the evolution and function/s of con-
sciousness can make researchers’ selections and assessments easier and, as already
pointed out, better.
What is more, the problems in the research literature discussed in the previous sec-
tion strongly suggest that an evaluation of means of inquiry is likely to be particularly
beneficial in the present context. Poor awareness of the existence of relevant means
of inquiry and their characteristics and the ensuing failure to use suitable means are,
I suspect, a major source of several of the identified problems, including the use of
inappropriate means, the failure to specify employed means, the underdevelopment
of hypotheses, and the insufficiency of support. This claim is difficult to prove, yet
it is clear that an evaluation of means can help solve each of these problems, namely
by examining which means are available for which research question and, more im-
portantly, by determining which means are best, most suitable, most efficient, and
hence most promising for contributing substantially to an evolutionary explanation of
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consciousness. With initial work in the area completed and—going by the increase in
research interest—a potentially productive period ahead, such an evaluation of means
of inquiry is timely.
Brief for this evaluation. For the reasons given above, I propose to evaluate the
promise of means of inquiry into the biological evolution of consciousness in this thesis.
As explained in the Introduction, means of inquiry is a broad term that encompasses
numerous different research procedures and tools for increasing our knowledge about
the phenomena under investigation. To enable a consistent evaluation of moderate
generality, this evaluation should, based on the foregoing discussion, focus on the
following kinds of means of inquiry: research strategies, research methods, and ar-
guments. When selecting such a means of inquiry for a particular study, what is of
most interest, apart from situational factors (e.g., expertise, funding, facilities, time
frame), is how much the means will likely contribute to the research objective that is
directly related to an increase in knowledge. Accordingly, we here want to know how
promising a means of inquiry is for helping to construct an evolutionary explanation
of consciousness.
This evaluation of the promise of means of inquiry should have the following char-
acteristics: It should be systematic and well-documented so that its procedures are
transparent and its results replicable (unfortunately this cannot be taken for granted
in evaluation; cf. Scriven, 2001). Moreover, a multicriterial evaluation is preferable to
reliance on a single evaluative criterion, not only because the potential contribution of
a means presumably depends on more than one factor, but also because an evaluation
on several criteria can teach us more about the evaluated means (e.g., how to better
match means to particular research situations, how to improve means). In addition
to supplying informative descriptions of means of inquiry, this evaluation should be
normative (Laudan, 1987; Nickles, 1987a) or, more precisely, prescriptive (Scriven,
1991): It can offer important advice, provided it is comparative (cf. Laudan, 1981),
on which one or more means of inquiry should best be used for which research ob-
jective. By presenting such an evaluation, this thesis performs the three major tasks
of methodology (Nickles, 1987b, 1989; adapted from Reichenbach, 1938), namely de-
scribing, criticising, and advising on means of inquiry, within the evolutionary study
of consciousness.
To clarify, I am neither promoting the exclusive use of a single means of inquiry nor
claiming that we can know in advance which means are best. Researchers need mul-
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tiple means both to address all aspects of an evolutionary explanation of consciousness
and to enable methodological triangulation (D. T. Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Mathison,
1988) when studying one aspect, ideally with the most promising means of inquiry.
Naturally, we cannot now determine which means of inquiry are actually best in the
present context, that is, which means will turn out to have been the most prom-
ising ones (or successful high-risk alternatives). Recommendations of means based
on indicators such as past performance and logic can nevertheless advance research,
for instance, by leaving less room for the blind continuation of research traditions,
personal biases, and oversights and by allowing better informed choices of means of
inquiry and assessments of their use.
When deciding how to evaluate means of inquiry, an important issue is the level
of generality of the means to be evaluated as well as that of the evaluation itself.
As already noted, a moderate level of generality is best suited for the means in this
evaluation, as it would be for means of inquiry more generally: Means that are too spe-
cific cannot be employed in other research projects without major modifications, yet
the most useful means of inquiry are typically content- and context-specific (Nickles,
1986, 1987b). As to the evaluation of promise, it should at least be specific to the
promise of means of inquiry; however, to assess the likely contribution of a means,
the evaluation needs to take into account the research objective and the maturity of
the area of research, including other available means. Pulling in opposite directions
also are requirements on the evaluation to be applicable to various means of inquiry
and to have clearly communicable results (for easy comparison of the many evaluated
means) and demands for details on the strengths and weaknesses of evaluated means
(to facilitate a more appropriate use of chosen means and their improvement). It is
thus a challenge to pitch the evaluation of promise at an appropriate level of general-
ity and detail, which in turn affects how much help we can expect from the relevant
literatures.
The need to construct a tool. Although the evaluation of means of inquiry is a
frequently performed and unavoidable routine activity of researchers (e.g., when plan-
ning a study or reading research reports), little has been published about pertinent
evaluative criteria. While other authors have tended to discuss general ways of evalu-
ating means at most, such as by intuition, logic, or historical evidence (Laudan, 1987;
Proctor & Capaldi, 2001; see also Nickles, 1987a), Rescher (1977) advocated effective-
ness as the evaluative criterion for methods (as did Laudan, 1987) and also mentioned
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efficiency, rationality, and suitability. Further leads come from the following two lists
of evaluative dimensions and criteria: First, Nickles (1987b) suggested that, “since
methods govern research processes, methods can be evaluated along three primary
dimensions: the suitability of research goals, the efficiency of the processes in produ-
cing research products (e.g., problem solutions), and the quality of these products”
(p. 42). The efficiency of means of inquiry has in fact been neglected by theorists, but
the means themselves should not be judged by the research goal for which they are
employed and only by their products’ quality if they are applied properly. Second,
Nickles (1989) proposed that scientists might evaluate the power of heuristics, de-
pending on the context, by the heuristics’ reliability, the difficulty of problems they
can solve or avoid, their efficiency, their scope of application, and the incorporation
of domain-specific knowledge. These criteria and Rescher’s are important consider-
ations, on which I comment when describing the construction of my evaluation tool
in the next section. Developing these criteria involves determining how they can be
measured and how they relate to the promise of means of inquiry.
Originally I had hoped to find one or more at least occasionally cited lists of method
evaluation criteria in the literature, just as there are well-known criteria for theory
evaluation. (Even better would have been a well-developed evaluation system, such as
the theory of explanatory coherence by Thagard, 1989, 1992.) A first step in increasing
my search radius was to check how well theory evaluation criteria might generalise
to the evaluation of means of inquiry. Compared with such criteria as predictive
accuracy and explanatory power, Kuhn’s (1977) standard criteria of theory adequacy,
for example, seem reasonably suited for this purpose: Good means should arguably
be consistent (especially internally), produce accurate results, and be fruitful; they
should simplify the complexity of the data and, as suggested by Nickles (1989), have
a broad scope. This shows that Kuhn’s five criteria can, with some imagination, be
adapted to means of inquiry, after which these criteria, like the ones for means of
inquiry, would need to be operationalised and related to promise.
Unlike most philosophers who, in writing about the evaluation of scientific theor-
ies, have focused solely on their acceptability (Laudan, 1977; Whitt, 1992), a few
have addressed their pursuit worthiness. Among them is Laudan (1977, 1981), who
equated a theory’s promise with its progressiveness, measured by the difference in
problem-solving effectiveness between its most and least (or a less) recent version
(where problem-solving effectiveness is the number and importance of solved minus
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unsolved problems) or by the rate of such progress. In contrast, McMullin (1976) held
that promise could be determined by “examining the theory here and now, and es-
timating its imaginative resources . . . for future extension and modification” (p. 400)
that will allow the theory, for instance, to resolve remaining problems or incorporate
new areas. A theory’s promise may thus lie in its potential to improve its performance
on standard criteria of theory acceptance (Nolan, 1999), suggesting a corresponding
evaluation. Whitt’s (1992) much more detailed account of the appraisal of theory
promise is too theory-specific to be useful here, but worth mentioning for recognising
that the evaluation of promise depends on both historical dimensions (e.g., a the-
ory’s conceptual viability and empirical fertility over a period of time) and formal
dimensions (e.g., the analogy and experimental strategies of a theory’s heuristic).
Furthermore, the following factors relevant to means of inquiry can be drawn from
Nickles’s (1989, 2006) discussions of heuristic appraisal in science: problem-solving
capacity, feasibility, usefulness, costs, and risks. Overall, though, philosophers of sci-
ence have neglected the evaluation of promise (for many reasons; Nickles, 1989, 2006),
and the majority of what has been written about the appraisal of theory promise is
difficult to apply to means of inquiry.
Perhaps we can shed light on what makes means of inquiry promising to research-
ers by considering how students are taught when to employ which means. Despite
the relatively broad and intensive training of psychology students in research methods
(Breakwell, Hammond, Fife-Schaw, & Smith, 2006), their introductory research meth-
ods textbooks are, for the most part, silent on research strategies and heuristics for
choosing and evaluating research designs (Evans, 2005). They typically recommend
matching methods to research questions, describe some of the methods’ strengths and
weaknesses, and discuss factors such as ethical issues and different types of reliabil-
ity and validity (e.g., Graziano & Raulin, 2000; Leary, 2004; Rosnow & Rosenthal,
2005). The general concepts of reliability (roughly, consistency or precision) and valid-
ity (roughly, effectiveness or accuracy) are highly relevant to the evaluation of such
means of inquiry as arguments and evolutionary methods, but much less so the afore-
mentioned traditional types of reliability and validity for measures and experiments
(see Lissitz, 2009, for current perspectives on test validity). The textbook advice is in
any case not sufficient for choosing means of inquiry, because, for example, many ad-
ditional factors affect the selection of means (Golden, 1976; Kulka, 1981) and different
methods used for addressing the same research question may produce different results
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(i.e., method variance; D. T. Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Wilson & Lipsey, 2001). For
whatever reasons the advice on selecting means is inadequate,3 it contributes little
beyond the general considerations of reliability, validity, and ethics to the evaluation
of means in the present context.
Turning now to evaluation advice, guidance on the evaluation of research, in par-
ticular its means, is generally along the lines of the topics found in research methods
textbooks—whether this guidance is for students evaluating published journal art-
icles (e.g., Dunbar, 2005; Pyrczak, 2008), for researchers peer-reviewing manuscripts
(e.g., Joint Task Force of Academic Medicine and the GEA–RIME Committee, 2001;
Sternberg, 2006), or for anyone determining the methodological quality of studies
for inclusion in systematic reviews (e.g., Fink, 2005; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Given
that the means of inquiry to be evaluated are more diverse than those on which the
above advice is given, as again exemplified by arguments and evolutionary methods,
it might pay to look further afield for advice. Some engineering design textbooks,
for instance, describe comparatively sophisticated and potentially suitable evaluation
techniques (e.g., Cross, 1994; Hyman, 1998; Pahl, Beitz, Feldhusen, & Grote, 2007).
It is more difficult to bring the literature on evaluation, nowadays largely dedicated
to the evaluation of social programmes, to bear on the evaluation of means of in-
quiry. However, what the evaluation literature does provide as helpful starting points
are lists of potentially relevant generic values (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Scriven,
2007a). Moreover, works on evaluation, such as Scriven’s various writings (e.g., 1991,
2007a, 2007b) and Davidson’s (2005) useful manual, can teach us how to conduct an
evaluation of means from scratch.
An exception to these general statements about the evaluation literature is the eval-
uator Coryn’s (2007) search for criteria of good research. He examined researchers’
own criteria and the norms and standards of research that are embodied in scientific
method, in Merton’s (1942/1949) ethos of science, and in the ideal of methodological
rigour as judged by the validity, reliability, and objectivity of quantitative studies and
the trustworthiness, dependability, and confirmability of qualitative studies. Based
3A widespread lack of attention to the topic is suggested by the fact that a few books do provide
social science students with more detailed information on how to choose means (e.g., Blaxter, Hughes,
& Tight, 2006; Evans, 2005; Golden, 1976; Mitchell & Jolley, 2007). Note that most of the additional
factors presented concern the preferences of particular researchers, those of other parties (e.g., col-
laborators, funders, reviewers, peers), and the availability of resources, none of which can be easily
evaluated at the more general level intended here (see section 2.3).
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on these sources and his definition of research, Coryn proposed the following list of
necessary criteria of good research, applicable to a research and development centre,
a researcher, many pieces of research together, or possibly a research proposal: ori-
ginality/novelty, significance/importance, relevance, fecundity, uniformity, validity,
replicability, and ethicality. Several aspects of his criteria descriptions are, after differ-
ing degrees of adaptation, also necessary properties of good means of inquiry: Means
should be fit for purpose (relevance) and ethical (ethicality); they should be logical and
produce well-supported inferences (validity); and they should be repeatable (replic-
ability) and perform well consistently (uniformity). Together with resource economy,
also mentioned by Coryn, these selected and modified criteria are comparable with
Rescher’s (1977) and Nickles’s (1989) criteria and will likewise be taken up in the next
section.
Before moving on it is worth checking whether the tools used in other evaluations
of multiple means of inquiry in psychology and related fields can be adapted for the
present purpose. The most common kinds of such published evaluations are charac-
terisations of research methods in terms of their particular strengths and weaknesses
(e.g., Cooke, 1994; Crothers & Levinson, 2004), simulation studies of the performance
of data analysis techniques (e.g., MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets,
2002; Velicer & Fava, 1998), and empirical comparisons of typically two to three
means of inquiry (e.g., Green, Rafaeli, Bolger, Shrout, & Reis, 2006; Seal, Bogart, &
Ehrhardt, 1998). Apart from supplying examples of positive and negative features
of means of inquiry, these evaluations are, unfortunately, of no help to a systematic
but time-limited evaluation of the promise of many means of inquiry in the under-
developed research area of interest here.
A few published evaluations of means of inquiry, however, are a step closer to the
evaluation outlined in the brief above. The authors of these evaluations have supple-
mented their descriptions of particular strengths and weaknesses of several means of
inquiry each with a table containing both evaluative criteria and evaluated means,
as illustrated in Table 2.1 (for other examples see J. S. Carroll & Johnson, 1990,
Table 8.1; Mitchell & Jolley, 2007, Table 7.3). Such systematic and usually more
comprehensive overviews enable a direct comparison of all means of inquiry on each
criterion. Table 2.1 is also interesting because Klahr and Simon (1999) employed what
they considered “the criteria generally used for evaluating research methods in general
and psychological research methods in particular” (p. 528). These criteria are, debat-
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Table 2.1














Face validity ++ − −− ++ −
Construct validity − − + + +
Temporal span & resolution
Short & fine-grained − ++ ++ + ++
Long & coarse-grained ++ −− −− − +
New phenomena ++ ++ − ++ +
Rigor & precision − + ++ + ++
Control & factorability −− − ++ − ++
External validity − − + − +
Social & motivational factors ++ −− −− ++ −
Note. ++ = high; + = moderately high; − = moderately low; −− = low. Adapted from “Studies
of Scientific Discovery: Complementary Approaches and Convergent Findings,” by D. Klahr and H.
A. Simon, 1999, Psychological Bulletin, 125, p. 530. Copyright 1999 by the American Psychological
Association.
ably, desirable features of means of inquiry in psychology, yet they are, where relevant,
less pressing at the current state of research into the evolution of consciousness than
the more basic dimensions introduced in the next section. Criteria-by-means tables
can in any case be useful for the comparison and possibly even selection of means of
inquiry, although they normally make no provision for combining the subevaluations
in the cells of the table into an evaluative conclusion.
In summary, research on the biological evolution and function/s of consciousness
could profit from a systematic evaluation of the promise of relevant means of inquiry.
The resulting information and advice, if taken on board, have the potential to signific-
antly enhance the selection of means of inquiry—as well as their use, assessment, and
development—and thereby to help remedy several of the biggest problems apparent
in the corresponding literature. However, there is no suitable or easily adaptable eval-
uation system or set of evaluative criteria available for conducting such an evaluation,
probably because the topic has not received enough attention and because the best
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means of inquiry tend to be content- and context-specific, as is by implication their
appropriate evaluation. This is why I needed to construct a tool for evaluating the
promise of means of inquiry in the present context.
2.3 Construction of the evaluation tool
Left wondering how to evaluate the promise of means of inquiry into the biological
evolution and function/s of consciousness, we should keep in mind the mantra of
matching research methods to research questions, as it applies equally to evaluation
questions (see, e.g., Owen, 1999; Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004). In tailoring a
suitable evaluation tool, there were, of course, further aspects that needed to be taken
into account, such as the purpose of the evaluation, the evaluation brief (both covered
in the previous section), and available resources. Accordingly, this section first sets
out the evaluation questions, followed by the requirements for both means of inquiry
to be evaluated and evaluative criteria. I then describe the steps that were involved
in the construction of the evaluation tool and give an overview of the tool, which is
specified in the following section and applied in the remainder of the thesis. At the
end of this section, I take a look at the tool’s validity, consistency, and objectivity to
allow an initial assessment of its trustworthiness.
Evaluation questions and requirements. The primary evaluation question here
was which means of inquiry are most promising for increasing our knowledge about
the biological evolution of consciousness. A means of inquiry that is more promising
than most other means may, however, still be unpromising (i.e., high relative but low
absolute promise) and hence not worth pursuing, which is why it was also import-
ant to determine how promising each means is. The evaluation should additionally
provide absolute and relative subevaluation results on every evaluative criterion to
facilitate the improvement of means of inquiry as well as a better fit of means to
specific research situations (e.g., available resources, risk aversion). Note that be-
cause the evaluation was not about a particular researcher or project, it could not
easily include factors that differ between researchers and projects if clear evaluative
conclusions were to be reached (their inclusion would have considerably complicated
the evaluation and probably led to a large number of conditional conclusions). Fur-
thermore, I intended this evaluation of promise to be valid for the potential use of
evaluated means of inquiry within a decade (and then to require review), thus giv-
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ing sufficient time to conduct studies based on the evaluation findings while avoiding
unnecessary speculation in a rapidly changing field of inquiry.
To be eligible for this evaluation, means of inquiry had to have been either evid-
ently used or suggested to be used in the investigation of any aspect of the biological
evolution of any aspect of consciousness. The means to be evaluated were research
strategies, research methods, and arguments, according to the evaluation brief. The
exclusion of means of inquiry that had not been used or suggested served to confine
the evaluation to means that had been considered promising in at least one research
publication. The judgement whether means had been (suggested to be) applied to
consciousness should follow the respective authors’ claims, as explained in section 1.1.
Any aspect of the biological evolution of consciousness should be taken broadly to in-
clude, for example, its current function/s (as argued in section 2.4), excepting only
epiphenomenalism (already discussed in section 1.3; arguments that are more directly
relevant to the evolution of consciousness are evaluated in Chapter 3). Besides ful-
filling these requirements, means of inquiry needed to be ethical, operationalised as
given or expected approval by an institutional ethics committee, to qualify for an
evaluation of their promise.
The criteria used in evaluating means of inquiry should be those properties of the
means that make them promising in the present context. Among the basic require-
ments enumerated by Scriven (1994, 2007b) for such a list of evaluative criteria are
that the criteria should be clear, nonoverlapping, and at a comparable level of general-
ity. Criteria were to be preferred over indicators, where possible, because a definitional
connection with promise is better than merely an empirical one (i.e., a correlation;
Scriven, 1991, 2007b). Moreover, the list of criteria should contain neither significant
omissions nor superfluous criteria; each evaluative criterion should help to distinguish
more and less promising means of inquiry here. The final requirement for evaluative
criteria was that the degree of their presence in means of inquiry needed to be de-
terminable by me and by other researchers who are familiar with the topic area and
means of inquiry. With this framework in hand, I now describe how I constructed the
promise evaluation tool for means of inquiry into the evolution of consciousness.
From values to synthesis. The three main tasks in the construction of the eval-
uation tool were to identify the relevant values, to set out how the performance of
means of inquiry on each criterion is to be measured and rated, and to define the syn-
thesis procedure for combining these subevaluations into an overall conclusion about
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the promise of a means. A good place to start identifying relevant values was the
characterisation of means of inquiry given in the evaluation brief above, not least
because “methodological value judgments are typically built on definitional or quasi-
definitional premises” (Scriven, 1972, p. 240). The brief stated that means of inquiry
are procedures and tools that are employed by researchers to attain those research ob-
jectives at different levels of generality that are directly related to learning more about
the phenomena under investigation. This characterisation highlights that means of
inquiry are means to an end, which should therefore be central to their evaluation
(Laudan, 1984; Rescher, 1977). Thus, a good means of inquiry is one that attains its
research aim.
Based on an analysis of the concept of a promising means of inquiry, including an
initial literature review (roughly the first half of the subsection The Need to Construct
a Tool), I constructed a basic evaluation scheme with the following three dimensions:
• Adequacy. How does the aim of the means of inquiry relate to the research
goal, which is giving a scientifically respectable evolutionary explanation of con-
sciousness?
• Validity. Does the means of inquiry tend to promote its aim, based on plausible
arguments and, where possible, empirical evidence from its past performance?
• Strengths and weaknesses. What additional strengths and weaknesses does
the means of inquiry have (e.g., assumptions, rules, specificity, data availability,
required resources)?
This evaluation scheme was piloted on the 10 means of inquiry evaluated in Chapter 3.
Its application resulted in qualitative evaluative conclusions (somewhat akin to the
descriptions of strengths and weaknesses criticised above), which I found unsatisfact-
ory because they were not sufficiently transparent, systematic, and comparable. For
example, it was not clear how levels of validity were determined, whether the same
standards were used for all means, how means could be compared on their strengths
and weaknesses, and how promise conclusions were derived. In my judgement, the
evaluation scheme was in need of substantial revision.
To arrive at a more satisfactory evaluation tool, I pursued two routes, both of which
were greatly helped by a more extensive consultation of the literature (summarised
in the second half of the subsection The Need to Construct a Tool). On the one
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Figure 2.1. Overview of the tool I constructed for evaluating the promise of means
of inquiry into the biological evolution of consciousness. Numbers denote weights of
evaluative criteria (right) used in determining a means’s performance on connected
evaluative dimensions (middle) and of dimensions in determining its promise. Co. =
scored in combination.
hand, I fleshed out the evaluation scheme by drawing up scoring rubrics for each
dimension and devising a numerical synthesis procedure with cutoffs. However, I
was not able to fashion a coherent and defensible set of evaluative criteria. On the
other hand, I extracted from the consulted literature and from my own notes all
those features of means of inquiry that were potentially relevant here. I completely
reworked the resulting list of 34 sets of candidate values recursively seven times, under
consideration of the aforesaid requirements for evaluative criteria and the present
state of the research literature on the evolution and function/s of consciousness. As
will become apparent in the next section, the current version of the evaluation tool,
outlined in Figure 2.1, turned out to have more or less similar evaluative dimensions
and criteria as the original evaluation scheme, while being significantly more elaborate
and systematic.
The evaluation tool is made up of only three evaluative dimensions, each assessed
on two criteria, yet all of these are essential to the promise of means of inquiry into
the evolution of consciousness. For several reasons I decided to focus on the needs
(i.e., requirements for satisfactory functioning; Davidson, 2005; Scriven, 1991) and not
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the wants (i.e., desirable features) of promising means of inquiry, thereby accepting a
somewhat incomplete evaluation for now. Needs are naturally much more important
than wants (e.g., improvability of a means; see Scriven, 1991, on needs assessment).
More importantly, needs are likely to be sufficient at the present state of research in
this area to distinguish promising from unpromising means of inquiry, as several of
the evaluated means, or at least their applications, have rather elementary problems.
Furthermore, the descriptions of applied or suggested means of inquiry often lack
detail, already making the evaluation of needs difficult. For a first evaluation study
of means of inquiry in an emerging and multidisciplinary area of research and with
limited resources, it seems most appropriate to use a no-frills tool on a large variety
of possibly promising means.
The tool’s synthesis procedure, termed numerical weight and sum by Scriven (1991),
is an application of multi-attribute utility theory: Performance scores are multi-
plied by the weight (i.e., relative importance) of the corresponding criterion and then
summed to obtain dimension and promise scores. This common procedure is suitable
for answering absolute and relative evaluation questions (unlike qualitative weight
and sum; Davidson, 2005) about many candidates (Scriven, 1991), but it needs to be
handled with care because of some of its assumptions (e.g., independence of criteria,
interval scale, compensatory criteria; Scriven, 1991) and because of the false sense of
certainty easily imparted by the use of numbers (Pahl et al., 2007). To deal with some
of these problems, the present evaluation tool has a small number of evaluative cri-
teria, each with a cutoff and equal weighting (the only exception, which is the weight
of the practicality dimension, stays within Scriven’s, 2007b, recommendations). In
addition, the scoring rubrics all range from 0 (very low) to 10 (very high) and are
constructed with equidistance between points in mind. (Both performance assessment
on the criteria and their weightings are explained in the next section.) What has not
been built into the evaluation tool is a measure against the tendency to overestimate
the certainty of numerical results, but several of the other potential problems with
this common and useful synthesis procedure have been mitigated or resolved.
Preliminary evaluation of the tool. To get a first impression of the quality of this
quantitative evaluation tool, I now consider tentatively its objectivity, consistency, and
validity. Objectivity refers to the absence of bias, that is, the absence of systematic
errors (Scriven, 1991). Biased results may derive either from the evaluation tool itself
or from its application (Scriven, 1994). Because any bias in the tool depends on how
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well the tool is justified (Scriven, 1991), I have tried my best to construct a well-
supported tool, which I have presented to psychology and evaluation audiences and
revised in light of their comments. In order to minimise bias in the tool’s application, I
provide scoring guidelines in the next section, which are meant to render the evaluation
more transparent and repeatable. These instructions could be expanded if required,
but the risk of their misinterpretation is low in the present evaluation because the
author and user of the tool are identical. The tool’s objectivity is much higher than
that of the original evaluation scheme; it could, however, be further enhanced, for
example, through feedback from other researchers and applications of the tool to the
same or similar evaluation questions.
An initial indication of the tool’s inner consistency (not to be confused with internal
consistency in psychometrics) comes from two different assessments of the 10 means
of inquiry that were already used in piloting the evaluation scheme (see Chapter 3
for their proper evaluation). I first performed a quick and chiefly global evaluation
of the promise of these 10 means with an early version of the current evaluation
tool, where neither the evaluative criteria had been finalised nor any weights assigned
to them. After the lapse of about six weeks and without knowingly referring to
the previous evaluations, I applied a nearly current version of the tool to the same
means of inquiry in an analytical pilot evaluation, scoring the means on each criterion
and calculating synthesised promise scores. The globally (M = 4.95, SD = 1.09)
and analytically (M = 4.92, SD = 0.98) determined promise scores were strongly
correlated, r(8) = .95, p < .001, 95% CI [.80, .99]. Even when taking into account
that these pilot evaluations were conducted by the tool’s author, the result suggests
that the tool’s synthesised performance assessments on all criteria measure the same
attribute of means of inquiry as a global evaluation of the means’ promise.
The next question, then, is that of the tool’s validity, namely, whether the evaluated
attribute of means of inquiry is in fact their promise. The unanticipated convergence
of the original scheme for evaluating the promise of means and the current promise
evaluation tool can be taken as a provisional sign of the tool’s validity—after all, I
constructed the latter anew, as described above, because I was dissatisfied with the
former. For want of criteria of promising means in the literature, we can compare
the present evaluation tool only to other relevant lists of criteria. The tool’s three
evaluative dimensions occur in, at times even constitute, some lists of evaluation
values (e.g., Foundation for Young Australians & Sharp, 2000; Guba & Lincoln, 1981;
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Wells, 1986, as cited in Owen, 1999), though with efficiency instead of practicality.
Stronger support comes from Rossi et al.’s (2004) linking of the tool’s dimensions
to the choice of methods: “The [evaluation] methods selected must be practical as
well as capable of providing meaningful answers to the questions with the degree
of scientific rigor appropriate to the evaluation circumstances” (p. 33). Moreover,
Coryn (2007), Nickles (1989), and Rescher’s (1977) values of good means of inquiry
or good research (see section 2.2) together speak to the majority of the present tool’s
evaluative dimensions and criteria, notably relevance (Coryn, Rescher) with aspects
of knowledge generation (Nickles), efficacy (Rescher) with procedures (Coryn), and
resource cost (as efficiency ; Coryn, Nickles, Rescher). The main omission is again
the availability of data, which is more pertinent to the promise of means of inquiry
(or research) than to their quality alone and a particular problem in investigating
the evolution of consciousness. Beside this tentative evidence for the tool’s essential
criteria of promise, the results of its application to means of inquiry in Chapters 3 to 5
as well as analyses of the means’ future performance should help to better determine
the tool’s validity.
To recapitulate, I constructed a tool for evaluating the promise of means of in-
quiry into the biological evolution of consciousness because I could not find a suitable
evaluation system or set of evaluative criteria in the literature. The evaluation tool
consists of only those criteria that are essential to the promise of means of inquiry
in the present context and uses a numerical weight and sum procedure for synthes-
ising subevaluations. Its aim is to provide both absolute and relative promise and
subevaluation results for each evaluated means of inquiry. A first check of the tool’s
validity, consistency, and objectivity revealed preliminary evidence of its trustworthi-
ness. What we need to know, though, before the evaluation tool can be applied is
how to go about assessing means of inquiry on each criterion.
2.4 Assessing promise by 3 x 2 criteria
So how can we determine the promise of means of inquiry practically? The first step
in preparing to use the tool just introduced is to identify the means of inquiry to be
evaluated. In the present project, this was done by searching the research literature on
consciousness for means of inquiry and checking whether they fulfill the requirements
stated in the previous section. It is then crucial to pinpoint the aim of each means
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Figure 2.2. Scale used in assessing means of inquiry on evaluative criteria and for
interpreting dimension and promise scores. Each label applies to scores up to 1 point
higher and lower than its centre.
of inquiry in context, as much of the evaluation relies on correct knowledge of these
aims. When the aim of a means of inquiry is not obvious, it can be helpful to try
writing out a means-end relation of the form “if one’s goal is y, then one ought to
do x” (Laudan, 1987, p. 24). Once the means of inquiry and their aims are identified,
the tool can be applied as specified after the following introductory remarks.
The guidelines set out below for scoring means of inquiry with respect to the tool’s
criteria are what Scriven (2007b) called weakly sequential : Adhering to their order
is for the most part not necessary, but doing so is beneficial. For example, the rel-
evance of means of inquiry is to be assessed first because it has already been judged
provisionally for the inclusion decision and sets the scene for the remainder of the
evaluation (viz., whether the means are capable of making their relevant contribution
and whether this is currently practical). The performance of means of inquiry on each
criterion is scored on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (very low) to 10 (very high;
see Figure 2.2). Because the two criteria in the relevance dimension are scored in
combination and required greater precision, I allowed half-integers on this dimension,
the same as on the other dimensions. The scoring rubrics describe very low, moder-
ate, and very high performance of means of inquiry and give examples. (Additional
descriptions of intermediate performances will be more appropriate if the evaluation
tool proves useful in the present project.) Let us now see how the promise of means of
inquiry can be assessed on the three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and practicality.
Relevance dimension. The more a means of inquiry may contribute to the research
goal—a scientifically respectable evolutionary explanation of consciousness—the more
relevant it is in the present context. What we can realistically expect to achieve is,
of course, far from the ideal research outcome, which would be a complete scientific
explanation of the biological evolution of all aspects of consciousness in all organisms.
The importance of the relevance dimension is illustrated by the editorial comment
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that “among the weaknesses most often cited by reviewers of manuscripts . . . is the
mismatch between the research question and the research methods and analysis tech-
niques employed to answer the question” (Lester, 1996, p. 130), and this despite what
I referred to as the mantra of matching research methods to research questions. The
assessment of the relevance of a means of inquiry can be broken into two steps: First
one classifies the means according to how suitable its aim makes it for answering the
research question of how consciousness evolved. Because means with the same gen-
eral aim may nevertheless differ in their potential contribution, one then determines
the size of the means’s contribution in the respective category under the temporary
assumption that the means actually works.
By distinguishing five approaches to constructing an evolutionary explanation of
consciousness in the literature, or rather by identifying five subgoals thereof, I created
a simple classification system for the aims of means of inquiry:
1. Showing that consciousness has a function (independent of what this function
may be; a function).
2. Identifying current function/s of consciousness (what function/s).
3. Showing that consciousness is (or was) an evolutionary adaptation (an adapta-
tion).
4. Identifying evolutionary function/s of consciousness (i.e., its survival value/s or
adaptive significance/s; what adaptation/s).
5. Identifying the evolutionary origin of consciousness and its development since
(origin and history).
These subgoals include means of inquiry with aims either matching or opposite to
the above statements. An example of the latter are deflationary evolutionary explan-
ations, which aim to show that some kinds of consciousness are nonadaptations (see
section 5.1). However, opposite aims are rare among means of inquiry evaluated in
this thesis, which is why I concentrate on matching aims in the present chapter.
The approximate relevance of the subgoals to the overall research goal was determ-
ined relatively, by ranking them based on (a) a specification being better than an
existential quantification (i.e., ∃, there exists; here, identifying approaches are more
66
2.4 Assessing promise by 3× 2 criteria
relevant than showing-that approaches of equivalent content) and (b) more evolution-
ary information being better than less:
A function <a What function/s
∧b ∧b
An adaptation <a,b What adaptation/s <b Origin and history
This framework of subgoals for assessing the relevance of means of inquiry is further
developed below. First note that although the subgoals can be pursued independently,
they are admittedly interrelated, with research outcomes in one approach likely to
affect other approaches (e.g., identification of an evolutionary function would probably
support the corresponding is-an-adaptation hypothesis). A means of inquiry may
therefore appear to have more than one aim, in which case it should be assigned to
the eligible category with the highest relevance, unless there is a clear indication that
this would lower its promise score. Note also that when considering single instances
of an author’s use or suggestion of a means of inquiry, the author’s goal may not
coincide with the present research goal.
Finally, the inclusion of nonevolutionary subgoals in the framework may be ques-
tioned, given that the overall research goal is an evolutionary explanation of conscious-
ness. The first nonevolutionary subgoal, showing that consciousness has a function,
targets epiphenomenalism. Means of inquiry in this lowest ranked category are not
evaluated in the present project, as already indicated in the requirements for means,
in order to focus on the many similar and much more relevant kinds of means that
are. Conversely, means of inquiry within the other nonevolutionary approach, identi-
fying current function/s of consciousness, could not be ignored. For one thing, the
identified function/s may well have been shaped by biological evolution. What is
more, many potentially promising means of inquiry cannot be used on consciousness
in the distant past but only on the consciousness of living creatures, typically humans.
These means of inquiry can provide us with much-needed knowledge about—at least
current—consciousness, which may constrain possible evolutionary explanations and
suggest hypotheses about how and why consciousness could have evolved.
The relevance of a means of inquiry within a category (also) depends on the size of
the means’s potential contribution to the research goal, that is, the contribution the
means can make if it works properly and is successfully applied. Factors that influence
how much and how well-supported knowledge a means of inquiry can be expected to
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Figure 2.3. Relevance ranges of the five approaches to constructing an evolu-
tionary explanation of consciousness (derived from Table 2.2).
generate include the means’s scope of application (e.g., all aspects of consciousness
but only in humans) and its specificity (e.g., consciousness not confounded with mind,
perception, or attention). The means of inquiry may have been used in or suggested
for either the generation or the development of hypotheses, both of which are generally
indispensable to research progress. However, because the literature on the evolution
and function/s of consciousness largely consists of many speculations with insufficient
support, means of inquiry that contribute evidence tend to be particularly important
in the present context. Estimating the knowledge generation potential of means of
inquiry is difficult, even after having allocated their aims to subgoals, and calls for
more concrete advice or at least examples.
To create guidelines for assessing the relevance of means of inquiry, I fleshed out the
framework of relevance-ranked subgoals by developing descriptions of what constitutes
a small, moderate, and large contribution to the research goal within each category
and by assigning numerical relevance values to these descriptions (see Table 2.2). The
resulting range of contribution-dependent relevance scores for each subgoal is depicted
in Figure 2.3. Apart from striving for a consistent scoring rubric with equidistant
points, two further possibilities needed to be considered. Some means of inquiry are
likely to lead to relevant knowledge advances beyond their respective aims, for which
they receive a fertility bonus. For example, the aim of arguments from complex design
is to show that consciousness is an adaptation, but they may give additional clues
about the evolutionary function of consciousness (see Chapter 3). Other means of
inquiry are not sufficiently relevant to the present research goal to be worth pursuing
at this time (viz., means with a relevance score ≤ 1.5) and are therefore not included in
this evaluation. The relevance scoring rubric provided in Table 2.2 takes into account
68
2.4 Assessing promise by 3× 2 criteria
the most relevant aim of a means of inquiry, the size of the relevant knowledge it may
generate within its approach to the research goal, its positive side-effects on knowledge
associated with other approaches, and the minimum acceptable relevance.
Efficacy dimension. The more a means of inquiry is capable of achieving its aim,
the more efficacious it is. Assessing the efficacy of a means of inquiry thus means
assessing how well the means can be expected to work under ideal circumstances.
Ideal circumstances are assumed here because the efficacy of a means of inquiry is
about the means itself, that is, its capability, and not about the characteristics of
particular researchers, the resources they have available, or the data they collect.
Factors affecting the application of means of inquiry are better evaluated as part of
the means’ practicality assessment. In the present evaluation tool, efficacy is assessed
on two equally weighted criteria:
Efficacy = .5 Input + .5 Procedure
During the following explanation of these criteria—and in fact during each application
of the tool in the remaining chapters—it is important to keep in mind that the tool
is for evaluating the means of inquiry themselves, not specific instances of their use.
The latter nonetheless inform the evaluation in several ways, especially in the efficacy
dimension, as will become apparent shortly.
The most common types of input to means of inquiry are the data to be processed
and the premises of arguments. Such input, as far as it is specified by the means of
inquiry, is to be evaluated for its quality or evidential strength. For example, data
from introspection is strong because it derives from more or less direct observation
of conscious experience but also weak because it tends to be biased (for the use of
introspection in evolutionary studies, see section 4.1). Although the criteria for con-
sciousness that are used to determine relevant input could be considered part of the
input to evaluated means of inquiry, they should only be taken into account in the
evaluation if they are specified by the means and differ significantly in quality from
commonly used criteria. This is because the focus of the evaluation is on evolutionary
means of inquiry, all of which have to rely on criteria for consciousness but generally
leave their selection to the user. The evaluation of input should be based on analyses
of the means of inquiry and, where available and relevant, records of their past ap-
plications. If the strength of the input to a means of inquiry is too low (i.e., input
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Table 2.2
Rubric for Assessing the Relevance of Means of Inquiry Within One of Five Research
Subgoals and With Potential Additional Fertility
Score Description
A function
1.5 Consciousness has physical effects.
2 Consciousness causes physical events that may be relevant to the functioning
of some animals.
2.5 Consciousness has a causal role function in certain animal species.
What function/s
2 Minor current function of consciousness that seems unlikely to be evolution-
arily relevant, without any additional details.
4 Current function/s of consciousness with some additional details.
6 Current function/s of consciousness that seem crucial to the functioning of
at least some species and may be evolutionarily relevant, with contextual
information about its role/s in the organisms’ functioning.
An adaptation
3 Consciousness has (or had) survival value.
3.5 Consciousness either is or has been an evolutionary adaptation in certain
animal species because of certain specified features of consciousness.
What adaptation/s
5 Past or current survival value of consciousness without any additional details.
6.5 Past or current evolutionary function/s of consciousness with some contex-
tual information.
8 Evolutionary function/s of consciousness, covering both past and present,
with contextual information.
Origin and history
4 Partial evolutionary history of consciousness without any contributing
factors or other details; for example, a partial description of one stage or
development during the origin of consciousness or its more recent history in
one species without any causes or effects.
7 Either evolutionary history of consciousness without additional details or
partial evolutionary history of consciousness with some contributing factors
and other details; for example, the origin of consciousness or a later transition
with some reasons for its development.
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Table 2.2 (continued)
Score Description
10 Evolutionary history of consciousness with as many details as we can cur-
rently hope for, including the origin and following development of all aspects
of consciousness until today with contributing factors.
Fertility bonus
+0.5 Some additional benefits for other approaches to the research goal, such as
a plausible new hypothesis, a new approach to a problem, or other leads for
future research outside the aim category of the means of inquiry.
+1 Significant additional benefits for other approaches to the research goal, such
as evidence with clear and strong implications for other categories.
Note. The bar (i.e., minimum performance for potentially promising means of inquiry) on each
criterion is 2.
score ≤ 1), the means cannot be promising—in line with the phrase “garbage in,
garbage out”—independent of the means’s performance on other criteria and dimen-
sions. Table 2.3 shows the evaluation tool’s rubric for scoring the strength of input
to means of inquiry.
The efficacy of a means of inquiry also hinges on how the means arrives at results
or conclusions or, in other words, how it processes and transforms the input into
output. Consequently, the quality of the procedure of a means of inquiry needs to
be assessed. This quality is positively influenced by, for example, a means making
sound assumptions, cogently connecting input to output, and excluding alternative
conclusions (except where this is linked to the specificity of the means, which is
assessed in the relevance dimension). The evaluation of procedures should, like the
evaluation of input, be based on analyses of the means of inquiry and, if appropriate,
previous applications. Unsuccessful applications may draw attention to procedural
problems, whereas successful applications can be evidence that a means of inquiry
works (Nickles, 1986), as long as either outcome is not accidental (Rescher, 1977) or
otherwise unrelated to the means itself. A means of inquiry is unpromising when its
conclusion does not follow or only very poorly follows from the input (i.e., procedure
score ≤ 1). The anchors given in Table 2.3 indicate how means of inquiry are to be
scored on the procedure criterion.
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Table 2.3
Rubric for Assessing the Efficacy of Means of Inquiry on Two Criteria
Score Description
Input
0 The type or source of data that the means of inquiry is designed to take
as input is very poor, or there is very strong evidence against an essential
premise of the means.
5 The input to the means of inquiry allows it to work moderately under ideal
circumstances. For example, the data may be somewhat biased or the evid-
ence for some of the premises weak.
10 The quality of the data to be processed by the means of inquiry is very high,
or the evidence for all premises of the means is very strong.
Procedure
0 The procedure of the means of inquiry is very poor due to, for example, a
faulty assumption, the irrelevance of the input to the conclusion, or a fatal
logical error.
5 The means’s procedure tends to lead to the conclusion, but, for example,
alternative interpretations are possible or an assumption is questionable.
10 The means’s assumptions or implicit premises are sound, and its conclusions
follow cogently and exclusively from the input.
Note. The bar (i.e., minimum performance for potentially promising means of inquiry) on each
criterion is 2.
Practicality dimension. The more a means of inquiry can realistically be put to
use, the more practical it is. Because the present project necessarily abstracts from
particular situations, the practicality dimension is limited to the currently available
prerequisite data for the use of a means of inquiry and its resource requirements:
Practicality = .5 Availability of data + .5 Resource cost
Note that, in a given research situation, the project’s recommendations are straight-
forward to integrate with pertinent situational factors (unless, e.g., the definition of
promising as likely to contribute substantially to the research goal is rejected as too
low-risk). The evaluation question in this dimension, in short, is how practicable the
application of a means of inquiry is, irrespective of its relevance and efficacy.
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Both the quantity and quality of available data or evidence about consciousness
that could serve as input to a means of inquiry help determine whether and how suc-
cessfully the means can be employed. For example, when evaluating the practicality
of the comparative method, we need to estimate how much and how good our know-
ledge of animal consciousness in different species is or could be soon (see Chapter 5).
Information on the input to a means of inquiry from the efficacy dimension is thus
useful in assessing the availability of data. The data or evidence do not have to be
ready for use now; it is sufficient for the purpose of this evaluation if they are likely to
be accessible within a decade. Evidence for data availability normally comes from the
research literature, including past applications of the means of inquiry in the present
context. A means is currently unpromising if hardly any or only very poor data or
evidence about consciousness are available for its application to consciousness (i.e.,
data availability score ≤ 1). Table 2.4 provides guidelines for scoring the availability
of data or evidence as input to particular means of inquiry.
The evaluation tool’s final essential criterion is resource cost, that is, the cost of the
resources required to employ a means of inquiry in a research project. The resource
cost of a means and the contribution it is capable of making determine its efficiency,
the only value agreed upon by Coryn (2007), Nickles (1987b, 1989), and Rescher
(1977). As this tool’s criteria are more basic, the efficiency of any evaluated means
of inquiry can be calculated from its relevance, efficacy, and resource cost: efficiency
= efficacy/cost; efficiency for the present purpose = 0.5 · (relevance + efficacy)/cost.
The resource cost of a means of inquiry should be estimated on the scale in Figure 2.2
in terms of time and money, which are the most elementary general resources—others
tend to reduce to them, or to depend on the particular research situation, or both (e.g.,
space, equipment, staff, expertise, effort, reputation, opportunity; Scriven, 2007a). A
means of inquiry that requires too much time or money is unpromising (i.e., resource
cost score ≤ 1). Table 2.4 assists with scoring the resource cost of means of inquiry.
Once the two criteria in each of the evaluation tool’s dimensions have been as-
sessed and the results combined into dimension scores, the final promise score can be
calculated as follows:
Promise = .4 Relevance + .4 Efficacy + .2 Practicality
The weights subordinate practicality to relevance and efficacy because practicality is
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Table 2.4
Rubric for Assessing the Practicality of Means of Inquiry on Two Criteria
Score Description
Availability of data
0 The data or evidence about consciousness that is required as input to the
means of inquiry is either very unlikely to be accessible within a decade or
useless because of its very poor quality.
5 The availability of data or evidence about consciousness enables the means of
inquiry to be applied to consciousness, yet the means’s contribution clearly
stays below its potential. There is (or will likely be soon) either a moderate
amount of data or evidence of moderate quality available as input to the
means of inquiry, or there is some data or evidence of high quality, or there
is much data or evidence of low quality.
10 There is (or will likely be soon) ample good data or evidence about con-
sciousness that could serve as input to the means of inquiry.
Resource costa
0 Employing the means of inquiry would require excessive time, money, or
both. That is, even if its use brought significant benefits, the means is very
unlikely to be used because the cost of the required resources would be too
large for most funding agencies and research groups.
5 The resources required to employ the means of inquiry are moderate overall:
Either much time and little money, little time and much money, or moderate
amounts of both are needed.
10 Very little time and money is needed to employ the means of inquiry, because
its input consists entirely of readily available data, or all of its premises are
well-established, and its procedure is easy and fast to execute.
Note. The bar (i.e., minimum performance for potentially promising means of inquiry) on each
criterion is 2.
aResource cost is scored inversely (i.e., a resource-expensive means of inquiry receives a low score) for




less essential to the promise of means of inquiry, as long as the means’ performance is
above the minimum acceptable level on the corresponding criteria, and because these
criteria differ more across situations (e.g., resource cost may be a lesser concern in an
exploratory phase of research or in a very well-funded project). The subordination
additionally prevents errors in the less accurate assessment of practicality from un-
duly influencing the overall promise score. Weights may be adjusted when selecting
means of inquiry according to the particular research situation, provided there are
compelling reasons to do so. Dimension and promise scores can then be translated
into descriptive labels using the scale in Figure 2.2. The results of the subevalu-
ations and the final synthesis should be presented in tables and graphs to facilitate
the systematic comparison of means of inquiry on criteria, dimensions, and promise.
Conclusion
This chapter explained the rationale for the research reported in this thesis and de-
scribed the construction of a tool that permitted the research to be carried out. First I
argued that the literature on the biological evolution and function/s of consciousness,
which is largely made up of various underdeveloped hypotheses, could be advanced
considerably by the use of suitable means of inquiry. To help with the challenge of
selecting suitable means of inquiry in this emerging multidisciplinary and methodo-
logically difficult research area, I set out to evaluate the promise of means of inquiry
into the evolution of consciousness. Because my literature search for an applicable
or adaptable evaluation tool was unsuccessful, I constructed one for this purpose.
The tool is underpinned by an evaluative theory (Scriven, 2007b) about what essen-
tial properties make a means of inquiry promising in the present context. In brief, a
means needs to be relevant, efficacious, and practical, as assessed on two criteria each,
using scoring rubrics. Applying a numerical synthesis procedure results in a promise
score, which indicates what means of inquiry are most worth pursuing because they
are likely to contribute substantially to the research goal: a scientifically respectable
evolutionary explanation of consciousness.
An issue that came up repeatedly in this chapter is the evaluation tool’s degree of
elaborateness. For example, I only constructed the tool because the earlier evaluation
scheme was not elaborate enough, but then I focused on essential criteria and left the
description of intermediate performances in the scoring rubrics for when the tool has
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shown itself useful. If readers accept that an evaluation of means of inquiry into the
evolution of consciousness should be beneficial, the more likely—and in any case the
more damaging—charge is insufficient rather than excessive thoroughness and pre-
cision. In reply I emphasise that appropriateness is crucial: Making the evaluation
much more detailed and its estimates much more precise would require an unreas-
onable amount of resources for a first evaluation study of the extent of elaboration
and in the area outlined above. We do not need evaluation results with a high degree
of certainty at this point; an approximate indication of which means of inquiry are
currently most promising, and why, already has the potential to significantly improve
research and, hence, ultimately our evolutionary understanding of consciousness.
We are now ready to see the evaluation tool in action. In the following three
chapters, I apply the tool to many different means of inquiry, all of which have been
used or suggested to be used in the investigation of the biological evolution or func-
tion/s of consciousness. To avoid varying all evaluative dimensions at once, I start
by evaluating 10 means of inquiry with the same research subgoal, namely showing
that consciousness is (or was) an evolutionary adaptation. This subgoal is particu-
larly suited for the first round because it is the best-defined subgoal with the smallest
range of relevance scores. In addition, the 10 means of inquiry were the ones used for
piloting the evaluation scheme and for comparing global and analytical evaluations
with earlier versions of the present evaluation tool. The following chapter thus be-
gins to show what we can learn about the means of inquiry, their promise, and the
evaluation tool through its application.
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What is arguably the most fundamental question about the biological evolution of
consciousness is whether consciousness has evolved for a purpose, that is, whether
consciousness is (or was) an evolutionary adaptation. All means of inquiry evaluated
in this chapter are aimed at providing support for the claim that consciousness is a
current (or past) adaptation. Sufficient support for this claim would strengthen the
many accounts of consciousness and its function/s that are based on the claim (e.g.,
Baars, 1988; Crick & Koch, 1995; Koch, 2004). Such support could also justify the
search for current causal role function/s of consciousness: Several philosophers have
argued for the claim that consciousness is an adaptation, and hence causally affects the
fitness of conscious organisms, in order to discredit epiphenomenalism (e.g., Flanagan,
1992; James, 1879, 1890/1907; Nichols & Grantham, 2000). Moreover, empirical
evidence and reasoning about the adaptation status of consciousness can yield valuable
information for pursuing the other three research subgoals (viz., identifying current
and evolutionary function/s of consciousness as well as its evolutionary development),
for example, by highlighting the most relevant features of consciousness, establishing
constraints on its possible function/s, and suggesting not only that it is (or is not) an
adaptation but why.
Approaching consciousness as a potential product of natural selection before trying
to exclude nonselective explanations is an instance of methodological adaptationism.
Although it may turn out that a particular trait was not directly selected for during
evolution, adaptationism as a research strategy recommends seeking an adaptation
explanation of the trait to begin with (Godfrey-Smith, 2001; Holcomb III, 2001).
Such an approach is motivated not only by the successful history of methodological
adaptationism—properly applied—since well before Darwin’s (1859) Origin of Species
(Godfrey-Smith, 2001; Mayr, 1983; West-Eberhard, 1992) but also by its current pre-
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valence and increased sophistication in evolutionary biology (Alcock, 2005; Freeman
& Herron, 2007; Griffiths, 1996; Zuk, 2002). Another reason for pursuing methodo-
logical adaptationism is that adaptation hypotheses are often less difficult to confirm
or disconfirm than hypotheses about the operation of nonselective factors (Lewontin,
1978; Mayr, 1983; Godfrey-Smith, 2001). Adaptationist methods can help to identify
such factors; for instance, an optimisation model’s unconfirmed prediction may point
to an overlooked genetic or developmental constraint (Maynard Smith, 1978; Sterelny
& Griffiths, 1999). Knowledge of adaptations is typically also necessary for support-
ing alternative hypotheses, for example, about by-products or vestiges (Buss et al.,
1998; West-Eberhard, 1992) and for allowing comparative evaluations of selective and
nonselective explanations (Andrews, Gangestad, & Matthews, 2002). Methodological
adaptationism is thus an important approach to the evolutionary study of biological
traits generally.
This chapter focuses specifically on the evaluation of those means of inquiry that
aim to show that consciousness is an adaptation independent of the function/s it may
have, hence the title methodological adaptationism without hypothesised functions. I
first consider the basic evolutionary reasoning that appears to commonly underlie
the claim that consciousness is an adaptation. The two arguments evaluated next
are characterised by their reliance either on users’ own experiences or expert opinion
on the adaptation status of consciousness. I then examine five further single-sentence
adaptation arguments. The final two evaluations are of comparative arguments, which
aim to infer the adaptation status of consciousness from its distribution among today’s
animals, and arguments from the complexity of consciousness as a feature of special
design. The chapter concludes with a comparison of the evaluated means of inquiry
based on a table of all subevaluations and a graph of dimensional and promise results.
3.1 Analysis of the argument from evolution
Perhaps it is obvious that consciousness is an evolutionary adaptation: “Conscious-
ness . . . is no doubt naturally selected” (Penrose, 1987, p. 266). After all, the most
developed cognitive theory of consciousness, global workspace theory, simply assumes
that, “like any other biological adaptation, consciousness is functional” (Baars, 1988,
p. 347); and prominent neuropsychologist Richard Gregory (1998) asked, “why should
consciousness have evolved if it is useless?” (p. 1693). In this section I examine a
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common basis of the presumption that consciousness is a current adaptation by writ-
ing out the underlying deductive argument, which I call the argument from evolution.
A detailed analysis of the argument’s premises enables a concise evaluation of its
promise at the end of the section.
Gregory’s (1998) question provides a clue to the reasoning that frequently seems to
be behind the claim that consciousness is an adaptation. The point he presumably
wanted to make with his question relies on the following modus tollens, a valid form
of argument that denies the consequent of the conditional premise:
If consciousness were useless, then it would not have evolved.
Consciousness has evolved.
Therefore, consciousness is useful.
By using transposition and adjusting the conditional, the conditional premise can
be rewritten as “If consciousness has evolved, then it is useful.” Because Gregory
employed the term useful in the context of evolution, it may be replaced by the term
adaptive. By substituting the latter in turn with the term an adaptation,1 the general
argument for consciousness being an adaptation can be expressed as the following
modus ponens, a valid form of argument that affirms the antecedent of the conditional
premise:
If consciousness has evolved, then it is an adaptation.
Consciousness has evolved.
Therefore, consciousness is an adaptation.
(A)
The form of this deductive argument is valid, but the argument is only sound if both
premises are true. The truth of the conclusion that consciousness is an adaptation
therefore depends on the truth of the conditional premise and the truth of the second
premise.
Second premise. Taking the second premise first, the following breakdown of the
claim that consciousness has evolved is helpful in assessing its truth:
1This substitution is only justified when taking into account the antecedent, that is, when assuming
that the trait in question has evolved. Although not all traits that have evolved and are adaptive
are adaptations (it depends on whether their existence is due to positive natural selection over many
generations), using evolution to infer adaptiveness implies a concern with adaptation.
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We are conscious.
We have evolved.
Therefore, consciousness has evolved.
(P2)
The argument is intuitively phrased, but its conclusion is at risk because the different
contexts of the term we in the premises suggest different meanings of the term. When
we evaluate whether we are conscious we tend to extrapolate from introspection,
concentrating on the inner view of our mental processes. However, when we consider
the claim that we are a product of biological evolution we are more likely to think
of our outward appearance, a salient feature of our phenotype. The tempting change
of meaning from mind to body is a reminder to use terms consistently: The meaning
assigned to the term we in the first premise must be the same as, or suitably related
to, the meaning assigned to it in the second premise. Authors who argue from the
existence of consciousness to it being adaptive or an adaptation typically speak of
Homo sapiens with a first-person plural personal pronoun or possessive adjective in
proximity (i.e., we, us, our ; e.g., Flanagan & Polger, 1995; Gray, 1971). Hence, we
should take both uses of the term we in argument (P2) as referring to whole human
beings without inattentively sliding in meaning from mind to body.
Both premises of the argument for consciousness having evolved are amply sup-
ported from a psychological and a biological point of view, respectively. Although
philosophical objections can be raised, the first premise that we are conscious is al-
most certainly true (which is why consciousness realism and other conscious minds
could be assumed in section 1.1). Consciousness exists not only in the mental worlds
of individual human beings, it is generated by their brains in interaction with their
environments and becomes apparent in their behaviours, such as their descriptions
of their own conscious experiences. Regarding the second premise, Darwin (1859)
already intended his theory of evolution by natural selection to apply to humans in-
cluding “each mental power and capacity” (p. 488). Today there is no scientific doubt
that human bodies—along with the minds their brains generate—are a product of
biological evolution (see section 1.2). Considered separately, both premises are highly
probable for humans.
The soundness of argument (P2) now only depends on whether the conclusion
follows necessarily from the premises. To clarify the connection between the two
premises, a reexamination of the meaning of we in each premise is required. Even
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though we are indeed conscious, consciousness is only part of human beings, which
is obvious when it is contrasted with, for example, unconscious mental processes or
the rest of the human body that is not directly involved in generating consciousness.
Modifying the first premise accordingly, reversing the order of the premises, and taking
into account the first examination of we gives a more precise version of argument (P2):
Whole humans are a product of biological evolution.
Human consciousness is a component of whole humans.
Therefore, human consciousness is a product of biological evolution.
Note that by calling consciousness a component I do not mean to prejudge whether
it is a state, a process, or an activity, only to point out that it does not amount to a
complete living and acting organism.
The meaning of the evolutionary premise that we or, in the most recent version
of the argument, whole humans have evolved becomes clearer if formalised further
into the major premise of a categorical syllogism: “All components of humans are
products of biological evolution.” Only such a strong version of this premise makes
argument (P2) valid without additional premises. To count as a product of biological
evolution, a trait or organism must have been shaped by evolutionary processes,
either directly or indirectly. However, even an evolved trait or organism may have
features that are not products of biological evolution, for instance, if they have been
determined by constraints or are too recent for evolutionary processes to have effected
significant change. Examples of the latter are such widespread activities of modern
humans as reading, typing, smoking, and playing soccer. The strong version of the
evolutionary premise is therefore false—not all components of humans have evolved—
and the deductive argument (P2) unsound.
The conclusion of argument (P2) may nevertheless be true. To argue that con-
sciousness is probably a product of biological evolution, we could use an inductive
version of the argument and supply additional premises with support. Consciousness
is more likely to have evolved, for example, if there is evidence that it is not purely
a recent cultural product (see section 1.4), that it is intimately associated with the
brain, that all humans seem to develop it early in their lives and spontaneously, and
that prolonged unconsciousness threatens their survival and reproduction. (Another
strategy, namely showing that consciousness is an adaptation, which entails that it has
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evolved, is not available here because argument [A] reasons in the opposite direction:
from evolution to adaptation.) Such an inductive version of argument (P2) would, I
believe, warrant the conclusion that consciousness has very likely evolved—otherwise
I would not have undertaken an evaluation of means of inquiry into the biological
evolution of consciousness.
First premise. Turning now to the conditional premise of the argument from evol-
ution, illustrations of the underlying reasoning show that the emphasis is on what the
evolution of consciousness contributes to its adaptation status. After having described
how Darwin’s ideas influenced the study of consciousness, George A. G. A. Miller
(1962/1966) explained that “the very fact that an animal had evolved through thou-
sands of generations implied that the changes were adaptive” (p. 151). Similarly,
Popper (1977) asserted that “the Darwinian view must be this: consciousness . . . [is]
to be regarded (and, if possible, to be explained) as the product of evolution by natural
selection” (p. 183). Reasoning like this can also be found in more recent publications.
For instance, “if we . . . follow the general ideas of evolution, then we would expect
to find that some of the effects of consciousness have survival advantages” (Squires,
1990, p. 36). Bringsjord, Noel, and Ferrucci (2002) answered the question whether
consciousness is “a big deal” for evolution, presumably meaning whether conscious-
ness is an adaptation, by stating “apparently; after all, we evolved” (p. 111). Likewise
reminiscent of Gregory’s (1998) rhetorical question discussed in the introduction to
this section, Humphrey (2002) concluded that consciousness is biologically useful for
the reason that “whatever exists as a consequence of evolution must have a function”
(p. 68) because it could not have evolved otherwise. These examples imply that we
can infer that consciousness is an adaptation from it having evolved.
To analyse the conditional premise of argument (A), the premise can be usefully
translated into a categorical proposition. The original statement “If consciousness has
evolved, then it is an adaptation” reads in categorical form “All products of biological
evolution that are identical to human consciousness are adaptations.” This statement
is undoubtedly true if all products of evolution are adaptations. However, we know
that some products of biological evolution are not adaptations. Well-known examples
of human nonadaptations include the redness of blood (Gould & Lewontin, 1979;
Wallace, 1889), the whiteness of bones (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Wallace, 1889),
heart sounds (Canfield, 1964; Hempel, 1959), the chin (Gould, 1977; Lewontin, 1978),
male nipples (Symons, 1979), and the belly button (Buss et al., 1998). Because the
82
3.1 Analysis of the argument from evolution
general statement that all evolutionary products are adaptations is contradicted by
the fact that some evolutionary products are not adaptations, the general statement
does not substantiate the conditional premise. In sum, then, the conditional premise
is false because the evolution of a trait does not entail it being an adaptation—and
so far nobody has claimed that consciousness is exempt from this general statement.
Most, if not all, of the examples above thus appear to be unsound deductive ar-
guments that reason from evolution to adaptation with certainty, yet the argument
from evolution could work as an inductive argument: Because evolution by itself is
not a sufficient condition of adaptations, additional support is needed to strengthen
the conclusion. This was already recognised, for example, by William James (1879)
who stated that consciousness had an evolutionary origin and who then, instead of
simply inferring that consciousness was adaptive, went on to provide evidence for its
usefulness. To conclude from its evolution that consciousness is an adaptation, ques-
tions such as the following should be answered and supported (see also section 1.2):
Is the considered concept or aspect of consciousness at a level of aggregation at which
potential adaptations may be found? Was consciousness behaviourally efficacious so
that natural selection could act on it? Were conscious organisms fitter than their
less conscious competitors? If so, was consciousness actually selected for? And was
consciousness heritable so that it could be passed on reliably? The argument from
evolution by itself does not establish that consciousness is an adaptation, but addi-
tional support, such as the arguments considered in the remainder of this chapter,
might warrant this conclusion.
Based on the preceding analysis of the argument from evolution, the argument’s
promise can be evaluated as described in section 2.4. The argument from evolution
aims to show that consciousness is an evolutionary adaptation. I give this argument
the higher of the two possible relevance scores for means of inquiry in this category,
for three reasons: The argument is applicable to any aspect of consciousness and
to any species whose consciousness can be supported as having evolved, it aims to
provide definite knowledge, and it specifies the feature of consciousness that allegedly
makes it an adaptation (i.e., having evolved). Although the argument highlights this
requirement for adaptations, which is in fact a necessary condition for all evolutionary
explanations of consciousness, it does not deserve a fertility bonus because it does not
carry additional benefits for other approaches (i.e., being an adaptation already entails
having evolved). Hence, the relevance of the argument from evolution to the research
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goal is still only low (3.5).
In evaluating the argument’s efficacy, we may take the premises of argument (A)
as input to the argument and its inference as procedure. The inference of this de-
ductive argument is valid (10), but the conditional premise is false (0, below the bar),
rendering the argument unsound and unpromising. The much less common inductive
version of the argument without additional premises fares only slightly better on the
input criterion, though it avoids the cutoff for potentially promising means: Having
evolved supports the first premise’s consequent that consciousness is very likely an ad-
aptation weakly (2). Even though the deductive argument’s promise has already been
determined, it is worthwhile to evaluate the argument’s practicality to enable com-
parisons and potential improvements. Much good evidence about the second premise
of argument (A) is already available or could easily be so within a decade (9), as
indicated by the above suggestions of support for the inductive version of argument
(P2). Giving the argument requires gathering such support, which implies a relat-
ively low consumption of resources (8), dependent, of course, on the extensiveness and
quality of support gathered. The analysis of the argument from evolution examined
the underlying reasoning and showed clearly why the argument is unpromising and
how it could be improved. Due to space limitations, the following nine evaluations of
arguments in this chapter are reported in less detail.
3.2 Arguments based on experience or others
Do you feel that consciousness might have come about as a functionless by-product or
by chance alone? It has been claimed that “the standard view is that consciousness
evolved because it conferred its bearers an adaptive advantage” (Polger & Flanagan,
2002, p. 21) and similarly that “the dominant view is that consciousness is itself an ad-
aptive feature, playing a crucial functional role” (Hameroff, 1999, p. 245). This section
identifies the main reason why nearly everyone who has thought about consciousness
is apparently convinced that it is an evolutionary adaptation. Most of the authors
who realised that they needed to provide support for such a claim about conscious-
ness, aside from stating that consciousness exists and has evolved (see section 3.1),
seem to have relied on introspective insight into their own conscious experience for
evidence. After analysing and evaluating the corresponding influential argument from
subjective centrality, I assess the two quotations given above, which appeal to the
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prevailing view as an authority in support of consciousness being an adaptation.
Argument from subjective centrality. Introspection and communication with other
people show us how central consciousness is to our lives. In fact, it is hard to imagine
what our lives would be like without consciousness; it seems to affect our experiences
and many of our actions vitally. Because we experience consciousness as such an
essential feature of our lives, we tend to infer that natural selection would not have
ignored but rather favoured it. For example, Gray (1971) argued that, “although
certain minor characteristics of organisms might arise by association with other char-
acteristics themselves possessing survival value, i.e., as epiphenomena, it seems im-
plausible that such a major characteristic as the possession of consciousness could do
so” (pp. 252–253). In summarising this inclination to believe that consciousness is an
adaptation because of its centrality to us, Ruse (2000) abstracted from introspective
evidence to human nature:
Consciousness seems a very important aspect of human nature. Whatever
it may be, consciousness is so much a part of what it is to be human that
Darwinians are loath to say that natural selection had no or little role in
its production and maintenance. (p. 197)
The suggestion is thus that the subjective importance of consciousness points to con-
sciousness being an adaptation.
The argument from the centrality of consciousness is often presented with more
emphasis on the adaptive significance of consciousness than on the action of natural
selection, as exemplified by the following three quotations. A˚rhem and Liljenstro¨m
(1997) called consciousness “an outstanding feature of man, and presumably of other
species as well,” and explained that, “according to the theory of evolution, outstand-
ing features of organisms have evolved because they have a survival value for the
organism” (p. 610). Franklin (2005) also believed that subjective consciousness was
“too central a trait . . . to have evolved and survived without serving a vital purpose”
(p. 118; his other reasons are discussed below). Finally, Baars (1988) asserted that,
“like many other major biological phenomena, consciousness plays more than one
significant adaptive role” (p. 377). The frequently given centrality argument sounds
plausible because we tend to agree with its authors that the lives we lead hinge on us
being conscious and, consequently, that being conscious probably helped our ancestors
in their survival.
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The basic idea that the significance of something for an organism can support the
claim that it is an evolutionary adaptation is not a bad one, provided that the some-
thing is likely to be an evolved trait of that organism. Plausible examples of evolved
traits that are central to our lives are bipedalism, tool use, and parental love. All
of the examples of centrality arguments quoted above do assume that consciousness
is a product of evolution at the appropriate level of aggregation, so the (inductive)
argument from subjective centrality may be phrased as follows:
Consciousness is central to us.
Consciousness has very likely evolved.
Therefore, consciousness is very likely an adaptation.
The evolutionary premise needs to be made explicit because stating the importance of
something, by itself, is at most weak support for an adaptation claim. This is because
the something could be central, for example, only at a particular time to a single
individual. More generally, the central something may be very rare in the population,
it may not be heritable, or it could simply be too recent for evolutionary processes
to have acted on it. The expanded argument from subjective centrality clears the
evolutionary hurdle, but there are other difficulties with it.
One weakness of the argument is that the notion of centrality is not clear. When can
something be considered central in the sense that qualifies it as a potential adaptation?
Consider a well-known counterexample which shows that seeming significance is not
necessarily a good guide for identifying adaptations: The redness of blood looks like
an important feature. The colour stands out, in particular when compared to the
transparency of other bodily fluids such as saliva, sweat, and tears. Blood could be
red, for example, because the redness draws attention to an animal’s wound requiring
action. Instead, blood is red because it comprises iron-containing haemoglobin used
for oxygen transport. Hence the redness of blood is not central. The next question
then is how much we need to know about something before we can reliably identify
it as central in the relevant sense. Knowing why something is central would make
the centrality argument stronger, but the aim of the arguments in this chapter is to
offer support for consciousness as an adaptation that does not require knowledge of
hypothesised function/s. The vagueness of the intended centrality weakens the link
between the centrality premise and the adaptation conclusion.
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The basis for the centrality argument about consciousness is, as already mentioned,
introspective evidence—principally from one’s own introspection, but also in the form
of reports about others’ introspections. That is to say, we typically know how im-
portant consciousness is to our lives from introspection, which itself depends on con-
sciousness: Insofar as introspection refers to the conscious action of looking into the
consciously accessible parts of one’s mind, we cannot introspect unconsciously. It
seems quite possible therefore that the conscious nature of introspection could lead
us to misjudge the significance of consciousness. This idea is in line with Flanagan’s
(1992) claim that consciousness makes us overestimate the part it plays in our mental
lives. Researchers who have contended that “the individual values his consciousness
above all else” (Barlow, 1980, p. 81), that it gives rise to “a Self whose life is worth
pursuing” (Humphrey, 2006, p. 131), or similarly that phenomenal consciousness is
“the phenomenon that makes life worth living” (Bringsjord et al., 2002, p. 121) cer-
tainly value consciousness deeply. Because introspection is probably not an impartial
consciousness meter, it is imprudent to rely on introspection unquestioningly. Other
reasons for mistrusting introspection are dealt with in section 4.1, and we should take
these warnings about introspection seriously when making or assessing claims about
consciousness.
Although introspection presumably leads us to overvalue consciousness, our high
esteem for consciousness could nevertheless point to an adaptive purpose in evolu-
tion. This is not because we are necessarily in accord with natural selection on what
is important (we take most adaptations for granted, such as circadian rhythms, biped-
alism, and eyes, and may even dislike some potential adaptations, such as pregnancy
sickness, sweating, and jealousy), but because there might be a good evolutionary
reason why we perceive consciousness as central. What matters to natural selection
is whether the felt importance of consciousness influences our actions in an evolution-
arily relevant way, as parental love does for instance. A possible example for such an
evolutionary function of consciousness is that we may all have “at some point decided
to go on living in large part in order to continue to be conscious” (Bringsjord et al.,
2002, p. 111). If the subjective importance of consciousness is an inherent feature of
evolved consciousness and if it is central to our lives, then valuing consciousness itself
might call for an adaptation explanation by the above centrality logic (e.g., Barlow,
1980). It is thus possible that we value consciousness because valuing consciousness
contributes to our survival, but it is unlikely that we value consciousness because it
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is an adaptation.
To recapitulate the main points about the argument from subjective centrality, vir-
tually everyone today feels that consciousness is important: “For us, consciousness
is, to put it barbarically, a big deal” (Bringsjord et al., 2002, p. 111). Such claims
are based on introspection in the first instance: Consciousness feels central to us.
However, the subjective significance of consciousness assists adaptation claims about
consciousness only insufficiently, because consciousness could be less central than in-
trospection makes us believe and because our own appreciation of our features does
not indicate their adaptation status reliably. Generalised statements, such as that
consciousness is an adaptation because it is a central characteristic of how we live or
of human nature, appear to rely less on introspection but also fail to forge a strong
connection between centrality and adaptation status. Whether or not consciousness
is said to be central according to our values, which may be irrelevant to natural
selection, it must enable, or at least help to enable, evolutionarily important beha-
viours. If generalised arguments from the centrality of consciousness were claiming
the latter, they would seem to involve unspecified assumptions about the function/s
of consciousness; this would make an adequate evaluation difficult, and not belong to
the present chapter.
The evaluation tool serves to determine the promise of the argument from subjective
centrality. Like the argument from evolution in the previous section, this argument
receives the higher possible relevance score (3.5) for means of inquiry that aim to
support consciousness as an adaptation: For now the argument may only be usable
for human consciousness, but it addresses a specific characteristic of consciousness and
gives a clue why consciousness might be an adaptation (i.e., its subjective centrality).
The clue is, however, too vague for other approaches to benefit (e.g., when and why
is centrality evolutionarily relevant), so the argument does not qualify for a fertility
bonus. The evidence for the premises is high (8), though it would be worth providing
support for the subjective centrality of consciousness in other current and in earlier
cultures. Because of the problems with overvaluing consciousness and simplistically
equating our concerns with those of natural selection, the argument’s premises support
the conclusion only slightly more (3) than the premises of the inductive argument
from evolution. The availability of good data for applying the argument to human
consciousness is very high (9), and the resource cost low (7; cf. the argument from
evolution, with an additional premise to be supported), depending again on what
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support is collected. Taken together, the argument is moderately promising (5.2).
Argument from the standard view. Arguments from authority for consciousness
being an evolutionary adaptation are rare in the consciousness literature. This is not
surprising as there are only few people, if any at all, who would count as genuine
experts on this topic. Claims that it is the standard or dominant view that conscious-
ness is an adaptation were already quoted at the beginning of the present section. It
is not clear who the authority is on which these arguments rely. If it is the part of the
general population who has a basic knowledge of the theory of evolution, I agree with
the assessment of the mainstream view on this matter, yet question its significance. It
is doubtful that the general population is informed enough to act as an authority on
the adaptation status of consciousness. Their standard reasoning might go like this:
Consciousness is useful because it is central to me, so it probably is an adaptation.
Both inference steps could be challenged, but for now it suffices to refer back to our
likely bias regarding the centrality of consciousness and to the limited inferences we
can draw from any trait’s subjective centrality to its adaptive usefulness. Most of
us are neither qualified nor impartial enough to be appealed to convincingly as an
authority on whether consciousness is an adaptation.
Instead of invoking folk opinion on the adaptation status of consciousness, Hameroff
(1999) and Flanagan and Polger (Flanagan, 1999/2000; Polger & Flanagan, 2002)
might rather have had the mainstream view of consciousness researchers in mind:
The standard view among qualified experts is the best available
approximation to the truth.
The standard view among consciousness researchers is that
consciousness is an adaptation (or adaptive).
Therefore, consciousness is probably an adaptation (or adaptive).
This interpretation of the argument is supported by Hameroff’s quotation being part
of his introductory remarks to a section in the proceedings of a consciousness confer-
ence (and as such it is probably primarily meant as a description, not an argument).
The following quotations also suggest the consciousness-researcher interpretation for
Flanagan (1999/2000): “It is not completely uncontroversial, but it is pretty close
to being uncontroversial that sensory consciousness is an adaptation” (p. 102); “Dar-
win called the eyes ‘organs of extreme perfection.’ There is little doubt that visual
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consciousness is an adaptation” (p. 109). Controversies about the adaptation status
of sensory or visual consciousness would typically occur among researchers, and the
quotation of Darwin reinforces the focus on researchers. The question then is whether
there is any merit in engaging consciousness researchers as authorities on the adapt-
ation status of consciousness.
The majority of consciousness researchers believes that conscious vision and sen-
sation, and consciousness more generally, are evolutionary adaptations; here I con-
cur with Hameroff (1999) and Flanagan and Polger (Flanagan, 1999/2000; Polger &
Flanagan, 2002). However, even if the researchers’ knowledge was sufficiently impar-
tial and based on established results of scientific research, their status of authority
could still be undermined by a lack of adequate scientific evidence. Chapters 3 to 5
give an indication of the currently available evidence for consciousness being an adapt-
ation. This evidence is limited and, in addition, unlikely to be known comprehensively
by the majority of consciousness researchers. Note also that the apparent usefulness
or adaptiveness of certain kinds of consciousness, such as conscious vision and sensa-
tion, has been challenged on the grounds that they do not seem to be necessary for the
corresponding mental processing and behaviours to occur (e.g., Jaynes, 1976/2000;
Velmans, 1991; see sections 1.3 and 1.4). Nevertheless, the present argument from
expert authority looks more promising than its folk version, especially once more
scientific evidence is available and taken into account.
To be evaluated with the tool is thus the promise of the inductive argument from
the standard view among consciousness researchers. Because the argument does not
provide any additional information about consciousness other than that it might be
an adaptation, its relevance is lower (3) than that of the two arguments evaluated so
far. The first premise expresses an acceptable general argument from authority, and
the second premise is, overall, also well-supported (7): Although many consciousness
researchers have not publicly addressed the issue, the most frequently expressed view
is that consciousness is an adaptation (a small number of researchers who hold other-
wise are cited in the next section). Given that consciousness researchers may be only
partially knowledgeable about evolutionary theory and susceptible to bias about con-
sciousness, the support for the conclusion might be moderate (4); it would be higher if
the authority consisted of experts on the evolution of consciousness. Evidence regard-
ing the second premise is already available and could easily increase (e.g., dedicated
conference symposia, special journal issues; 8). Surveying the relevant academic lit-
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erature for standard-view support requires comparatively little time and hardly any
money (9). On the whole, the argument is about as promising (5.1) as the argument
from subjective centrality. Remarkably, all subevaluation scores of these two inductive
arguments are within 1 point of each other, and they both appeal to nonevolutionary
authorities to support the claim that consciousness is an adaptation.
3.3 Five simple adaptation arguments
At least on the surface, evolutionary reasons would appear to be more suitable for
making the case that consciousness is an evolutionary adaptation than introspection-
based or standard-view arguments. I discuss five such reasons in this section, which
are at least loosely connected with evolutionary theory: Among the most direct indic-
ators of the adaptation status of consciousness may be such features as its apparent
adaptedness and biological cost. Another argument infers that phenomenal conscious-
ness must be an adaptation from an evolutionary history constructed to explain its
nature. Then there is the observation that support for consciousness not being an
adaptation is lacking. And finally, people sometimes generalise from the adaptation
status of particular kinds of consciousness to that of consciousness in general. Most of
these arguments for consciousness being an adaptation, which I examine and evaluate
in turn, have the character of passing comments—maybe because no opposition was
expected.
Argument from apparent adaptedness. If consciousness has been selected for,
conscious organisms must have been better adapted to the selective environment than
their less conscious counterparts. Consequently, some researchers have argued that if
consciousness appears to render its possessors better adapted, it is more likely than
not an adaptation (assuming it has evolved): “Given its apparent adaptedness, the
null hypothesis must be that consciousness was selected for in the process of evolution
by natural selection” (Polger & Flanagan, 2002, p. 30).2 Using the more common term
adaptive for traits, the argument can be restated as follows:
2Incidentally, if we draw on the usefulness of consciousness to support the claim that consciousness
is an adaptation, we should not use the adaptation statement to infer that consciousness is functional,
as its efficacy has already been assumed at the outset.
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An adaptive trait is probably an adaptation.
Consciousness appears adaptive.
Therefore, consciousness is probably an adaptation.
Taking a trait’s adaptiveness as tentative support for it being an adaptation seems
reasonable in the absence of agreed-upon estimates of the prevalence of adaptations
compared to other evolutionary products: Although there are other causal processes
which could have led to the trait being adaptive (and the corresponding alternative ex-
planations should be examined as well), the simplest or most economical explanation
of its adaptiveness is that it is an adaptation.
What makes the application of the evaluation tool to this argument difficult is
that it is not clear what the basis is for the claim that consciousness is apparently
adaptive, nor even what its basis should be. On the one hand, the authors cited above
asserted that (consciousness of) acute pain is, prima facie, useful for minimising injury.
On the other hand, they acknowledged that “although it seems likely that some
varieties of consciousness are adaptations, specifying what the adaptive advantage
of a kind of consciousness might be is difficult” (Polger & Flanagan, 2002, p. 27),
thereby suggesting that the adaptation judgement need not depend on knowledge of
evolutionary function/s. For this reason, I do attempt to evaluate the argument from
apparent adaptedness here.
Starting again with the argument’s relevance to the research goal, I assign the lower
possible relevance score to the present argument (3) despite its similarity with the ar-
gument from evolution in this respect. Its potential contribution is lower than that
of the deductive argument from evolution because it does not aim to provide def-
inite knowledge; rather, it merely seems to recommend the research strategy, meth-
odological adaptationism, pursued by all arguments in this chapter. The evidence
concerning the apparent adaptiveness of consciousness—possibly from intuition, in-
trospection, or personal experience—is not strong, but in its favour (4). However,
apparent adaptiveness is only weak adaptation support (3), as it may well differ from
actual adaptiveness: Many intuitive beliefs about consciousness have already been
overturned, for instance, by evidence for unconscious mental processes. The availab-
ility of the aforementioned data is probably high (8), and the resource cost incurred
by collecting this data—whether from participants or the existing literature—low (8).
The argument from apparent adaptedness by itself is moderately promising (4.2).
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Argument from biological cost. Another feature of consciousness, its biological
cost, may suggest that it is an adaptation. Searle (2001) relied on such reasoning: “In
humans and higher animals an enormous biological price is paid for conscious decision
making . . . To suppose that this plays no role in inclusive fitness is . . . like supposing
that vision or digestion played no evolutionary role” (p. 509); as did Baars (1993):
“By any reasonable measure, the conscious stream is biologically very expensive. . . .
What evolutionary benefits could justify such costs?” (pp. 285–286; see also Keenan,
Rubio, Racioppi, Johnson, & Barnacz, 2005). Once again it is helpful to spell out the
premises and the conclusion of the argument:
A biologically costly trait is probably an adaptation.
Consciousness is biologically costly.
Therefore, consciousness is probably an adaptation.
The biological costs of (particular kinds of) consciousness referred to in this argument
include the energy consumption of its neural bases (Baars, 1993; Keenan et al., 2005;
Searle, 2001), the consequences of being limited to a single conscious stream (Baars,
1993), and the investments in rearing conscious offspring (Searle, 2001).
One way in which the argument from biological cost can go wrong is illustrated
by the following example. Beginning an argument by contradiction, Franklin (2005)
assumed that subjective consciousness was a by-product. He had previously granted
that a particular function of subjective consciousness could in principle be performed
unconsciously. Subjective consciousness would then have to be generated by a mech-
anism that was separate from the mechanism responsible for performing its function,
and hence, would carry its own computational or biological costs. He concluded
that because subjective consciousness had evolved in spite of these costs, it had an
adaptive significance outweighing them. A problem with this argument is that a by-
product is a by-product of an adaptation and is therefore not produced by a separate
mechanism—think of the redness of blood or the belly button as examples. Because
a costly by-product cannot be selected against while its adaptation is being selected
for, their costs and benefits need to be considered jointly. In general, costliness can
serve to identify adaptations (Andrews et al., 2002), in that a costly trait that could
be selected against would not normally evolve unless it was associated with benefits,
either directly (adaptation) or indirectly (by-product of an adaptation).
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The argument from biological cost performs well on the relevance dimension of
the evaluation tool (3.5) compared to other means of inquiry in the same category,
because it specifies why consciousness is probably an adaptation; yet it does not
entail additional benefits for other approaches to the research goal. The conclusion
of the argument follows from the premises (10), whose support seems closer to high
than moderate (7): The first premise is reasonable if the trait has evolved, though the
proportion of costly adaptations to costly by-products is not well-established. Support
for the second premise comes from, for example, evidence for lower neural activity both
during lower levels of consciousness (e.g., Laureys, Owen, & Schiff, 2004; Shulman,
Hyder, & Rothman, 2009) and for less conscious contents (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2001;
Tong, Nakayama, Vaughan, & Kanwisher, 1998). Although we should not expect
all confounds to be removed from measurements of the cost of consciousness within
the next decade, the accessibility of data about the premises is high (7). Especially
if a large proportion of the data is or becomes available as part of other studies,
the argument’s resource cost is low (7), and thus its promise for contributing to an
evolutionary explanation of consciousness is moderate to high (6.2).
Argument from evolutionary history. If we knew in what stages consciousness
evolved, we might be able to infer whether natural selection was involved in any of
them. In reply to self-posed questions about the nature of phenomenal consciousness,
Humphrey (2008) summarised his theory of conscious sensation, according to which
sensory responses became internalised during evolution. Before addressing the evolu-
tionary function of phenomenal consciousness, he stated that “we can surely assume
that the kind of development I have sketched above will not have happened accident-
ally. It must be the result of natural selection favouring genes that underwrite the
specialised neural circuits” (p. 267). A more formal version of the argument is the
following:
If the evolutionary history of changes in a trait necessitates that the trait was
selected for, the trait is, or was, an adaptation.
The evolutionary history of consciousness necessitates that it was selected for.
Therefore, consciousness is, or was, an adaptation.
Humphrey’s strategy of inferring that consciousness is an adaptation from its evolution
is appealing, but difficult to implement successfully: One would need a well-supported
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account of the evolutionary development of consciousness without any reference to the
action of natural selection—no likely selection pressures, function/s of consciousness,
or evidence about its adaptation status.
Although the present evaluation is of means of inquiry, not instances of their use,
it might be instructive to see how well Humphrey’s (2008) argument worked. Unfor-
tunately, his theory of the evolution of phenomenal consciousness appears to assume
natural selection: “Sentition [the activity of sensing] has been subtly shaped in the
course of evolution so as to make our picture of it have those added dimensions of
phenomenality” (p. 266). Other publications of his confirm this reading. For example,
Humphrey (2000) declared consciousness being an adaptation his default assumption
and set out to identify the evolutionary function of conscious sensory experience. He
combined the ideas that the subjective quality of sensations was selected for and that
it is private, hence invisible to evolution, by suggesting that it became so only after
its selection. Humphrey then outlined his theory of the evolution of sensation and
concluded that “we can both make good on our ambition, as Darwinists, to explain
sensory quality as a product of selection, and we can accept the common sense idea
that sensations are as private as they seem to be” (p. 250). In fact, natural selection
was already part of Humphrey’s (1992) evolutionary history of sensation when he
first began to develop his theory of sensation. Overall then, Humphrey (2008) did not
implement his own strategy, and his actual approach (1992, 2000) does not belong to
the present chapter because his evolutionary history involves hypothesised functions
of consciousness.
For means of inquiry aiming to show that consciousness is or was an adaptation,
the proposed argument from evolutionary history is relatively relevant to the research
goal (3.5) because it can be expected to identify changes involved in the emergence of
the adaptation. By specifying the evolutionary history of consciousness, the argument
carries significant additional benefits (+1), especially for the origin-and-history ap-
proach. I find no fault with the inference (10), and the first premise is only phrased too
strongly. However, so far there is at most weak evidence for the second premise (5);
almost all hypothesised evolutionary histories of consciousness do involve changes due
to natural selection, but this could, for example, reflect a shared bias instead of the
truth. The Achilles heel of the argument, at least in this evaluation round, is the very
low availability of data for the second premise within a decade (1, below the bar); we
still seem to be far from a well-supported nonselective evolutionary history of con-
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sciousness.3 The cost of the resources required to reconstruct as much as possible
of the evolution of (maybe just one kind of) consciousness is high (2), which is why
it appears unwise to neglect potentially valuable selective evidence in the face of a
largely missing historical record. In sum, the argument is currently unpromising due
to insufficient data but worth including in future evaluation rounds.
Argument from the absence of opposing evidence. Another argument centres
on the idea that consciousness is more likely to be an adaptation not only if there is
support for it being an adaptation but also if, in addition, there is little support for
it not being one:
If the evidence about a trait as an adaptation is mostly supportive, the
trait is probably an adaptation.
The evidence about consciousness as an adaptation is mostly supportive.
Therefore, consciousness is probably an adaptation.
For evidence to be mostly supportive, there needs to be clearly more evidence for the
trait being an adaptation than opposing evidence, such as evidence against the trait
being an adaptation or evidence for the trait being some kind of nonadaptation. The
argument has been used by Franklin (2005) who, besides offering positive reasons
for thinking that subjective consciousness is an adaptation, also gave the negative
reason that “either an argument, or evidence, for subjective consciousness being a
byproduct would be needed [to support the anti-adaptation case]. I know of neither”
(p. 118). The negative reason is problematic in this instance because Franklin stated
his ignorance in reply to a self-posed question that contained a suggestion for such
an argument: “It is hard to see why it [consciousness] is not just a byproduct, given
that we can explain the behavior purely in terms of the computational mechanisms”
(p. 117). Regardless, the general argument depends on how much opposing evidence
there is.
Hardly anyone has seriously claimed that consciousness is an evolutionary product
other than an adaptation. One exception is Thomas Huxley (1874/1882) who argued
3Leary and Buttermore (2003) have attempted a detailed reconstruction of the history of self-
reflection since the last common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees, but they cautioned that “far
more research is needed to offer a cogent and convincing explanation of why [emphasis added] symbolic
ability and the conceptual self evolved precisely as they did” (p. 395).
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that consciousness was “a collateral product” (p. 236) of brain processes without any
causal influence on such processes. He reasoned that our consciousness was preceded
in evolution by simpler forms of consciousness in nonhuman animals, but failed to con-
sider how such an epiphenomenal consciousness might have evolved. This oversight
could be remedied by Blakemore’s (2008) suggestion that consciousness evolved as a
by-product of the ability for metarepresentation, if we could explain the latter’s associ-
ation with consciousness. Note that the coupling of Blakemore’s metarepresentations
with conceptual language entails that most animal species are not conscious. Likewise,
Macphail (1998, 2000) speculated in his comparatively well-developed theory of the
evolution of consciousness that only the evolution of conceptual language brought
about consciousness in humans. He construed the benefits of self-consciousness,
namely helping to direct thoughts and to predict others’ actions, as possible addi-
tional advantages of language. Because the experience of pleasure and pain is not
necessary for appropriate behaviour to occur, Macphail could not conceive a function
for phenomenal consciousness and concluded that it was an evolutionary by-product
of self-consciousness. In doing so he erroneously inferred etiological epiphenomenalism
from inessentialism about phenomenal consciousness (see section 1.4) and overgener-
alised from pleasure and pain to other forms of phenomenal consciousness.
Two other nonadaptation accounts of consciousness deserve mention. The thrust of
Gould’s (1991) argument, as I understand it, is that “complex human consciousness”
(p. 59) evolved and is presently useful but did not originate as an adaptation, just like
almost everything else human brains, which did become enlarged for adaptive reasons,
do today. This argument is rooted in his belief that, “surely, for something so complex
and so replete with latent capacity as the human brain, spandrels must vastly out-
number original reasons, and exaptations of the brain must greatly exceed adaptations
by orders of magnitude” (p. 57).4 Most relevant here is that Gould did not provide
additional support for his claim and that he was only concerned with the nonadaptive
origin of human consciousness, not with its subsequent evolutionary development nor
with other kinds of consciousness. According to Rosenthal (2008), consciousness of
thoughts and desires occurs once self-ascriptions of thoughts and desires as causes of
behaviour (based on other- and self-observation) have become automatised through
4In this quotation the term spandrels most likely refers to co-opted by-products and exaptations
to co-opted adaptations. Gould’s (1991) use of the terms was inconsistent, including the question of
whether these traits’ current utility has biological significance (Buss et al., 1998).
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practice, but it does not add any significant benefit. This explanation is based on
“the difficulty of finding any credible function for the consciousness of psychological
states” (p. 837) and assumes Rosenthal’s higher-order-thought theory. Support for
consciousness not being an adaptation could also come from deflationary evolutionary
explanations (see section 5.1) and other epiphenomenalist arguments (see section 1.3),
but the latter have so far only been made in nonevolutionary contexts and are incon-
clusive.
Returning to the argument from the absence of opposing evidence to evaluate it,
its relevance to the research goal merits only the lower score in the respective cat-
egory of means of inquiry (3), because available evidence is reviewed merely for its
direction. A comparison of the digression in the last two paragraphs with Chapters 3
to 5 illustrates that most evidence is indeed for consciousness being an adaptation.
However, the other (generously phrased) premise is less certain (5), mainly because
the general principle is applied to potential adaptations and, furthermore, meant to
be applicable to consciousness: The near absence of nonadaptation evidence about
consciousness can alternatively be explained, at least in part, by the prevalence of
methodological adaptationism or the existence of a general bias in favour of con-
sciousness as an adaptation. This bias has been proclaimed by several researchers as
the default position (e.g., Humphrey, 2000; Polger & Flanagan, 2002) and is likely
to discourage researchers to look for and identify opposing evidence. Apart from this
significant concern, the conclusion follows from the premises (10); and determining
whether there is more evidence for than against the hypothesis that consciousness is
an adaptation is very resource inexpensive (9). Higher-quality data could be available
within a decade (6), but would require more efforts dedicated to identifying opposing
evidence, which goes against the continuing adaptation tendencies. The synthesis
procedure indicates that the argument is moderately promising for increasing our
knowledge about the biological evolution of consciousness (5.7).
Generalisation argument. Some adaptation claims are about consciousness in gen-
eral, whereas others are about particular kinds of consciousness. Consider the phrase
preceding an argument from the standard view: “Generalizing from cases like vision
and pain, the standard view is that consciousness evolved because it conferred its
bearers an adaptive advantage” (Flanagan, 1999/2000, p. 109). The suggestion here
is that the adaptation status of visual and pain consciousness extends to consciousness
in general:
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If some subtypes of a trait are adaptations, the trait is an adaptation.
Some subtypes of consciousness are probably adaptations.
Therefore, consciousness is probably an adaptation.
The argument raises several issues: How do we know which subtypes to consider?
Conscious vision and pain may be adaptations, but that is unlikely for other kinds of
consciousness such as conscious schizoid thinking (Flanagan, 1999/2000), conscious
chronic pain, and dreaming (see section 5.1). Moreover, it does not follow necessarily
from parts of a structure or function being adaptations that the whole structure or
function is an adaptation (Flanagan, 1999/2000, himself makes this point in a some-
what different context). Assuming that some kinds of consciousness are adaptations,
it is unclear what the encompassing consciousness is, how it has evolved in relation
to its subtypes, and hence whether, and how, its adaptation status and those of its
kinds are related in a general way.
This generalisation argument, the final means of inquiry to be evaluated in this
section, receives the lower possible relevance score of means for showing that con-
sciousness is an adaptation (3): The relation of consciousness to its subtypes that
supposedly makes it an adaptation may simply follow the alleged general rule in the
first premise without pointing to any evolutionarily relevant feature of consciousness.
It is this first premise that breaks the argument (0, below the bar), as should be evid-
ent from the aforementioned issues, especially the consequent not following logically
from the antecedent. Additionally, the first premise very much depends on our ability
to correctly identify traits and their subtypes at appropriate levels of aggregation.
In my phrasing of the argument, the inference is valid (10). Further, we can expect
the availability of provisional evidence about the adaptation status of different kinds
of consciousness to be high within a decade (7). Gathering this data may require
few resources, but might not be sufficient and would in any case need to be gathered
for more than one kind of consciousness (7). However, this is not advisable for the
purpose of the present argument as it is unpromising due to its false first premise.
The five arguments in this section, despite having a closer connection with evolu-
tionary theory than those in the previous section, are not on average more promising.
Two arguments are even unpromising, the argument from evolutionary history be-
cause of insufficient data within a decade and the generalisation argument because of
a false premise. The arguments that do perform better in the evaluation of promise,
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the argument from biological cost and the argument from the absence of opposing
evidence, can also easily go awry, as illustrated above. In addition, the basis of some
of the arguments is not clear, specifically of the argument from apparent adaptedness
and the generalisation argument. I suspect that the elaboration of the arguments,
which might have revealed problems with them or with instances of their use, either
did not occur to the respective authors or appeared superfluous because of the general
bias for consciousness being an evolutionary adaptation.
3.4 Evolutionary arguments taking us further
Proper evidence for the adaptation status of consciousness should ideally come from
proper evolutionary biology or psychology methods. Variations of two such means of
inquiry, namely of the comparative method and the special design standard (some-
times taken to include costliness; e.g., Andrews et al., 2002), have been employed
as arguments for consciousness having evolved by natural selection. As long as con-
sciousness does not exist exclusively in humans, we might be able to learn more about
its adaptation status based on which other species are conscious. Accordingly, the
argument from species comparisons relies on animal consciousness to infer that con-
sciousness is probably an adaptation. The argument from complex design, which is
introduced in more detail below, bears on the observation that some biological traits
appear so complex and well-designed that they are extremely unlikely to have arisen
by chance. I now analyse and evaluate the promise of these two arguments.
Argument from species comparisons. The common denominator of the first set
of arguments in this section, concerned with the distribution of consciousness in bio-
logical organisms, is what I call the argument from species comparisons:
A trait that is present in several animal species is probably an adaptation.
Consciousness is present in several animal species.
Therefore, consciousness is probably an adaptation.
An early illustration of such reasoning with a historical perspective is William James’s
(1879) statement that “consciousness . . . has been slowly evolved in the animal series,
and resembles in this all organs that have a use” (p. 3). James (1890/1907) later
elaborated on this:
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It is very generally admitted, though the point would be hard to prove,
that consciousness grows the more complex and intense the higher we rise
in the animal kingdom. That of a man must exceed that of an oyster. From
this point of view it seems an organ, superadded to the other organs which
maintain the animal in the struggle for existence; and the presumption of
course is that it helps him in some way in the struggle, just as they do.
(p. 138)
James’s (1890/1907) argument has intuitive appeal (perhaps excluding his claim to
oyster consciousness), but several points—about the general argument, James’s ver-
sion, and another version—need to be examined more closely.
First of all, to provide comparative arguments about consciousness, we must be able
to determine whether other biological organisms are conscious. By this I do not mean
to bring up the philosophical problem of other minds, which I shelved in section 1.1,
but rather a practical difficulty with animal consciousness: Nonhuman animals cannot
communicate with us about whether they are conscious or what they are experiencing,
by using a conceptual language. However, evidence for their consciousness can, for
instance, come from behavioural and neural similarities between them and us and
from nonverbal reports. Examples of similarities used in reasoning by analogy are pain
responses, efficacy of anaesthetics, brain structures, sensory systems, susceptibility to
visual illusions, and cognitive abilities (Allen, 2010). To give a specific example of the
use of nonverbal reports, macaque monkeys in Myerson, Miezin, and Allman’s (1981)
study of binocular rivalry were trained to indicate the direction in which vertical
gratings moved by pressing keys. When the direction of movement was opposite
for each eye, the monkeys reported direction alternations with similar characteristics
(e.g., distribution of durations, velocity dependence) to those reported by human
observers in the same experimental situation. Myerson et al. (1981) took this finding
as evidence of similar binocular-rivalry experiences in monkeys and humans.
Similarity support for animal consciousness can be boosted by taking possible com-
mon evolutionary descent into account (Allen, 2010). If species have a common an-
cestor and show similar behaviour, the more parsimonious explanation is that the
same, not different, mechanisms are involved in producing the behaviour in question,
with parsimony reflecting Fisherian likelihood (i.e., the same-mechanism explanation
makes the observed similarities more probable; Sober, 2000). Arguments from ho-
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mology, that is, from similarities due to shared ancestry, require knowledge of what
behaviours (and neural processes or structures) are associated with consciousness,
as does plain reasoning by analogy (for sample criteria of animal consciousness, see
Mesulam, 1998, and A. K. Seth, Baars, & Edelman, 2005). Any comparative argu-
ment should be based on evidence that the animals under consideration are conscious.
Granting that some animals are most likely conscious, are there alternative explana-
tions of the distribution of consciousness described by James (1890/1907)? It might be
possible, for example, that consciousness spread in an ancestral population common to
all of today’s conscious species by genetic drift and was then neither directly selected
for nor against, because it did not affect its bearers’ fitness. Yet this scenario makes
it unlikely that consciousness became more complex over time. In accordance with
James’s claims about the signs of this complexity, human behaviours are generally
more flexible and human brains more complex (e.g., encephalisation; Jerison, 1985;
number of neurons and synapses; Roth, 2001), particularly so when compared to the
cerebral ganglia of oysters. A different alternative explanation is that consciousness
spread as the by-product of an adaptation. In this case, consciousness could be asso-
ciated with the complexity of the brain, which may have increased during evolution
for unrelated reasons (Gould, 1985; these reasons might be adaptive, but the original
adaptations are likely to be very few and unidentifiable today; Gould, 1991). However,
the by-product scenario becomes much less likely once the complexity of conscious-
ness is properly taken into account in the next section. Yet without this complexity,
James’s comparative argument would exclude neither alternative explanation—a clear
weakness, but not a fatal one, as even the anti-adaptationist Gould (1991) admitted
that “those characteristics that we share with other closely related species are most
likely to be conventional adaptations” (p. 61).
Species comparisons can be used to argue that consciousness is an adaptation either
from homology, as James (1879, 1890/1907) did and A. K. Seth et al. (2005) suggested,
or from analogy.5 The notion behind arguments from analogy is that consciousness
may have evolved independently in different lineages because of similar selection pres-
sures (i.e., convergent evolution). Or, with Flanagan (1992) quoting Calvin (1991),
evolution tends to “reinvent” biologically useful traits, as it has done with powered
flight at least four times and with photoreceptors over 40 times (current estimates
5Analogy refers here to the similarity of functions performed by separately evolved structures and
has nothing to do with the aforementioned reasoning by analogy for nonhuman consciousness.
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of the latter are much lower; Fernald, 2008; Nilsson, 2005). Flanagan recommended
the argument from analogy as a “credible way to argue” (p. 133) for the adaptation
status of subjective consciousness, provided that some distantly related species were
supported as being conscious; his examples were snakes, salamanders, fish, birds, bats,
and dolphins. To be successful, the argument from analogy needs support both for
the presence of consciousness in the animal species in question and for its absence in
their common ancestor, or at least in today’s intermediate species.
Although the comparative method is considered to be useful for identifying mental
adaptations in general (Andrews et al., 2002; Grantham & Nichols, 1999), Nichols and
Grantham (2000) claimed it was “poorly suited” and “currently of no use for determ-
ining whether phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation” (p. 653). They argued that
the allegedly common assumption of philosophers that all vertebrates are phenomen-
ally conscious precludes the necessary identification of differences in the consciousness
of closely related species. Their only example, Flanagan’s (1992) argument, lists only
vertebrate species, yet these are listed as distantly related. In other words, Nichols
and Grantham criticised arguments from homology, whereas Flanagan argued from
analogy. Nonetheless, their criticism is valuable in highlighting the importance of
specifying, in arguments from analogy, which intermediate species are probably un-
conscious (or differently conscious). In addition, their criticism suggests studying the
potential adaptive divergence of consciousness, that is, exploring how differences in
consciousness between closely related species correlate with their ecological niches.
The evaluation of the argument from species comparisons applies to its different
versions. Although the argument cannot be used on distinctly human kinds of con-
sciousness, it is more relevant to the research goal than some other means of inquiry
in the an-adaptation category, as it identifies animal species in which consciousness
is probably an adaptation (3.5). Depending on how much of the relevant species
similarities is revealed, the argument is likely to provide additional leads for other
approaches (+0.5). The first premise does not completely exclude alternative explan-
ations, and would not do so even if it stated the particular version of the argument
being used; this premise would be stronger if not only the presence but also the absence
(or difference) of consciousness in closely or distantly related species were specified (7).
As in previous arguments, I have expressed the premises so that they support the con-
clusion (10). Data about animal consciousness can be difficult to collect but is, or
could soon be, available (see D. B. Edelman & Seth, 2009; A. K. Seth et al., 2005),
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albeit to differing degrees for the different kinds of consciousness, their operational-
isations, and animal species (8). These factors also influence the argument’s resource
cost, as does the need to include evidence about several animal species (7). Overall,
the promise of the argument from species comparisons qualifies just as high (6.5).
Argument from complex design. A crucial element of what makes evolutionary
adaptations special is their special design: Natural selection has shaped each adapta-
tion to better solve a problem posed by the organism’s environment. A trait’s features
of special design can therefore indicate that it is an adaptation (Tooby & Cosmides,
1992; Williams, 1966); special design has even been considered the “leading eviden-
tiary standard” (Andrews et al., 2002, p. 496) for identifying adaptations. Among
special design features, it is complexity that “provides some of the most compelling
evidence” (Polger, 2007, p. 72) for adaptations. Not all adaptations are complex, but
if a biological trait is complex, “we can reasonably expect that the trait was formed by
natural selection” (Polger, 2007, p. 80). This is because natural selection is the most
likely—many have claimed the only (e.g., Dawkins, 1985; Futuyma, 2005; Gould,
1997; Pinker, 1997; Stearns & Hoekstra, 2005)—natural process that can produce
biological traits with complex functional design. The corresponding argument about
consciousness goes as follows:
A trait that exhibits complex design is probably an adaptation.
Consciousness exhibits complex design.
Therefore, consciousness is probably an adaptation.
The remainder of this section deals with an argument from evolutionary design and
an argument from structural complexity (roughly the respective authors’ terms), both
of which have been advanced to support the view that phenomenal consciousness is
an adaptation.
In presenting his argument from design, Flanagan (1992) contended that subjective
consciousness “has been hooked onto many distinct mental systems” (p. 134) nonran-
domly. He suggested two ways in which consciousness could have evolved, depending
on the cognitive model employed: Either consciousness is domain-specific and had
to be reinvented for each distinct sensory module and for the declarative memory
system, or there is a single consciousness that had to be connected to each module.
Either way, consciousness may be considered complex because cognitive models sug-
104
3.4 Evolutionary arguments taking us further
gest structures that connect conscious experience with the senses and memory. These
connections in turn explain why neuropsychological deficits can affect specific parts
of consciousness. Flanagan pointed to isolated deficits in subjective consciousness,
such as blindness, colour blindness, deafness, and prosopagnosia (i.e., the inability to
recognise faces). He also claimed that the design of subjective consciousness is nonran-
dom because we have conscious access to “primarily just what we have the most need
to know about: conditions in the sensory environment, and past facts, and events”
(p. 134). The apparent relevance of conscious information to our successful survival
and reproduction is supposed to help create a picture of subjective consciousness as
complex, specialised, and evolutionarily relevant.
Even though we are not concerned with epiphenomenalist worries here, I want to
raise three points about a criticism of design arguments such as Flanagan’s (1992).
Nichols and Grantham (2000) dismissed what they call “functional complexity argu-
ments for phenomenal consciousness” (p. 656) as begging the question against epi-
phenomenalism: The alleged fallacy is using an assumed function of consciousness
to show appropriate functional design. My first point is that Flanagan did not state
what the biological advantage of conscious over unconscious information might be,
nor does his complexity defence depend on his last claim that consciousness appears
adaptive. Second, matching features of biological traits with expected design features
is a well-known evolutionary method called reverse engineering (e.g., Lewontin, 1978;
Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Williams, 1966), which is admittedly not suited for fighting
epiphenomenalism. Third, Nichols and Grantham’s own complexity argument also
failed to defeat epiphenomenalism, suggesting that such arguments are generally un-
suitable for this purpose (Polger, 2007). Complexity arguments might, however, be
suitable for supporting consciousness as an adaptation, which I determine in their
evaluation following the description of Nichols and Grantham’s complexity argument.
When looking to construct an argument from the complexity of consciousness, it
makes sense to study examples of complexity arguments in biology. Sometimes bio-
logists are convinced that a biological trait is an adaptation, even if its usefulness is
initially unclear, because the trait shows structural complexity (Williams, 1966). This
was the case for the lateral line system in fish, which subsequent evidence strongly in-
dicated is an adaptation. Nichols and Grantham (2000) maintained that phenomenal
consciousness is structurally complex in the same way as the lateral lines are. The
lateral lines are made up of mechanoreceptors along a fish’s length that connect the
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lateral line nerve with the lateral line canal just underneath the skin. The analogous
structure consists of “several independent input channels that feed into a more central
mechanism” (p. 663). Nichols and Grantham cited the philosopher Searle (1992) in
support of the claim that consciousness involves the unification of experiences across
short time spans as well as within and across different modalities, and pointed to
selective neuropsychological deficits of consciousness to demonstrate the existence of
multiple independent input channels to consciousness. They added that the presence
of consciousness in humans shows that it has neither been selected against nor deteri-
orated, as the lateral lines in some fish species have in which they had become useless.
Hence, consciousness appears structurally complex and adaptive.
Compared to other instances of the use of arguments in the present chapter, Nichols
and Grantham’s (2000) argument stands out as the most developed and is worth
pointing out as a model. The length of their argument already indicates this: a
core of nine journal pages versus a single sentence in many cases (Flanagan’s, 1992,
comparative and design arguments span a paragraph and a book page respectively).
Nichols and Grantham explained their hypothesis in detail, gave empirical evidence
for it, addressed disanalogies between the lateral lines and phenomenal consciousness,
considered possible objections, and even asked biologists whether they expected the
phenomenal consciousness system, abstractly described, to be an adaptation. The
apt use of a biological analogy strengthens their argument, but the high level of
abstraction of the analogous structure (i.e., a central mechanism with independent
input channels) detracts from the benefit gained. Regardless, the argument from
complexity presumably looked sufficiently promising for Nichols and Grantham to
develop it in some detail for a particular case.
As before, I apply the evaluation tool to the general argument—here from complex
design—not to specific instances of its use (e.g., Flanagan, 1992; Nichols & Grantham,
2000; Polger, 2007). The argument from complex design clearly deserves the higher
possible relevance score for means of inquiry with the same aim (3.5): It identifies
a feature of consciousness that characterises it as an evolutionary adaptation, and
this may additionally provide clues about the function/s of consciousness (Nichols
& Grantham, 2000) and its evolution (+0.5). The argument’s premises fully sup-
port the conclusion (10), but the weaker second premise has currently only moderate
support (6)—even Nichols and Grantham (2000) speak of apparent complexity. Nev-




Subevaluations of Means of Inquiry That Aim to Show That Consciousness Is (or
Was) an Evolutionary Adaptation
Relevance
Efficacy Practicality
Promise§ Means of inquiry Input Procedure Avail. Cost
3.1 Evolution 3.5 0 10 9 8 5.1
3.2 Subjective centrality 3.5 8 3 9 7 5.2
3.2 Standard view 3 7 4 8 9 5.1
3.3 Apparent adaptedness 3 4 3 8 8 4.2
3.3 Biological cost 3.5 7 10 7 7 6.2
3.3 Evolutionary history 4.5 5 10 1 2 5.1
3.3 No opposing evidence 3 5 10 6 9 5.7
3.3 Generalisation 3 0 10 7 7 4.6
3.4 Species comparisons 4 7 10 8 7 6.5
3.4 Complex design 4 6 10 7 8 6.3
Note. All means of inquiry in this table are arguments. Unpromising arguments are marked by
horizontal lines through some of their (sub)evaluation results, indicating criteria scores below bars
and affected promise scores. § = section; Avail. = data availability; Cost = resource cost.
to which the argument can be applied (7), and gathering this evidence bears, in the
main, a low resource cost (8). The argument from complex design has thus moderate
to high promise (6.3). Both evolutionary arguments evaluated in this section are, as
expected, the most promising means of inquiry for supporting consciousness as an
adaptation without knowledge of its function/s.
Conclusion
To facilitate a comparison of the 10 means of inquiry evaluated in this chapter, their
subevaluation and promise scores are listed in Table 3.1, and their dimensional pro-
files shown in Figure 3.1. The aim of all of the evaluated arguments is to support the
hypothesis that consciousness is (or was) an adaptation while disregarding the poten-
tial function/s of consciousness. This category of means of inquiry has the lowest and
most restricted relevance scores in the evaluation, which explains why the arguments’
relevance scores vary between 3.0 and 4.5, thereby limiting their theoretical promise
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Figure 3.1. Dimensional promise profiles of the arguments evaluated in this
chapter. All of these arguments were aimed at showing that consciousness
is (or was) an evolutionary adaptation, hence their similar relevance scores.
Unpromising arguments are marked by black horizontal bars, indicating at
least one criterion score below the bar within the respective dimension.
scores to a range of 2.4 to 7.8, apart from plain unpromising. Three arguments are
unpromising, two because of a false premise and one because of very poor data avail-
ability. The remaining arguments differ widely in their efficacy (3.5 to 8.5), but are all
highly practical means of inquiry (7.0 to 8.5). The arguments that pick out features
of consciousness that are directly associated with natural selection—complex design,
biological cost, and distribution—are most promising for supporting consciousness as
an evolutionary adaptation. These arguments should be employed on each kind of
consciousness in question to find out whether their results converge.
There is an interesting discrepancy between these evaluation results and a number of
the cited application examples. Most of the arguments have been found to be moder-
ately to highly promising, and it is impressive how much evidence about consciousness
as an adaptation can be mustered without any consideration of what it might be an
adaptation for. Yet the cited examples tend to perform significantly worse. The most
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plausible explanation of this discrepancy is that the circumstances under which the
arguments were employed differed markedly from the ideal circumstances assumed in
the evaluation of their promise. One factor may be a poor evolutionary understand-
ing, which, by the way, is not unique to consciousness studies (cf. R. C. Richardson,
2007; Workman & Reader, 2008). Another probable reason is the bias that I have
suggested exists in many researchers in this area for consciousness being central and
an adaptation. This suggestion is supported, for instance, by brief arguments being
given with little or no evidence, which suffer more often from seemingly careless mis-
takes than fundamental problems, by the scarcity of both adaptation opponents and
opposing evidence, and by the adaptation position being proclaimed the standard
view. Perhaps the adaptation bias is a larger problem than suspected in section 2.1.
Yet, if applied properly, these arguments are likely to make a moderate to high con-
tribution to the research goal by helping to determine whether consciousness is an
evolutionary adaptation.
The approach I have called methodological adaptationism without hypothesised func-
tions is attractive for at least three reasons: It is practicable because it does not need
a consensus, or even a hypothesis, on the function/s of the different kinds of con-
sciousness. Even if we knew the function/s of consciousness, the present approach
would be useful because it promises an independent analysis of consciousness, which
could then be compared to the known function/s of consciousness. The approach also
offers a first step toward an evolutionary explanation of consciousness. For example,
the present approach could help to identify the adaptive significance of consciousness,
and it can provide important information for discovering its evolution. However, some
of the arguments in this section would greatly benefit from, if not require, knowledge
of the function/s of consciousness (e.g., argument from apparent adaptedness or sub-
jective centrality). Moreover, asking whether consciousness is an adaptation or not
in isolation seems of limited interest; we also want to know how it evolved and what
its function/s are. Common strategies for identifying the function/s of different kinds




4 General strategies for reasoning about
consciousness
“Once upon a time, there was no consciousness on Earth. There were animals, but
they were aware of nothing. Their actions were instinctive responses” (Elbert, 2000,
p. 288). Most statements of evolutionary or functional hypotheses about consciousness
have less dramatic beginnings. Either way, we may wonder how these hypotheses
were constructed and whether they merit provisional acceptance. The evaluation
in this chapter therefore asks whether the strategies used to generate and develop
such hypotheses may contribute to the construction of a scientifically respectable
evolutionary explanation of consciousness. A major challenge for the evaluation is the
fact that the majority of authors do not explain the origin of either their hypotheses
or support for them, that is, if they provide any. Thus, despite the existence of many
hypotheses about the function/s and evolution of consciousness, there is relatively
little material on which to base the evaluation of the general strategies presumably
used in their construction.
The two strategies evaluated in the first two sections of the chapter are charac-
terised by the source of their input: introspection and common sense, respectively.
However, how these types of input are treated is at least as important as their value
for studying consciousness in general. The cores of the three reasoning strategies dis-
cussed in the third section of the chapter consist of the drawing of distinctions, the
use of analogies, and inferences from models or theories of consciousness. In the last
section of the chapter, I first examine a strategy called contrastive analysis, which
here refers to the comparison of empirical findings about more and less conscious but
otherwise equivalent processes. I then analyse the related strategy of excluding either
unconsciously performed functions as potential functions of consciousness or altern-
ative explanations of consciously performed functions. In the conclusion I compare
the dimensional and promise evaluation results of these general reasoning strategies.
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4.1 From introspection to functions
Concerning introspection as a point of departure for consciousness research, Rama-
chandran (1980) asked, given that “Galileo and Newton began with observations . . .
Why sneer on the same approach being used for studying our own conscious experi-
ence?” (p. 8). Whatever the details of the varied historical treatment of introspection,
the common view among contemporary consciousness researchers writing about in-
trospection is that introspective reports are the primary source of information about
consciousness (e.g., Baars, 2003b; Block, 1995; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Haynes et
al., 1998; Marcel, 2003; Overgaard, 2003). This is not surprising because conscious-
ness refers to a first-person phenomenon, at least in current thought. It is thus very
likely that introspective data have a role to play in the evolutionary study of con-
sciousness. The purpose of this section is consequently to determine, based on uses
and suggested uses of introspective data in the relevant research literature, what role
or roles these data may fulfill in this area and with what promise.
Introspection is a vital but not infallible source of information about conscious-
ness. Many illuminating examples and evidence of its unreliability have been given
(e.g., Marcel, 2003; Schwitzgebel, 2008). There are several reasons why it has been,
and may still be, called “a dangerous tool to handle carelessly” (Hebb, 1954/1994,
p. 833). Among the issues already mentioned in section 2.1 are the potential inac-
curacy of reports on mental processes generally (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) as well as
the potential incompleteness of reports on conscious contents, for example, due to
language constraints (Schooler & Fiore, 1997). Introspective reports are affected by
implicit theories that are, among other things, based on the individual’s folk and sci-
entific knowledge at the time (P. M. Churchland, 1985; Hebb, 1954/1994). A further
problem is related to what Mandler (1975) termed “the uncertainty principle of psy-
chology” (p. 239): Not only may the task influence what is reported, the conscious
contents themselves may change through introspection. However, methodological im-
provements can increase the validity of introspective reports (e.g., Ericsson & Simon,
1980; Velmans, 1993), and such reports are widely relied on in psychological research.
Besides, most of these concerns apply equally to reports about anything but one’s
own mind (Marcel, 1988; Velmans, 2007). Hypotheses about consciousness based on
introspection are likely to be corrected and refined with scientific progress, but for
now they are an important basis for such progress.
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Problems with introspection, such as the ones listed above, are not uniform; that is
to say, employing introspection in some research situations is more problematic than
in others. How problematic depends on, for example, whether introspection is used
to generate ideas, to engage the audience, or to collect data as part of a confirmat-
ory study. It also depends on the mental aspect under investigation (e.g., sensory
perception, mental imagery, reasons for actions, problem solving; Baars, 2003b) and,
as already pointed out, the design of the study (e.g., instructions to report attended
vs. unattended information, with or without delay, and with or without additional
required inferences; Ericsson & Simon, 1980). Moreover, introspective reports can be
a confounding factor in consciousness studies (Overgaard, 2004; see section 4.4). Note
that introspection itself is not a single process, and the different kinds of introspection
have different epistemic qualities (Butler, 2006; Prinz, 2004). One should thus recog-
nise that introspection, like any other measurement method, has measurement limits
(Baars, 2003b). The way forward for introspection as a measurement method is, in
Lieberman’s (1979) words, “to identify systematically the conditions under which it
is most likely to prove useful” (p. 332). My interest here is not in this general project
but in the determination of the usefulness of introspection specifically for contributing
to evolutionary explanations of consciousness, to which I now turn.
Strategies with introspective input. So how have introspective data been used,
or suggested to be used, in the evolutionary study of consciousness? I am not aware
of any such suggestions where the authors have not also followed their own sugges-
tions in the same work. The question therefore reduces to how introspective data
have actually been used in this area. I begin with an example that helps to explain
the intended generality of introspection uses. Bringsjord (1997) cited his own experi-
ence of not being phenomenally consciousness of a particular activity against Block’s
(1995) objection to an argument for phenomenal consciousness having the function of
facilitating creativity. Bringsjord (1997) first avowed “since I often do what [the hypo-
thetical character] Brown does, I can inform Block that the answer is ‘No’ ” (p. 146).
He then generalised that “all of us, I venture, have experienced” (p. 146) a partic-
ular type of experience. I could exclude such explicit generalisations to everyone’s
experience from the evaluation below, but the difference is often merely rhetorical:
Introspective evidence has been variously described either in the first-person, second-
person (typically in imperative mood as an activity for the reader), or third-person
perspective. In all of these cases, researchers need to generalise their hypotheses or
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findings from introspection to other organisms at some point to be able to make a
contribution to the evolutionary study of consciousness.
Usages of introspection in research on the evolution and function/s of consciousness
vary widely. For instance, Block (1995) defended his use of an introspective example of
phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness as part of his argument that
functions of the latter kind of consciousness have been illicitly attributed to the former.
Others have used introspective evidence in arguing for their philosophical frameworks
of the nature and derived or supported function/s of consciousness (e.g., Tye, 1996;
Van Gulick, 1997). I address the strategy of inferring functions of consciousness from
models or theories in section 4.3, but not the construction of these models or theories.
The strategy discussed in section 4.4, contrastive analysis, can take different types of
input including introspective evidence. For example, Roth (1999) and Merker (2005)
suggested evolutionary functions of consciousness based on “the contrast between
the types of information that are and are not included within its compass” (p. 89).
From this brief overview, it should be clear that introspection may contribute to
evolutionary explanations of consciousness in many different ways. Some of these,
however, are not easily evaluated as strategies beyond their particular application,
and others are evaluated in later sections because their overarching strategy can also
be pursued without introspective input.
The strategy I do evaluate in this section involves a more direct connection between
introspection and function/s of consciousness. An early modern application of this
reasoning moves from consciously experienced pleasures and pains to their evolu-
tionary functions as seen in the accompanying behaviours. Herbert Spencer (1872)
included a chapter entitled “Pleasures and Pains” in his Principles of Psychology, in
which he stated that “pleasures are the incentives to life-supporting acts and pains
the deterrents from life-destroying acts” (p. 284). Spencer’s account was endorsed by
James (1879) and Baldwin (1896). A few years after Spencer, Darwin (1887/1958)
wrote the following comment about the evolution of “sentient beings” (p. 89) by nat-
ural selection (which was, however, not published for over 75 years; Badcock, 2000):
An animal may be led to pursue that course of action which is the most
beneficial to the species by suffering, such as pain, hunger, thirst, and
fear,—or by pleasure, as in eating and drinking and in the propagation of
the species, &c. (p. 89)
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To come to this result, early modern researchers presumably interpreted the correl-
ation of their own conscious pleasures and pains with their actions in the short and
long term.
Far from having been superseded, the introspection–function strategy for pleasures
and pains is still being used. In most instances its use leads to the same conclusion:
“It is good that we feel pain. It keeps us from being burned, cut, and maimed.
. . . the capacity to experience pleasure and pain is a design solution that Mother
Nature has often used in different lineages of locomoting organisms” (Flanagan, 1992,
p. 42; see also Cairns-Smith, 1999; Pinker, 1997). Yet the same strategy has also
been employed to argue against the usefulness of consciousness: “We know from
experience that in fact rapid withdrawal from, say, a hot surface, typically precedes
the conscious experience of heat” (Macphail, 2008, p. 99). Is this discrepancy in
outcomes a problem for the strategy? Yes, in the sense that it highlights the difficulty
of inferring causation from correlation, apart from showing how input dependent
the strategy is. However, the quoted examples could simply differ in the periods
of effectivity considered: Even if conscious pain does not initiate immediate action,
which is an important insight, consciousness of pain could be beneficial, for instance,
for overriding withdrawal reflexes or helping to avoid similar situations in the future.
Introspective evidence from many other situations has served as input to the intro-
spection–function strategy. In order to illustrate the variety of applications of this
popular strategy, I present four examples that have yielded well-known functions of
consciousness. First, Mandler (1975) asserted that the trouble-shooting function of
consciousness becomes apparent when originally learned but now automatically per-
formed actions, such as typing, driving, or participating in small talk, are suddenly
interrupted by a failure, such as a stuck key, a faulty brake, or an indignant direct ad-
dress. Second, Baars (1997b) illustrated his list of cognitive functions of consciousness
with an imagined situation meant to resemble everyday problems of our evolutionary
ancestors. He introduced this self-experiment for the reader as follows: “Consider
what would happen at this very moment if you were accosted by some large, aggress-
ive, and dangerous beast, such as a full-sized angry bullock. How would you cope?
And how would you use consciousness, as such, to survive” (p. 157)? Baars emphas-
ised that this reference to the reader’s experience (or imagination) is “a key source of
evidence” (p. 157), hence not merely didactic.
Another application of the strategy is Gregory’s (1996a, 1996b, 1998) comparison
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of the vivid visual experience when looking at something with the much dimmer
experience when remembering or imagining it. He took this difference to indicate
that the phenomenal qualities of conscious perceptions “serve to flag the present”
(Gregory, 1996b, p. 377) so that it is not confused with the remembered past or
anticipated future. This seems necessary because perceptions are based on stored
knowledge to at least 90% (Gregory, 1998). Regarding my above warning not to
overinterpret the perspective in which introspective evidence is described, it is worth
noting that Gregory stated the experiential difference between perception and mental
images from memory or imagination first in general terms (1996b), then about himself
(1996a), and later as a self-experiment for the reader (1998).
The final introspective example comes from the most widely known evolutionary
account of (reflective) consciousness. Humphrey’s (1982) use of the introspection–
function strategy begins with its description: “From all I know about myself, what
strikes me—and seems to give some kind of cutting edge to consciousness—is this”
(p. 474).1 In short, he claimed that the regular accompaniment of his waking beha-
viour by conscious experiences had led him to consider his consciousness as identical
to the neural mechanism controlling his behaviour. He thus contended: “In so far
as I am conscious, I can see as if with an inner eye into my own” (p. 475) neural
behaviour-control mechanism. Consciousness provides him with a way to make sense
of his own behaviour and, through this explanatory model, of the behaviour of oth-
ers. This would have been more advantageous for our ancestors living in collaborative
groups than explanations based merely on input–output observations of their own and
others’ behaviour.
Evaluation of the introspection–function strategy. At least three reasons have
been advanced against the usefulness of introspection for discovering the function/s
and evolution of consciousness. The first reason has to do with animal conscious-
ness: Corballis (2007) maintained that our introspection helps little with investig-
ating the evolution of consciousness because “the identification of consciousness in
non-human species must surely be based largely on behavioral rather than intro-
spective evidence” (p. 572). The quoted statement seems reasonable, although, as
1Although all one knows about oneself is not limited to introspective knowledge, it appears to be
Humphrey’s focus in the present paper. In a 1987b lecture, he said about consciousness that because
“every one of us has experienced it in our own person, to consult oneself may not be such a bad plan
after all” (para. 2) and that “commonsense coupled to a bit of self-analysis suggests that consciousness
is a source of information, and that this information is very likely about brain-states” (para. 37).
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Corballis acknowledged, at least macaque monkeys appear capable of providing be-
havioural introspective evidence (e.g., Cowey & Stoerig, 1995; Myerson et al., 1981).
However, difficulties with obtaining introspective reports from nonhuman animals do
not constitute a problem for the strategy in question, because the strategy aims to
follow a different path to a better understanding of the evolution of consciousness,
namely via its evolutionary function/s in us.
The second and most commonly cited reason for the alleged unsuitability of in-
trospection for studying the function/s of consciousness is that introspection has no
access to permanently unconscious mental processes. Barlow (1980) mistrusted intro-
spection in part because it seems to conceal that unconscious processes can guide our
actions. Roth (2000a) explained that we do not have introspective access to the uncon-
scious reasons of our conscious experiences owing to the anatomy and physiology of our
brains; for example, we are not aware of the strong influence that the unconsciously
operating limbic system has on our conscious experience. This information may or
may not be important for figuring out the function/s of consciousness. Rosenthal
(2008) argued that we cannot determine introspectively whether suggested functions
of consciousness, such as rationality and intentional action, also occur unconsciously.
I agree that we cannot do so directly by introspecting, but we could notice the result
of such a function having been executed after a period in which no related content was
present in consciousness (cf. examples above given by Mandler, 1975). Besides raising
doubts about the veracity of the results of introspection, which I address shortly, the
criticisms point to a serious limitation of introspection when employed in isolation
for directly inferring function/s of consciousness: the inaccessibility of unconscious
processes. The upside of this limitation is that it serves to demarcate consciousness
from unconsciousness, a contrast that many researchers have used to suggest what
consciousness might be good for.
The third reason against the usefulness of introspection is that it does not inform
us directly about the survival value of consciousness. In a nutshell, “Nature does not
tell us what our organs are for” (Barlow, 1980, p. 82). Barlow (1980, 1987) illustrated
this principle with pain, which feels unpleasant but is protective, and love, which
poets’ introspective descriptions do not portray as serving to propagate the human
species. Ultimate motivations do indeed not need to be conscious, so long as the
associated proximate mechanisms promote them (Rossano, 2003). In line with this,
William James (1890) wrote about instincts:
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It is not for the sake of their utility that they are followed, but because
at the moment of following them we feel that that is the only appropriate
and natural thing to do. Not one man in a billion, when taking his dinner,
ever thinks of utility. He eats because the food tastes good and makes
him want more.2 (p. 386)
In order to learn more about the evolutionary function/s of consciousness, one should
therefore consult the effects it has, if any, particularly on behaviour (Barlow, 1980,
1987). This is an important clarification about the introspection–function strategy,
but not a common mistake in the contemporary consciousness research literature.
Introspective messages are nowadays rarely, if ever, used to directly infer function/s of
consciousness without additional consideration of, for instance, unconscious processes
or associated behaviours.
To be able to apply the promise evaluation tool to the introspection–function
strategy, the strategy’s aim needs to be established. All applications of the strategy of
which I am aware, including the examples described above, occur in an evolutionary
context. Although the function that is derived from introspective evidence is fre-
quently not called evolutionary (or comparable terms), in none of the applications is
there any doubt expressed that the identified function/s of consciousness could differ
from its evolutionary function/s. So the aim of the introspection–function strategy
is to identify evolutionary function/s of consciousness from introspective evidence
about current human consciousness. The strategy might thus help to discover sur-
vival value/s of consciousness, albeit only in humans for now; and it might provide
limited additional information about the corresponding proximate mechanisms, mak-
ing it moderately relevant to the research goal (5.5).
The assessment of the strategy’s input should concentrate on introspective evidence,
which is to be used in combination with other input, such as evidence about associated
behaviours or unconscious processes. The additional input cannot easily be evaluated
in general, as it differs between applications of the strategy, at times completely.
However, this is only a significant impediment to the evaluation if the additional
types of evidence are much weaker than introspective evidence, which is unlikely after
what has been said above. Because introspective evidence might be obtained and
2It is likely that today more people in Western countries think of the consequences of what and how
much they eat, possibly indirectly linked to evolutionary reasons; regardless, the obesity epidemic
demonstrates his point.
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used in various ways, it is difficult to assign a single quality score to it. As a rough
estimate and under the assumption of ideal circumstances, including the collection of
introspective data from a good number of people, the quality of the input is likely to
be high (8). This score takes into account that the introspection–function strategy
relies on a better, or more direct, criterion for consciousness than most other evaluated
means of inquiry.
Some pitfalls of the strategy’s procedure can be avoided by not depending on in-
trospective evidence in isolation and by implementing the procedure carefully (e.g.,
not confusing introspective messages with survival values), both of which are assumed
here. However, these measures cannot prevent erroneous inferences from correlation
to causation and failures to detect the potential uselessness of (particular kinds of)
consciousness. Another concern is that human consciousness in 21st-century civilisa-
tions might differ markedly, at least in some respects, from its biologically evolved
version. Because there are several ways of using introspective and other input as part
of the introspection–function strategy, and these are not specified by the strategy,
another somewhat crude generalisation is required in its evaluation: Its procedure
might work at least moderately well overall (6). Turning to the strategy’s practical-
ity, introspective evidence is readily available, as is pertinent additional input for the
most part (9). Employing the strategy involves gathering this input and reasoning
to potential function/s of consciousness; it has thus a low resource cost (8). Taken
together, the promise of the introspection–function strategy for contributing to an
evolutionary explanation of consciousness is high (6.7). As in the previous chapter,
I report the remaining means of inquiry in this chapter and their evaluations in less
detail.
4.2 Folk psychological input
What about the things we all know about consciousness? With very few exceptions,
all humans live with consciousness day in, day out. It would make sense if, over
many generations and in each lifetime, much knowledge about consciousness is ac-
cumulated. Such knowledge would be part of folk psychology, which helps us, as
everyday people, to generate common-sense explanations and predictions of beha-
viour. Folk psychology can also play an important role in the work of researchers,
specifically psychologists, as acknowledged in a standard behavioural research meth-
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ods textbook: “Social and behavioral scientists rely heavily on commonsense notions
regarding behavior, thought, and emotion” (Leary, 2004, p. 7). This suggests that
folk psychology could be useful in the investigation of consciousness too, and “it is
exactly in this area that the appeal to common sense has always seemed most cogent”
(Hebb, 1954/1994, p. 831). Consequently, I consider its usages and their potential to
assist with evolutionary explanations of consciousness in this section.
Usages of common-sense knowledge. Folk psychology is commonly used to argue
that consciousness is functional or, more precisely, that consciousness is not function-
less or epiphenomenal. Such a use of common sense could well be the basis of the
following statement by Roger Sperry: “It is just that I find it difficult to believe that
the sensations and other subjective experiences per se serve no function” (as cited in
Voneida, 1998, p. 1078). Similarly, Humphrey (1987b) stated that he found definitions
of consciousness as a useless phenomenon “counter-intuitive and wholly unconvincing”
(para. 26). And Gregory (1996a) supported the assumption that phenomenal proper-
ties of conscious experience are causal by commenting that “this fits common sense”
(p. 756). Because these uses of common sense are aimed at showing that conscious-
ness has a function, I do not evaluate them here (as stipulated in section 2.4 for
means of inquiry in the a-function category). Related arguments are based on the
inconceivability either of consciousness not having a function (e.g., James, 1890/1907)
or of it having a function (e.g., Macphail, 2000, who based his whole account of the
evolution of consciousness on this). Yet how close a hypothesis is to the truth is not
indicated by how imaginable (P. S. Churchland, 1996) or intelligible (Wright, 2007)
the hypothesis is. In any case, I do not assess these uses of common sense either,
because their aim is as little evolutionary as the folk-psychological arguments for or
against epiphenomenalism of the metaphysical or causal-role variety.
Appeals to common sense have also been made in arguments for consciousness being
an evolutionary adaptation. For example, Bringsjord et al. (2002) considered possible
answers to the question, designated as Q1ZP, of why phenomenally conscious humans
have evolved instead of functionally identical unconscious zombies. They used a good
dose of common sense to dismiss the answer, designated as A1, that consciousness
does not aid survival and hence that there is no particular reason for conscious beings
having evolved instead:
A1 is really not an answer to Q1ZP; and as such it’s profoundly unsatisfying
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(if the informal poll we’ve taken is any indication). It even seems down-
right bizarre to hold that the phenomenon that makes life worth living
(Wouldn’t you be depressed upon hearing that starting five minutes from
now you would have the inner life of a slab of granite?) is a fluke. (p. 121)
This is a nice example of reliance on common sense: To reject the possibility that
consciousness is not an adaptation, the authors depend exclusively on their own and
others’, including the presumed readers’, dissatisfaction with and opinion of the sug-
gestion as too out of the ordinary.
It is important for the evaluation of the use of folk-psychological input to determine
the most relevant subgoal for which it has been employed. The categories that are
distinctly more relevant than the a-function and an-adaptation categories have the
subgoals of identifying the evolutionary function/s of consciousness and identifying
its evolutionary origin and history. A contender for the most relevant category is
a reason that Humphrey (1995) gave against his earlier account of the evolution of
reflective consciousness outlined in the previous section. The reason has to do with
reactions to a consequence of his theory, namely that most animals and babies are not
conscious: “I couldn’t sell this idea even to myself, let alone to my nonphilosophical
friends” (p. 200). This reason, as well as others, did not motivate him to abandon his
previous theory but to realise its proper domain and to construct a theory of conscious
sensation, which I mentioned in section 3.3. In this particular case, common-sense
beliefs seem to have triggered, and thus contributed to, evolutionary theorising about
consciousness. However, it appears more like a fortuitous coincidence than planned
use of a means of inquiry and is therefore not suitable for the present evaluation.
The most relevant evaluable applications of common-sense knowledge in conscious-
ness research use it as support for evolutionary function/s of consciousness. For
instance, it is likely that some of today’s uses of the introspection–function strategy
for pleasures and pains, which was evaluated in the previous section, are based on folk
psychology to a significant degree; the same goes for conscious intentions to act (cf.
Libet et al., 1983) and free will (cf. Wegner, 2002). Clear expressions of the use of
folk psychology in this area are difficult to find, which is why I return to Humphrey’s
(1987b) writing for another valuable example. He introduced his evolutionary func-
tion of reflective consciousness with the example of a dentist enquiring whether his
patient was feeling pain and then noted “Common sense tells me that when a person
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describes his states of mind, either to me or to himself . . . , he is making a reveal-
ing self-report” (para. 27). Humphrey’s theory does not follow folk psychology in all
respects, but he evidently employed folk psychology to support his hypothesis that
consciousness is useful because it is informative.
Evaluation of folk input. The use of common-sense knowledge in research has
received much bad press, both in general and in consciousness studies. The main
problem is that folk psychology and intuitions derived from it can turn out to be (prob-
ably) wrong about the function/s of consciousness (e.g., Kinsbourne, 2006; Rosenthal,
2008), but they can also be (probably) right (e.g., Barlow, 1987; Goldman, 1993;
Morsella, 2003). Of course, this is true for most sources of information, so maybe
the criticism, especially when nonphilosophical, is that folk psychology is wrong more
often (but see Pinker, 1997, 2006). Graham and Horgan (2002) advocated a charit-
able approach to the folk psychology of the function/s of phenomenal consciousness in
saying that “folk psychology need not be completely correct . . . , but its homely plat-
itudes are innocent until proven guilty” (p. 65). I agree that common-sense knowledge
can be a very useful starting point. However, both folk psychology and the intuitions
it inspires change, and these changes by and large lag behind increases in scientific un-
derstanding, which expectedly applies to consciousness as well (Banks, 1993; Lamme,
2006). We should thus be careful not to let common-sense ideas about consciousness
hinder scientific progress. As addressed briefly in section 1.1, consciousness itself is
a folk-psychological term that will likely be elaborated through research (including
its division into components; Frith & Rees, 2007). An interesting question is where
folk-psychological beliefs about consciousness come from, but because I am not aware
of any suggested or actual attempts to tackle this in connection with the evolution or
function/s of consciousness, I do not deal with it here.
The use of common-sense beliefs should be evaluated here, as already established,
as a strategy in the what-adaptation category, that is, for identifying the evolution-
ary function/s of consciousness. This strategy’s moderate relevance to the research
goal (6) is slightly higher than that of the introspection–function strategy, for two
main reasons: Folk psychology extends to nonhuman animals (think of the conscious
pleasure and pain examples rather than the reflective consciousness one) and might tap
into how people actually use consciousness or what role/s it plays in their lives. The
quality of folk-psychological input to the strategy is moderate (5) due to the many
potentially distorting influences, such as individual (e.g., psychological, biological),
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social, political, and economic interests. Folk psychology is simply less interested in
the truth than is scientific psychology; its goal is rather to allow the best possible ex-
planations and predictions of the behaviour of people in relevant social groups based
on user-friendly rules of thumb.
If the present strategy consisted of importing folk-psychological accounts of the
function/s of consciousness into scientific research as definite statements about its
evolutionary function/s, the strategy’s procedure would be poor. However, Humphrey
(1987b) did not trust common sense blindly. For example, he expected his suggestion
that the evolutionary function of consciousness is to provide descriptions of brain
states to be perceived by most people as odd and unconvincing. The procedure of
such less naive uses of folk psychology could work moderately (4), the problem now
being that the strategy does not specify how to deal with the common-sense input,
other than not to believe it unquestioningly. There also seems to be no consideration
of the facts that folk-psychological function/s of consciousness may not be identical to
its evolutionary function/s and that scientific knowledge may already have advanced
past folk-psychological knowledge.
Regarding the practicality of the strategy, the availability of—rather general—folk-
psychological input might be high (7); this depends on the reference group (probably
not “most people in the world [who] probably don’t even know they’ve got a brain,”
Humphrey, 1987b, para. 29) and how important consciousness has been within folk
psychology. The resource cost of using this strategy is low (8), which may still be
higher than expected, but researchers implementing this strategy need to consult
with lay people. If used carefully, folk-psychological knowledge could thus make a
moderate contribution to the research goal (5.7). Having considered two common
sources of information about consciousness—introspection and folk psychology—that
supply input to, on the whole, poorly defined procedures, my focus now shifts to the
procedural cores of three general reasoning strategies.
4.3 Distinctions, analogies, and models
In his influential 1975 paper, Mandler stated that “the important advances in our
excursions into consciousness must come through the usual interplay of empirical in-
vestigation and imaginative theory” (p. 231). There certainly is a wealth of what
could be regarded as the early beginnings of such theories, as described in section 2.1.
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There are at least a few dozen hypotheses about the evolution or function/s of con-
sciousness in the research literature that have been provided with very little evidence,
most of which are referred to as speculations by their authors. Even if support is
given for such hypotheses, the means of inquiry used to construct them often remain
unclear. Out of close to 100 works with distinguishable reasoning steps that lead to or
support a hypothesis on the evolution or function/s of consciousness, I have selected
three reasoning strategies to be evaluated in this section. They are less specific than
an individual applications’ reasoning steps and also than the arguments in the last
chapter, but more specific than groupings of means of inquiry such as reasoning or
providing empirical evidence.
Drawing distinctions. A good example of the first strategy is Dretske’s (1997) draw-
ing of three distinctions in order to reveal the evolutionary functions of consciousness.
He explained his strategy as follows:
It seems to me that the flurry of interest in the function of consciousness
betrays a confusion about several quite elementary distinctions. Once the
distinctions are in place—and there is nothing especially arcane or tricky
about them—the advantages (and, therefore, the good) of consciousness
is obvious. (p. 2)
He distinguished creature consciousness (without it the creature is “a vegetable,”
p. 5) from state consciousness, conscious states either as being made conscious by
the creature becoming aware of them (no function) or as making a creature conscious
(which is then their function), and the associated conscious knowledge from conscious
experience (maybe for the identification and recognition of objects). To give another
example, Cairns-Smith (1999) constructed a “phylogeny of qualia” (p. 277) based
on his classification of phenomenal consciousness as raw perceptual, interpretative,
intellectual, coercive, volitional, or background feelings. Relatedly, Mesulam (1998)
used dimensions of human consciousness, such as intentionality, introspection, and
theory of mind (other introspecting selves), as hypothesised evolutionary milestones.
Can the evaluation tool determine how promising this general strategy is for con-
tributing to an evolutionary explanation of consciousness? I think so, although the
little information available on the strategy increases the uncertainty in the assigned
scores. As the latter two examples indicate, distinctions have been drawn with the aim
of identifying stages in the evolutionary history of consciousness. If the distinctions
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are well-supported, the relevance of this strategy to the research goal is at least mod-
erate (5.5): It may help to discover major stages in the evolution of consciousness and
suggest evolutionarily relevant differences between them. The input to the strategy
could include comparative and developmental evidence, yet in the examples consists
solely of knowledge of contemporary adult human consciousness of unspecified origin.
Note that the relevance score takes this limited applicability into account. Provided
it is scientific knowledge from which the distinctions are drawn, the strategy’s input
could be of very high quality (9). The procedure might work moderately well (5), the
main concern being that the evolutionarily relevant distinctions and their order may
not be obvious from the input and mistakes not noticed (historical data could be use-
ful with this). Data about adult human consciousness is highly available (7), though
it may not have afforded suitable, sophisticated distinctions so far (but see Leary &
Buttermore, 2003, , on the evolution of self-consciousness in different domains). The
evidence-based drawing of distinctions has a low resource cost (8). The calculated
promise score for drawing distinctions is moderate (6.5).
Analogical reasoning. The second strategy in this section was used by Nichols
and Grantham (2000) as part of their complexity argument. As outlined in more
detail in section 3.4, these authors argued that because the structure of phenomenal
consciousness is analogous to that of the lateral line system in fish, which is an evol-
utionary adaptation, phenomenal consciousness also is an adaptation. Climbing the
relevance ladder, Baars (1998) promoted a theatre metaphor for consciousness with
implications for the evolutionary function/s of consciousness:
Many proposals about brain organization and consciousness reflect a single
underlying theme that can be labeled the ‘theater metaphor’. In these
views the overall function of consciousness is to provide very widespread
access to unconscious brain regions. Such access is needed for global ac-
tivation, co-ordination and control. (p. 62)
Finally, Tannenbaum (2001) suggested that consciousness might be usefully viewed
as emerging from the organising mechanism of a biological sense of consciousness
that provides adaptively useful information about the brain. It is then the case
that “much of what we know about the evolution and role of the conventionally
recognized senses should help us understand the evolution and role of the sense of
consciousness, and of consciousness itself” (p. 377). Tannenbaum proposed that the
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sense of consciousness evolved, like other complex senses, through the integration of
existing systems. Furthermore, it “might have acquired the capacity to scan and
organize its environment into useful patterns, just as some other senses acquired
the capacity to scan and to organize their environments” (p. 380). The sense of
consciousness would thereby have increased the knowledge that the organism can
have about itself and its environment, as all other biological senses did. It differs
from other senses, however, in its complexity, comprehensiveness, and unique effects,
which include our conscious experience.
Analogical reasoning has thus been used for each of the three evolutionary subgoals
specified in the relevance dimension of the evaluation tool. The third application
example above suggests that, in the most relevant category, the use of analogies could
contribute a potential, or even likely, partial evolutionary history of consciousness
with adaptive significance/s, albeit in very broad strokes (6.5). The input to this
strategy comprises knowledge about consciousness that enables the selection of an
analogy and knowledge about the analogous thing, so that their relevant similarities
and dissimilarities can be identified. The quality of this input could be high un-
der ideal circumstances (8). Depending on the relevance and number of similarities,
among other things, the strategy’s procedure may work moderately in the evolution-
ary study of consciousness (6).
The availability of input to the strategy that enables it to be used successfully
is difficult to assess. The analogical thing needs to be suitably comparable to con-
sciousness and have known developmental stages for the strategy to work. Although
consciousness can surely be compared to many things, it is doubtful that there are
good analogies for each kind of consciousness readily available that allow us to learn
more about those kinds’ potential evolution (4). (Better input would be available if
the aim was only to identify the survival value/s of consciousness, but the associated
increase in promise would be offset by a lower relevance score, viz. 5.5.) Employing
this strategy requires the identification of a suitable analogy, which has very variable
resource costs, and then inferences from its comparison with consciousness, so might
carry low resource costs on average (8). The combination of these subevaluations
suggests that, if suitable evolutionary analogies can be found, analogical reasoning in
this context is highly promising (6.6).
Inferring from models. The third general strategy in this section involves inferences
from models or theories of consciousness and therefore not reasoning from evolution-
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ary theory. For example, Shallice (1972) identified consciousness with the selector
input to the dominant action system in an information-processing model, based on
similar properties. As a consequence, consciousness inherits the dual functions of
the selector input, namely strongly activating the action system and setting its goal.
Computational models can also help to study the function/s of consciousness (A. Seth,
2009), but the focus here is on the use of the model strategy for subgoals that are more
relevant to an evolutionary explanation of consciousness. Barlow (1980) derived an
evolutionary function of consciousness from his theory of its nature: “The view that
consciousness arises in interpersonal relations . . . gives a clear answer to the question
about its functional role and survival value” (p. 88), that is, to induce humans to
communicate with each other. And lastly, Grossenbacher (2001) inferred from his
neural theory of consciousness, the access mediation model, how the contents of con-
sciousness may have changed during evolution. Although content types can become
less conscious over evolutionary time, consciousness has probably evolved to include
an increasing number of different content types. In addition, Grossenbacher explained
why the most recent content types may be the most salient ones in consciousness.
Even if function/s of consciousness are what is most commonly inferred from models
or theories of consciousness, this strategy has also been used to infer its evolutionary
function/s and partial evolutionary history. Because additional details are likely to be
obtained, such as about the functioning of consciousness and interactions with other
phenomena, the strategy has a high potential to contribute to the research goal (7). In
each specific case, the quality of the input to the strategy is a function of the quality
of the chosen model or theory of consciousness. However, the quality of this type of
input is high (8), though not higher because models and theories necessarily make
simplifying assumptions. If a suitable model or theory is chosen, the information of
interest may follow more or less directly from it without much room for error. At
other times, more reasoning steps may be necessary, and these are not specified by
the strategy. Nevertheless, the procedure can be expected to work at least well under
ideal circumstances (8).
The critical issue for employing the model-inference strategy is not its resource
cost, which is very low (9), but the availability within a decade of suitable models or
theories of the different kinds of consciousness from which their evolutionary functions
and histories could be inferred. There are models and theories of consciousness, but so
far they allow rather limited evolutionary inferences at most (4). In sum, the promise
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of model inferences for contributing to the research goal is high (7.3). Having covered
three possible reasoning strategies that may play a role in constructing theories, I
now return to strategies that work much more closely with empirical evidence to
adequately cover both aspects of the required “interplay of empirical investigation
and imaginative theory” (Mandler, 1975, p. 231).
4.4 Contrastive analysis and exclusion
“In The Principles of Psychology (1890/1983), [William] James suggests a way of
focusing on the issue of consciousness by contrasting comparable conscious and un-
conscious events” (Baars, 1988, p. xvi). James did not pursue this strategy himself
(because he thought that psychology should only study conscious processes; Baars,
1988), but this is how Baars (1988) introduced the term contrastive analysis into
consciousness studies. He later explained that “this ‘method of contrastive analysis’
is a generalization of the experimental method, with consciousness as a [independent]
variable” (Baars, 1994, Abstract, para. 3). This extremely popular strategy has been
applied in many different areas:
1. A popular everyday example is an experienced car driver driving on a familiar
route and holding a conversation at the same time; when an unexpected hazard
presents itself, the driver’s focal attention switches back to the traffic situation.
2. Psychological experiments have compared, for instance, conscious and uncon-
scious stimuli, conscious and unconscious elements in memory, and new and
habituated events.
3. Functional brain imaging studies have looked at brain activity, for example, dur-
ing conscious and unconscious perception in paradigms such as visual masking,
change blindness, and binocular rivalry.
4. Healthy brains can be compared to damaged brains or to neurological syndromes
such as epilepsy, blindsight, and synaesthesia.
5. Artificial intelligence researchers have compared human capabilities with what
robots can or cannot do.
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This list indicates that there is no lack of input to contrastive analyses, at least some of
which may have been aimed at answering functional or evolutionary questions about
consciousness.
So for which subgoals of giving an evolutionary explanation of consciousness, if any,
have contrastive analyses been conducted? The strategy has been used for studying
the function/s of consciousness (Baars & McGovern, 1996; Frith & Rees, 2007), but
not explicitly for studying its evolutionary history, as far as I know. However, con-
trastive analyses have frequently been used to identify the adaptive significance/s of
consciousness. In section 4.1 I already mentioned examples of comparisons of the
contents inside and outside of consciousness that were used to identify potential evol-
utionary functions of consciousness (i.e., Merker, 2005; Roth, 1999). Searle (1992)
inferred such functions from case reports of behaviour during absence seizures:
Normal, human, conscious behavior has a degree of flexibility and creativ-
ity that is absent from the Penfield cases of the unconscious driver and
the unconscious pianist. . . . The hypothesis I am suggesting then is that
one of the evolutionary advantages conferred on us by consciousness is the
much greater flexibility, sensitivity, and creativity we derive from being
conscious. (pp. 108–109)
Bringsjord et al. (2002) agreed that phenomenal consciousness enables creative cog-
nition and gave the additional reason that researchers have made several attempts to
engineer artificial creativity without any success, another example of the contrastive
strategy.
Evaluation of contrastive analysis. Contrastive analysis is generally seen as a
valuable strategy in consciousness research. For example, Velmans (1994) commented
that “one could hardly take issue with the usefulness of contrastive analysis, as the
method (Hume’s ‘method of difference’) is as old as empirical science” (para. 1.2). And
Mangan (1995) asserted that, “as a pragmatic method for organizing experimental
results, contrastive analysis is extremely useful” (para. 1.1). It is, of course, not
without its problems, some of which have been pointed out in the literature. Block
(1995) called attention to the importance of properly identifying the presence and
absence of relevant kinds of consciousness in the compared conditions or situations,
in order to avoid ascribing the function of one kind of consciousness to another kind.
Other criticisms have highlighted likely confounds, such as performance (Lau, 2008),
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unconscious processes, attention, and introspective reports (Overgaard, 2004). These
difficulties threaten the conclusions reached by contrastive analysis, yet they can be
bypassed, for instance, by following the cited critics’ recommendations and suggested
solutions for dealing with these confounds.
Contrastive analyses that are aimed at identifying evolutionary function/s of con-
sciousness are likely to contribute some additional details but probably little contex-
tual information, making them moderately relevant to the research goal (6). There
is no restriction on the type of input other than that it should allow a comparison
between more conscious and less conscious conditions or situations. Hence, the input
should allow the strategy to work very well under ideal circumstances (9). The con-
trastive approach is generally sound, but there are likely confounds and no clear links
to biological evolution (7): Most suggested or performed comparisons simply assume
that the identified function/s have evolutionary significance. Given the thousands of
relevant published studies (Baars, 2003b), the accessibility of either original data or
research findings as input to contrastive analyses is very high (9), though this does not
apply to all kinds of consciousness equally. If new data are collected for comparison,
the resource cost is moderate; if results of existing studies are compared, it is low.
Here I compromise between the two by assigning their average score to the present
strategy (7). Overall, then, contrastive analysis is a highly promising strategy (7.2),
although its evolutionary connection tends to be weak.
Excluding functions. A strategy that is even more concerned with unconscious pro-
cesses than contrastive analysis is exclusion. This strategy seeks to narrow down the
potential functions of consciousness by showing that particular candidate functions
are in fact performed unconsciously. (Authors who exclude potential functions of con-
sciousness may not have this motivation, yet this does not invalidate the evaluation
of this strategy in the present context.) An example of exclusion is Morsella’s (2005)
conclusion about certain informational conflicts: “At a minimum, these phenomena
demonstrate that conscious processing is unnecessary to integrate information from
sources as diverse as different modalities. Intermodal cross-talk can occur without
it” (p. 1003). It was taken for granted at the time of Descartes that consciousness
enabled voluntary action and rational thought; however, the latter has been shown to
occur unconsciously (Frith & Rees, 2007), as has the former. For instance, Lau (2009)
presented evidence against several alleged evolutionary functions of consciousness as-
sociated with voluntary action. Exclusion thus appears to be part of the progression
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from a folk theory of consciousness to its scientific equivalent.
The exclusion strategy is best evaluated as being aimed at excluding potential cur-
rent evolutionary functions of consciousness (i.e., what-adaptation/s category). The
strategy’s contribution to the research goal depends on the strength of the discounted
candidate function/s. The knowledge gain from exclusion is minimal if the function
does not occur in the organism in question (say, photosynthesis in humans) and max-
imal for contemporary strong contender functions, such as in the last two examples
above. Even when the knowledge gain is maximal, the strategy is unlikely to provide
additional details about consciousness and its function/s or evolution. Consequently,
it receives the lowest possible score in its category (5), indicating that it is moderately
relevant to achieving an evolutionary explanation of consciousness. Like contrastive
analysis, the present strategy allows any type of input, which is of very high quality
in a best case scenario (9). The exclusion strategy does not prescribe how the disso-
ciation between consciousness and the function/s is to be established (the inference
is unfortunately often from inessentialism to epiphenomenalism; see section 1.4). In
the absence of such instructions, the strategy underperforms slightly but nevertheless
works well (8). Much input is available for the strategy to be implemented (9) and
at a low research cost (9). Based on these subevaluations, the exclusion strategy is
as promising for increasing our evolutionary understanding of consciousness as con-
trastive analyses are (7.2), despite its opposite aim.
Conclusion
To make the comparison between the means of inquiry evaluated in this chapter easier,
their summarised subevaluation scores are presented in Table 4.1 and their dimen-
sional profiles in Figure 4.1. All means of inquiry were evaluated for the research
subgoal of identifying the evolutionary function/s of consciousness, except the means
in the third section of the chapter, which were evaluated for additionally identifying
aspects of the evolutionary history of consciousness. Correspondingly, the relevance
scores of these seven general reasoning strategies vary from moderate to high (5–7).
The efficacy of all strategies is high (7–8.5), with the exception of the only moder-
ately efficacious use of folk-psychological input. The procedures of some of the other
strategies also work only moderately well, but the quality of the input they all take
is high to very high. The practicality of all means of inquiry is also high to very
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Table 4.1




Promise§ Means of inquiry Input Procedure Avail. Cost
4.1 Introspection 5.5 8 6 9 8 6.7
4.2 Folk psychology 6 5 4 7 8 5.7
4.3 Distinctions 5.5 9 5 7 8 6.5
4.3 Analogies 6.5 8 6 4 8 6.6
4.3 Models or theories 7 8 8 4 9 7.3
4.4 Contrastive analysis 6 9 7 9 7 7.2
4.4 Exclusion 5 9 8 9 9 7.2
Note. All means of inquiry in this table are strategies. § = section; Avail. = data availability; Cost
= resource cost.
high (7.5–9), apart from that of analogical reasoning and inferences from models,
which are both limited by a moderate availability of input. Although the evaluated
means of inquiry are very general reasoning strategies with different weaknesses, they
are all moderately to highly promising for contributing to evolutionary knowledge
about consciousness (5.7–7.3).
What the means of inquiry in this chapter have in common is that they are general
reasoning strategies that make their contribution to the present research goal to a
significant degree by relying on the content and quality of the input they receive.
This means that the evaluated strategies benefit from a wide applicability, but are
very input dependent. For some of these strategies, the modest availability of input
calls into question their current practicality. In all cases but one was the quality
of input evaluated as high to very high. This is because the strategies are capable
of taking high-quality input, and assuming that they do helps to determine their
potential or promise. However, the high input scores to some extent mask the fact
that the quality of input is much lower in most of the examples cited in this chapter.
(Note that I have intentionally omitted examples of lower quality.) The challenge for
using such general means of inquiry, then, is to obtain suitable high-quality input. In
the next chapter, I examine somewhat more specific and clearly more evolutionary
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Figure 4.1. Dimensional promise profiles of the seven general strategies for
reasoning about consciousness evaluated in this chapter.
means of inquiry, which also depend on input but do (a bit) more of the work toward
the research goal themselves.
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5 Evolutionary means of inquiry into
consciousness
What we really want when investigating the biological evolution of consciousness is
one or more ways of looking back at the origin of consciousness and its subsequent
development. Unfortunately, we cannot record the corresponding historical data at
the time of occurrence, nor do we know of any direct fossil evidence left by early con-
sciousness, nor has anyone so far seriously suggested recreating some of the relevant
conditions in a laboratory. As already pointed out, however, these difficulties are not
unique to the evolutionary study of consciousness (Polger, 2007; Polger & Flanagan,
1999), and the associated methodological questions may be the most foundational in
evolutionary behavioural sciences generally (Gangestad & Simpson, 2007a). Research-
ers in these sciences have developed several methodological approaches for studying
past evolutionary changes to mind and behaviour and their effects. This chapter
evaluates the promise of those evolutionary means of inquiry that have been used or
suggested to be used in consciousness studies.
The first section of the chapter deals with the natural method, a means of inquiry
that prescribes the integration of evidence about consciousness from different discip-
lines. The natural method could have been classified as a general strategy and placed
in the previous chapter; however, it has been recommended by its author for studying
the evolution and function/s of consciousness and is meant to include evidence from
evolutionary biology. In the following section, I analyse a means of inquiry that is
commonly employed in evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology, namely the
reverse engineering of organisms’ traits. I then discuss how much we may hope to
learn about the evolutionary development of consciousness from its ontogenetic de-
velopment. The last section, about the comparative method, considers comparisons
of the behaviour and brains of animals both across species and time. I summarise the
evaluation results of these evolutionary means of inquiry in the conclusion.
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5.1 The natural method and associates
“The question is by what method consciousness is to be studied. I propose that we
try the most natural strategy, what I call the natural method, to see if it can be made
to work” (Flanagan, 1992, p. 11). With this statement Flanagan (1992) introduced
the natural method. Despite his promotion of it since, it is not widely cited. Other
authors, however, agree with his claim that “the natural method . . . will . . . yield
success in understanding consciousness if anything will” (Flanagan, 1995a, p. 1104).
For example, Dooremalen (2003) deemed the natural method “the way to find answers
to questions about consciousness” (p. 7) and was “convinced that if we can solve
the problem of phenomenal consciousness [its realisation and evolutionary function]
this method will do the job” (p. 70). So how promising is the natural method for
contributing to a scientifically respectable evolutionary explanation of consciousness?
And why has it not been cited more?
The natural method is a methodological strategy that gives equal consideration
to any kind of evidence about consciousness. The three key sources of information
about consciousness within the natural method are phenomenology, psychology, and
neuroscience. Flanagan (1992) explained:
The object of the natural method is to see whether and to what extent the
three stories can be rendered coherent, meshed, and brought into reflective
equilibrium. The only rule is to treat all three—the phenomenology, the
psychology, and the neuroscience—with respect. (p. 11)
It is to be expected that the different kinds of evidence will be weighed differently in
the end; the point is not to privilege any kind of information prematurely (Polger &
Flanagan, 1999). Right from the start Flanagan included evolutionary biology as an
additional potentially relevant source of information about consciousness and asser-
ted the usefulness of the natural method for constructing a theory of consciousness
covering its origins and functions.
To illustrate the natural method in action, I summarise Dooremalen’s (2003) only
explicitly evolutionary case study. Dooremalen purportedly combined phenomenolo-
gical, psychological, and biological evidence to explain the experience of facial beauty.
He took patterns in the requests for plastic surgery to suggest that there are inter-
subjective and intercultural standards of beauty. He then cited psychological studies
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indicating, first, that averaged faces are judged more attractive than actual faces
and, second, what features further increase the perceived beauty of faces. These fa-
cial features have been found to be markers of high fertility, good genes, and good
health. Dooremalen concluded that “these feelings [of beauty evoked by faces] are
nature’s way of telling us that this [potential] mate is a good candidate for reproduc-
tion” (p. 155) and, more generally, that “phenomenal experiences . . . provide us (and
other animals) with a fast way to pick up highly complex information in a glimpse”
(pp. 156-157). This by itself does not show that the conscious experience of beauty
affects behaviour in an evolutionarily relevant way, but the case study does show the
coordination of different kinds of evidence according to the natural method.
One may wonder what is new about this multidisciplinary strategy. A coevolution
of phenomenological, psychological, and neuroscientific research has been repeatedly
advocated, albeit under different names and with variations (e.g., P. S. Churchland,
1986; Revonsuo, 2006; Varela, 1996; Wimsatt, 1976). This is not surprising, for
example, in light of O’Keefe’s (1985) claim that a complete theory of consciousness
should comprise a psychological model linked to knowledge from introspection, neuros-
cience, behavioural sciences, evolutionary biology, and sociology. Polger and Flanagan
(1999) admitted that consciousness researchers already do—at least implicitly, to some
extent, and some of the time—seek to balance the different kinds of evidence. In fact,
consciousness researchers nowadays often explicitly integrate different kinds of inform-
ation about consciousness, for example, in behavioural-cum-neuroimaging studies of
participants reporting conscious contents (cf. natural-method examples in Flanagan,
1992, pp. 13-19), and this might help explain why the natural method is not more
widely cited. However, Flanagan (1992) asserted that employing the natural method
was not standard practice, and Polger and Flanagan complained that “almost every-
one who has approached questions about consciousness has done so by privileging one
source of information above the others” (p. 243). An unwarranted preference could
certainly hinder research progress, and so an important feature of the natural method
is considering all relevant informational sources on an equal footing.
Evaluation of the natural method. The research subgoal in relation to which
the natural method is evaluated here is identifying the evolutionary function/s of
consciousness (what-adaptation/s category; see section 2.4). Although the natural
method has also been recommended for learning more about the evolutionary his-
tory of consciousness (Flanagan, 1992, 1995a), making it a contender for the origin-
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and-history category with the highest relevance to the research goal, its adequate
evaluation in this category would require more information than is contained in the
available very general strategy and applicability statements. Apart from applications
of the natural method in support of nonadaptation claims (discussed later in this
section), Dooremalen’s (2003) case study above is the only acknowledged evolution-
ary application of the natural method I know; all other acknowledged instances of
its use are about different properties of consciousness. Dooremalen’s case study thus
facilitates the evaluation of the natural method as a means of inquiry for identifying
the survival value/s of consciousness.
So if the natural method is employed with the aim of identifying evolutionary func-
tion/s of consciousness, its potential contribution to the research goal is high (6.5),
as it is likely to provide additional relevant information about consciousness. Lacking
specific instructions on how to apply the natural method with this aim, I assume that
it is unlikely to contribute knowledge of (differing) past evolutionary function/s and
detailed contextual conditions. The natural method might well be capable of doing
so, but so far this has not been clearly suggested. Flanagan and Polger (1995) may
have come closest to such a suggestion when they called for the cooperation of “bio-
logists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers of mind with interest and expertise in
evolutionary theory . . . plus comparative psychologists, ethnologists, paleontologists,
zoologists and neuroscientists, among others” (p. 321) for solving the problem of how
consciousness evolved, yet they did not mention the natural method. By excluding,
for the purpose of this evaluation, past function/s and contextual conditions as likely
results of the natural method, a lower demand is placed on the data required as input.
The natural method takes as input evidence about consciousness from all relevant
sources, whether neuroscience or folk medical practice (Polger & Flanagan, 1999); it
stipulates that all of these sources must be treated with equal respect, independent of
their quality. Note that the quality of this input is to be evaluated in relation to the
efficacy of the natural method and that this efficacy is not impaired by some lower-
quality evidence, because such evidence is simply weighed less heavily when following
the procedure of the natural method. Naturally, including and assessing all relevant
kinds of evidence is very desirable for a means of inquiry (10). Moreover, cross-
disciplinary integration of evidence is very important when studying multidisciplinary
problems, such as the adaptation status of psychological traits (Schmitt & Pilcher,
2004) or the evolution of consciousness. However, without a more specific articulation
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of the procedure of the natural method, there are doubts about how cogently and
exclusively the conclusions follow from the input (7).
Regarding the availability of input to the natural method, Polger and Flanagan
(1999) commented that “what one gets, automatically, as it were, by taking up . . .
the natural method, is an immense body of data” (p. 235; as for the contrastive ana-
lysis evaluated in section 4.4). The natural method can indeed take any available
relevant evidence as input, but evidence about the evolutionary function/s of con-
sciousness is not as abundant as evidence about some of its other properties (and
evidence about its past function/s and contextual conditions is much less so). As
Dooremalen’s (2003) case study illustrates, relevant evidence, though available, may
not be sufficient for drawing a convincing conclusion about the survival value/s of
consciousness. Because the available evidence clearly allows the natural method to
be used but not to reach its potential, the data availability in the present case is
moderate overall (6). Employing the natural method involves locating, assessing, and
coordinating relevant evidence from various disciplines, even if known by other means
to be inadequate, and thus carries a moderate resource cost (6). The synthesis of all
subevaluation scores indicates that the natural method is highly promising (7.2).
Deflationary evolutionary explanations. It is likely that at least some kinds of con-
sciousness are not adaptations and hence do not have any evolutionary function/s.
The natural method can be used in such cases also, leading to deflationary evolution-
ary explanations (Polger, 2007; the term deflationary was introduced in this context
by Flanagan, 1999/2000, and Polger & Flanagan, 1999). Given that this type of
application of the natural method has its own name, the question arises whether it
requires a separate evaluation. We need to know, for example, whether the natural
method has been used, or suggested to be used, merely for supporting the hypothesis
that a particular kind of consciousness has no evolutionary function/s (an-adaptation
category) or for developing a more detailed alternative account of that kind of con-
sciousness as a nonadaptation (what-adaptation category). This is where two further
evolutionary applications of the natural method come in handy.
The first of the two acknowledged uses of the natural method for giving defla-
tionary evolutionary explanations is Flanagan’s (1995a, 1995b, 1999/2000) argument
that dreaming is not an evolutionary adaptation. In brief, ponto-geniculo-occipital
waves during REM sleep activate visual areas (and memories), which, when com-
bined with the adaptive tendency of the cortex “to make sense out of experience”
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(Flanagan, 1995b, p. 25), largely accounts for phenomenological reports of dreaming.
Flanagan claimed that the activation of visual areas serves their early development
but has no other obvious developmental function. Even once in place, he argued,
dreaming is unlikely to have been affected by positive natural selection. Furthermore,
the phenomenology of dreams is not in agreement with predictions of their content
based on potential memory-related functions of REM sleep. The integration of this
phenomenological evidence with the aforementioned neuroscientific data and evolu-
tionary reasoning led Flanagan to hypothesise that dreaming is a by-product of both
the possession of waking consciousness and adaptive brain processes during sleep.
The second deflationary evolutionary explanation, given by Sufka (2000; Sufka &
Turner, 2005), is of chronic pain. Although acute and persistent pain are adaptive,
as they assist with the prevention of further injury and with recovery, chronic pain
has no known use, only disabling effects. Sufka (2000) suggested that the key to
solving the problem of “how something so maladaptive to an organism as chronic pain
could have ever possibly evolved in the first place” (p. 156) is the striking similarity
between the neurochemical mechanisms involved in chronic pain, specifically wind-
up, and those subserving learning and memory, specifically long-term potentiation,
a form of activity-dependent neural plasticity. Chronic pain may thus result from
neural plasticity in the pain sensory system. And despite being maladaptive, it could
not have been selected against because it is tied to subchronic pain on the one hand
and neural plasticity on the other, both of which are phylogenetically old and highly
adaptive. Sufka and Turner (2005) concluded that susceptibility to chronic pain
appears to be a maladaptive by-product of pain and neural plasticity.
The interest here is not in the promise of these two deflationary evolutionary explan-
ations, but in that of the deflationary application of the natural method. What these
two examples demonstrate is that the natural method has been used in attempts to
explain certain kinds of consciousness as by-products of specified adaptations, rather
than merely to support the view that these kinds of consciousness are not adapta-
tions. Essentially the same strategy is used whether the natural method is employed
to give an adaptation account or a deflationary evolutionary explanation. Although
the aims in those two situations are opposite with respect to the adaptation status
of consciousness, both types of application of the natural method aim to discover
the reasons for the postulated status (what-adaptation category). Because of these
equivalent aims and the same strategy (and equally little information for accurately
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estimating performance on the other criteria), the evaluation of the natural method
need not be repeated in writing for deflationary evolutionary explanations.1 Defla-
tionary applications of the natural method are therefore roughly as promising (7.2)
as its applications to alleged adaptation kinds of consciousness.
5.2 Reverse engineering consciousness
In biological evolution every variation of an organism that arises is tested against
existing alternatives in the relevant context. Depending on, among other factors,
the relative effects of this variation on the organism’s survival and reproduction, the
variation is retained or not. Virtually everything biological that we see today is the
cumulative result of many such generational cycles as well as the basis for future
developments. Thus, when studying a trait of an organism at the present time, “the
biologist is in the position of an archaeologist who uncovers a machine without any
written record and attempts to reconstruct not only its operation but also its purpose”
(Lewontin, 1978, p. 164). Such reverse engineering in biology has been promoted by
Dennett (1995a) as “extremely fruitful and, in fact, unavoidable” (p. 213). This
view has been extended explicitly to psychology, for example, by Pinker (1997), who
contended that “psychology is engineering in reverse” (p. 21). Taken together, these
considerations suggest that the application of reverse engineering to consciousness is
a worthwhile target of evaluation.
Application examples. William James (1879) already engaged in reverse engineer-
ing consciousness, as is apparent in his summing up of the core of his argument:
A priori analysis of both brain and conscious action shows us that if the
latter were efficacious it would, by its selective emphasis, make amends
for the indeterminateness of the former; whilst the study a` posteriori of
the distribution of consciousness shows it to be exactly such as we might
expect in an organ added for the sake of steering a nervous system grown
too complex to regulate itself. (p. 18)
James characterised consciousness and its selection function at different levels, iden-
tified a potentially corresponding adaptive problem, and compared the distribution
1If the chronic pain account were the only evolutionary application of the natural method so far, the
natural method would score slightly higher on relevance (7) owing to a more historical and contextual
perspective, but lower on general data availability (5), resulting in almost the same promise score (7.3).
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of consciousness in animals to that hypothesised for an optimally designed trait with
the same function. Note the similarity of his wording to that of evolutionary biolo-
gist Williams (1966): “Suppose we did find some features of the feeding activities of
earthworms that were . . . exactly what we should expect of a system designed for soil
improvement. We would then be forced to recognize the system as” (pp. 18–19) an
evolutionary adaptation.
A well-structured and clear application of this general strategy to consciousness is
Pinker’s (1997, 2004) reverse-engineering analysis of access consciousness. He first
explained that any information processor’s access to information must be limited
because information (including information processing) is costly in terms of space,
time, and energy. A computational system should therefore be designed so that only
currently relevant information is accessible to the processor in question. Pinker (1997)
claimed that this design specification comprises “the engineering specs of information
access, and thus the selection pressures that probably gave rise to it” (p. 137). Next
he compared his independent optimality analysis with the empirical features of access
consciousness in us. According to Pinker’s (2004) strategy, if the criteria derived from
the design specification for the relevance of information match the empirical features
of access consciousness, we may conclude that it is an adaptation.
Four empirical features of access consciousness are pertinent to the design specifica-
tion because they each prioritise relevant information or discard irrelevant information
(Pinker, 1997, 2004):
1. The perceptual contents of access consciousness are at intermediate levels of
mental representation, between sensory input and abstract cognition. This
makes sense for an information processing system because computations at lower
levels are based on rules that are mostly constant over one’s lifetime and also
context-independent to a certain degree, whereas higher levels lack important
information.
2. Access consciousness has a serial, limited-capacity focus corresponding to atten-
tion and working memory. The spotlight of attention helps to detect conjunc-
tions of features. Because conjunctions are combinatorial, unconscious parallel
processing cannot be designed within the space of a brain to be capable of
detecting all possible conjunctions. Relatedly, slow serial memory retrieval con-
forms to many principles of an optimal information-retrieval system, aimed at
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retrieving the currently most useful information. Examples of such principles
are retrieval by frequency and recency.
3. Conscious states have emotional colourings. These activate goal states, which in
turn initiate operations for reducing discrepancies with present states. Sources
of emotional colourings such as pleasures and pains are closely related to survival
and reproduction, these sources being precisely those factors that could not
be taken for granted in our evolutionary environment, such as food (but not
oxygen), romantic partners, and surviving children.
4. Conscious experience includes the feeling of being in control, of making decisions
about what actions to take. An executive control mechanism has the benefit
of facilitating the selection and coordination of a single course of action for a
single body.
Pinker’s (1997, 2004) descriptions of these features of access consciousness are based
on everyday experiences and research studies. In sum, Pinker gave independent en-
gineering reasons for the existence of access consciousness and four of its features in
order to support its explanation as an adaptation.
Because applications of reverse engineering to consciousness differ, I briefly sum-
marise four additional examples. Dessalles (2001) drew an analogy between, on the
one hand, the experiential spaces associated with each sensory modality, which are
characterised by continuous, directional, and regular stimulus-experience projections,
and a large dynamic range, and on the other hand, optimal projections in communic-
ation theory with the same four properties. He concluded that phenomenal conscious-
ness has been optimally designed by natural selection for perceptual discrimination.
Merker (2005) argued that the systematic absence from consciousness of “sensory
preliminaries and motor sequels of central control functions” (p. 95) is a design fea-
ture: Mobile animals with centralised brains and diverse complex sensory and motor
systems would have benefited from decision making within a single stable summary
world. Baars (1993) explained the biological cost of a single limited-capacity stream
of consciousness with the benefit of global workspace architectures, which can, by
combining the activities of various specialised processors, solve problems that special-
ised processors cannot solve by themselves. Making use of Nichols and Grantham’s
(2000) principle of adaptive complexity, according to which “the features that make an
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organ complex likely contribute to its adaptedness” (p. 667), also amounts to reverse
engineering: A complex trait’s structure may assist in figuring out what the trait was
designed to do. For instance, phenomenal consciousness is unified and has multiple
input mechanisms, which suggests that it integrates information (like the similarly
structured lateral line system in fish; Nichols & Grantham, 2000). In each of these
examples, an aspect of consciousness has been reverse-engineered, often with the help
of an analogy, in search of that aspect’s evolutionary function/s.
Evaluation of reverse engineering. Criticisms of reverse engineering offer clues as
to how well and for what this strategy might work. The trait to be reverse-engineered
is at the outset assumed to be an evolutionary adaptation, in line with methodolo-
gical adaptationism. To be able to implement the reverse-engineering strategy, one
then needs a hint of what the trait might have been designed to do (Pinker, 1997).
Even if the trait is an adaptation and we have an idea of what its evolutionary func-
tion/s might be, there are many reasons why its design may not be optimal (see
section 1.2). What is more, the trait’s function/s might be underdetermined by its
structure (R. C. Richardson, 2007), simply because “the same feature may serve dif-
ferent ends . . . [just as] the same end may be served by different features” (Griffiths,
1996, p. 524). Further, R. C. Richardson (2001) complained that reverse-engineering
analyses with a priori unknown design constraints are compatible with different histor-
ical routes, and Griffiths (2001) that a reverse-engineering explanation can be highly
plausible, correctly predicting the observed trait, and the best one available, yet false
(e.g., as shown by comparative data). Against the expectations underlying these cri-
ticisms,2 a single means of inquiry is seldom sufficient to support a broad hypothesis
beyond reasonable doubt, and the focus of reverse-engineering analyses is on the ad-
aptive advantages of traits, not their precise historical development. A benefit of
the ahistoricity of reverse engineering is that it allows the development of hypotheses
about functions based on more readily available evidence.
Some problems with reverse engineering have also been mentioned in papers on
consciousness. For example, Sufka and Turner (2005) explained chronic pain as a
maladaptive by-product using what they called a bottom-up research strategy and
commented that “anyone who tried to ‘reverse engineer’ chronic pain . . . would go
badly astray” (p. 255) because it was not designed to solve an adaptive problem.
2These criticisms served to argue against an over-reliance on reverse engineering in evolutionary
psychology, narrowly construed, and for the use of the comparative method.
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This is the above point about the adaptation assumption of reverse engineering ap-
plied to consciousness: Attempts at reverse-engineering a kind of consciousness are
bound to fail if that kind of consciousness is not an adaptation—neither of which
may be obvious. Relatedly, Welshon (in press) set aside reverse engineering of con-
sciousness because he believed that many current human traits have not been selected
for their current adaptiveness, which would invalidate inferences about their evolu-
tionary functions. So when considering an aspect of consciousness that might have
been affected by recent changes, the existence and nature of these changes should be
investigated first (Sleutels, 2008), that is, here, before attempting to reverse-engineer
the corresponding aspect of consciousness.
The application of the promise evaluation tool to reverse engineering requires its
aim to be established first. The application examples above make evident that reverse
engineering is employed in consciousness research with the aim of identifying evolu-
tionary function/s of consciousness. Two inferences are involved in achieving this
aim: “from structure to function and then from function to history” (R. C. Richard-
son, 2007, p. 44). The latter inference is where the analogy of the present strategy
with the reverse engineering of technology or software breaks down. When reverse-
engineering such a product, the interest is normally in the functioning and purpose
of the product and its components, not in its historical development. However, when
reverse-engineering a biological trait, the more contentious historical inference is es-
sential for determining its naturally selected function/s.
The relevance of reverse engineering to the research goal is moderate (6): Be-
cause of its aim, this strategy belongs in the what-adaptation/s category, and its
use can reasonably be expected to provide some additional knowledge, such as know-
ledge about important characteristics of consciousness, its functioning, and possible
selection pressures. The principal input to reverse-engineering analyses consists of
empirical data on consciousness, for instance, from laboratory experiments or intro-
spection. If data on consciousness in today’s animals are used and their sources are
appropriately taken into account, which is suggested, for example, by Pinker’s (2004)
discussion of the conscious feeling of being in control, the data quality is likely to be
very high (9). This is also true for other reverse-engineering input, such as hypotheses
about functions, suitable analogies, and the bases of optimality analyses, again under
ideal circumstances.
Most of the criticisms of reverse engineering concern its procedure, which I rate
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as moderate overall (5). The strategy does connect input to output and is common-
sensical, but there are problems with its inferences and assumptions. For example,
the structure-to-function inference can go wrong because of underdetermination, and
the function-to-history inference blindly assumes that the trait in question is an ad-
aptation largely unaffected by culture. Other questionable assumptions are that the
trait solved an adaptive problem optimally and that trait and problem can be ana-
lysed in isolation. The availability of the data that have been described above as
input to reverse-engineering analyses is high (8). Employing this strategy requires
the gathering of such mostly available empirical data and their analysis, possibly in-
cluding an independent optimality analysis, and thus carries a relatively low resource
cost (7). Despite concerns with its procedure, reverse engineering is on the whole
a highly promising strategy (6.7)—if executed well—for studying the evolution and
function/s of consciousness.
5.3 Parallels between ontogeny and phylogeny
A completely different approach to the investigation of the evolution of consciousness
was suggested by Baldwin (1896), based on his assertion that “in the life history of the
organism we have the problem of development actually in a measure solved before us”
(p. 302). Given the difficulties with obtaining evidence about the evolutionary history
of consciousness, data on its development in present-day organisms could be a handy
resource indeed. The corresponding strategy consists of examining how consciousness
develops in the individual organism and generalising the findings to the biological
evolution of consciousness. This strategy may not only help to learn more about the
evolutionary stages of consciousness: Baldwin claimed that “the biologist no less than
the psychologist must . . . resort to this field of investigation [children’s mental devel-
opment] if he would finally settle the function of consciousness in evolution” (p. 302).
Although this strategy has been employed little in consciousness research compared
to the other evolutionary means of inquiry evaluated in this chapter, Baldwin’s state-
ments indicate that its promise is well worth evaluating.
A crucial question concerns the intended closeness of the parallels between the on-
togeny and the phylogeny of consciousness. If ontogeny were thought to recapitulate
phylogeny strictly, investigations of individual development could be taken to provide
direct knowledge about the evolutionary history of consciousness. However, the par-
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allels between ontogeny and phylogeny are most likely weaker (see next subsection).
This has been acknowledged by researchers writing about the evolution of conscious-
ness. For example, Baldwin (1906) devoted half of his first chapter to the discussion of
systematic deviations from strict parallelism in mental development. Herrick (1945)
stated that the “developmental series [of experience] shows many similarities with the
phylogenetic series . . . though the parallelism is by no means close” (p. 63). And
Reber (1992) pointed out that “the recapitulation is not ‘literal’ ” (p. 111) and that
“a gentle form of recapitulation holds” (p. 123) for the emergence of consciousness.
Having clarified that the present strategy assumes limited ontogeny–phylogeny par-
allelism only, I first consider example applications of this strategy and then examples
of other uses of ontogenetic findings in evolutionary studies of consciousness.
Example uses of ontogeny. As called for above, Baldwin (1896) generalised from
observations of the early development of human children that consciousness has the
evolutionary function of enabling the acquisition of noninherited things: “The in-
stinctive equipment of the lower animals is replaced by the plasticity necessary for
learning by consciousness” (p. 301). He summarised further results of his application
of the ontogeny–phylogeny strategy, but did not demonstrate the strategy in action.
A better source of parallelism examples is Baldwin’s (1906) book Mental Development
in the Child and the Race. Having recommended the use of the present strategy in
research on the evolutionary history of consciousness, he outlined four evolutionary
stages of mental development, corresponding approximately to invertebrates, lower
vertebrates, higher vertebrates, and humans, and identified these stages in the devel-
opment of human infants. Conversely, he described four stages of human children’s
consciousness of other persons, namely others as objects, others with personality,
the child as subject, and others as subjects, the first three of which he claimed to
have clear parallels in other animals. These are early illustrations of stages in human
individual development found to resemble evolutionary stages.
In two other cases in which the ontogeny–phylogeny strategy has been used, the
evolutionary development is presented before that of the individual. Reber (1992)
stated as an axiom that consciousness is evolutionarily recent; after all, “we have con-
sciousness, protozoa do not” (p. 113). Among the predictions that he derived from this
axiom and confirmed mainly by literature review is that conscious processing devel-
ops later in infancy than unconscious processing. Herrick (1945) described conscious
experience in humans but believed we had no means of determining its emergence
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in either ontogeny or phylogeny, which is why he focused on its early precursors.
He distinguished two primordial types of experience in all animals: sensorimotor and
integrative experience (the latter is associated with the active preservation of the indi-
vidual and the coordination of its parts), which are forerunners of human extro- and
introspection, respectively. During evolution animals have tended to become more
specialised to achieve a better fit with their environments in an increasing number of
ways, with higher-ranked animals surviving and living better. Making use of paral-
lelism, “the evolutionary series of progressively amplified experience may profitably
be compared with the simpler and more accessible series of changes observed in the
growth of the individual from egg to maturity” (p. 63). Herrick cited developmental
studies of the behaviour and anatomy of many different species including humans in
support of the proposed types of experience, of which the integrative type seems to
be primary and develop first. Ontogenetic findings can thus support old and suggest
new phylogenetic hypotheses.
More commonly, usages of alleged ontogeny–phylogeny parallels in the development
of consciousness are sketchier or have different purposes. For example, Thomas Huxley
(1874/1882) argued for consciousness in animals and therefore against the sudden
emergence in humans of what he deemed a complex phenomenon: “We know, that, in
the individual man, consciousness grows from a dim glimmer to its full light, whether
we consider the infant advancing in years, or the adult emerging from slumber and
swoon” (p. 233). Ga¨rdenfors (2008) used behavioural evidence from human children
and nonhuman animals to support his ordering of five levels of intersubjectivity, by
which he referred to the awareness of others’ consciousness. When considering how the
integration of the components of consciousness develops, Lagercrantz (2008) suggested
that sensory signals in the brains of human newborns are not yet fully integrated. To
support his statement that “maybe there is an evolutionary parallel” (p. 171), he
gave an animal example from a theoretical chapter. Finally, the only obvious use of
ontogeny in Roth’s (2000b) chapter “The Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness”
occurred in his comparison of the capabilities of human children and nonhuman apes to
learn theory of mind and language. These examples show awareness of the potential
usefulness of parallels between the ontogeny and phylogeny of consciousness—the
question is how far their use can take us toward an evolutionary understanding of
consciousness.
As an aside, the concept of recapitulation already existed well before Darwin’s
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(1859) Origin of Species (Mayr, 1994), and possibly also before its discovery by the
German Naturphilosophen in the 1790s. Blaise Pascal expressed the basic idea in
1647, albeit not about different species: “The same thing happens in the succession
of men in general as in the different ages of a single individual man” (as cited in
Martindale, 1977–1978, p. 262). It is therefore not surprising that early, culturally
oriented theories of the evolution of consciousness already tended to subscribe to
the recapitulation idea and rely on observations of children as support among other
sources (reviewed by Martindale, 1977–1978). More recent theories of the history
of consciousness that maintain that only humans with a conceptual language are
conscious also draw on evidence from developmental psychology (e.g., Jaynes, 1986;
Macphail, 1998, 2008). Overall, then, we might expect the recapitulation heuristic to
have a certain value, but what about its biological foundation?
Evaluation of ontogenetic parallels. There may be no consensus on recapitulation
in biology, but the general view seems to be that parallelism between ontogeny and
phylogeny does hold to some extent, even if the original law of recapitulation has
been largely discredited (M. K. Richardson & Keuck, 2002). In short, parallelism
holds when new stages are added to the end of ontogenetic development, but not
when new characters are introduced earlier or old ones modified or when reproduction
occurs at an earlier stage (Gould, 1977; Ridley, 2004). Groups of species may differ
in their susceptibility to the different types of changes (Mayr, 1994). Recapitulations
have been almost exclusively found in the transformations of single characters, not
whole stages as originally proposed (M. K. Richardson & Keuck, 2002). Futuyma
(2005) concluded that the recapitulation “law is certainly not an infallible guide to
phylogenetic history. However, embryological similarities provided Darwin with some
of his most important evidence of evolution, and they continue to shed important light
on how characteristics have been transformed during evolution” (p. 56). Because there
is no one-to-one correspondence between ontogeny and phylogeny, care is needed when
using the former to help reconstruct the latter.
The aim of employing ontogeny–phylogeny parallels in consciousness research is to
learn more about the evolutionary development of consciousness. This means that the
strategy fits well into the origin-and-history category of the promise evaluation tool.
The relevance of this strategy to the research goal is high (7), though it has a slight
bias for the history as opposed to the origin of consciousness. Its strength lies in the
potential discovery of evolutionary changes of consciousness and their sequence. Ad-
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ditionally, parallels with ontogeny could suggest factors responsible for these changes
and possibly also evolutionary function/s of consciousness. The input to the strategy
consists primarily of findings on the consciousness of young human children. Good
data may be difficult to obtain in some cases (see below), but even then the strategy’s
input can be strong (8) if the results of several means of inquiry agree.
Although the ontogenetic-parallels strategy can lead to valid conclusions, its pro-
cedure is threatened by the variable reliability of the link between ontogeny and phylo-
geny (6). Not only do ontogenetic changes occur relatively faster or slower, stages in
the development of consciousness may be missing, additional, or in the wrong order.
The strategy should include a mechanism for trying to ascertain whether recapit-
ulation is likely to apply to the case at hand. One could, for instance, study the
ontogenetic development of consciousness in other species, as Herrick (1945) did for
its precursors. Or one could investigate whether the bases of consciousness are part
of the main lines in the embryogenetic development of vertebrate nervous systems
that Nicolau et al. (2000) asserted recapitulate phylogeny. In any case, the availab-
ility of data that allows the application of the strategy is high (7), in spite of some
methodological and ethical difficulties with pre- and postnatally collecting data on
consciousness. Unlike historical data on consciousness, human children are not rare,
and results of developmental studies are available (see Lagercrantz, 2008; Zelazo,
Gao, & Todd, 2007). The resource cost of locating these studies and collating their
results would be low (7), though further studies will need to be conducted. Taken to-
gether, the promise of the ontogenetic-parallels strategy, which offers a unique access
to historical developments of consciousness, is high (7.0).
5.4 The comparative method: Round two
“The comparative method . . . was Darwin’s favoured technique. And, since his day,
it has been used sooner or later by almost all right-thinking evolutionary biologists”
(Harvey & Pagel, 1991, p. 5). The comparative method is also the most popular
evolutionary means of inquiry among consciousness researchers. A basic version of
it was already evaluated in section 3.4 as an argument for consciousness being an
adaptation. Comparisons of animal species have, in general, been used at many
different levels, for example, to identify adaptations that have evolved independently
in similar selective environments (analogies) and evolutionarily relevant variations of
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a trait in species with shared ancestry (homologies) as well as to determine when
a trait has evolved. Hence, in order to use the comparative method properly, the
phylogenetic relationships of examined species must be taken into account (Freeman
& Herron, 2007; Futuyma, 2005; Harvey & Pagel, 1991). I therefore exclude from my
analysis of the comparative method publications that discuss animal consciousness
without any reference to phylogeny. The majority of consciousness researchers who
have employed the comparative method have compared both animal behaviour and
brains. However, these types of evidence are often not well integrated, they have been
employed individually, and they face different criticisms, which is why I evaluate their
use in the comparative method separately.
Today’s behaviours. A memorable example of a behavioural comparison of mam-
mals with reptiles led Sjo¨lander (1995) to identify what he considered “one of the
most important breakthroughs in the evolution of mind” (p. 5). Sjo¨lander (1997)
compared, amongst other behaviours and species, the mouse-related behaviours of
cats and snakes. When a cat hears a mouse, it might search for it by sight and smell,
anticipate its path behind an obstacle, wait for its emergence from a hole for many
hours, and perhaps even dream about it. A snake, on the other hand, relies purely on
its eyes (or heat-sensitive organs) to strike a prey, on smell to track the prey to where
the venom immobilises it, and on touch to swallow the prey by its head. The snake
does not anticipate the path of its prey and, even when holding the prey with its
body, searches for it by smell (Sjo¨lander, 1995). The snake’s behaviour thus appears
to indicate that it does not have a single centralised mental representation of reality
as we and probably other mammals do. Rather, it “seems to live in several different
worlds, where a mouse is not an object with different characteristics, but rather many
‘things’ ” (Sjo¨lander, 1997, p. 597). The behaviour of birds indicates that their inner
worlds may be placed somewhere between those of mammals and reptiles; they either
live in a single reality or in many sophisticated modality-specific ones (cf. Sjo¨lander,
1999). These behavioural comparisons suggest a fundamental change in the exper-
ience of animals in the mammalian lineage after its divergence from reptiles, and
possibly analogous experience in birds.
Because comparisons of animal behaviours differ in many respects, a couple of re-
marks on the strategy and two further examples are helpful. To begin with, the
comparative method does not specify how behaviours should be selected for compar-
ison, so I do not address criteria for animal consciousness here (see section 3.4 for
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some comments on this). Sometimes the search in comparisons is for a critical differ-
ence between human behaviour or cognition and that of nonhuman animals regarded
as unconscious (e.g., Macphail, 1998, 2008), but more often it is for several species
groupings according to prespecified behavioural or cognitive abilities (e.g., Ga¨rden-
fors, 2008; Oakley, 1985). Pursuing the latter approach, Roth (2001) listed nine
cognitive-behavioural criteria for human consciousness, of which the first one may
be found in primates and other mammals, whereas the last one is found in humans
only: task-structure and tool learning by imitation, perspective-taking in deception,
anticipation of future events, comprehension of mechanisms, theory of mind, mirror
self-recognition, teaching, simple syntactical language, and complex syntactical lan-
guage. He used evidence of the presence or absence of these criteria in mammals
to identify four evolutionary steps in their cognitive abilities including consciousness.
Focusing on the evolutionary origin of consciousness instead of evolutionary changes
in consciousness, Cabanac et al. (2009) concluded, based on experimental evidence on
emotion, sensory pleasure, play, REM sleep, and other indicators in several vertebrate
species, that consciousness emerged in early amniotes approximately 325 million years
ago (see Figure 5.1). These examples illustrate well enough for evaluation purposes
how behaviour comparisons have been employed in different ways to learn more about
the evolution of consciousness.
The aim of such behaviour comparisons is to discover the origin and development of
consciousness by linking its distribution in animals to their phylogenetic relationships.
The potential contribution of these comparisons to the research goal comes closest yet
to the best evolutionary history of consciousness that we can currently hope for (8).
Because much evidence is missing, we cannot expect, for example, to establish the
responsible evolutionary mechanisms in every case or to give complete adaptation
explanations. However, this strategy’s contribution is likely to include evolutionary
relations between different levels of consciousness in many different species, some
of whose selective environments may be partially known. A potentially significant
drawback of behaviour comparisons is that they can only be applied to aspects of
consciousness that have clearly and consistently observable effects on behaviour. Yet
unlike the argument from species comparisons in section 3.4, the comparative method
can be used to investigate the emergence of distinctly human aspects of consciousness
when historical evidence, such as archaeological artefacts, is taken into account (e.g.,
Leakey, 1994; Leary & Buttermore, 2003; Mithen, 1999; Welshon, in press). The
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Figure 5.1. Phylogenetic tree with behavioural signs of consciousness pre-
sent or absent in living vertebrates. (REM sleep signs are probably based
on behaviour and neurophysiology.) Myr = million years; Sensory pleas. =
sensory pleasure. From “The Emergence of Consciousness in Phylogeny,”
by M. Cabanac, A. J. Cabanac, and A. Parent, 2009, Behavioural Brain Re-
search, 198, p. 271. Copyright 2009 by Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.
input to this strategy is thus made up of behavioural studies of living animals (e.g.,
experiments, laboratory and field observations) or, less commonly, historical evidence
(e.g., artefacts, skulls, bones, fossils). The high quality of well-conducted animal
studies (8) may be approached through historical evidence about the human lineage
under ideal circumstances.
Behaviour comparisons utilise the pattern of presence and absence of consciousness
in animals well, and their procedure is generally sound (8), though the determination
of animal consciousness as part of this strategy can be problematic. For one thing,
the assumption that the behaviour of today’s animals is the same as that of their
early ancestors may well not hold. For another, it is questionable if criteria for con-
sciousness, whether derived from theory or based on the human model, can be applied
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successfully to a large variety of species. To conclude from the absence of a criterion
behaviour that the species is fully unconscious, one would have to exclude failures to
elicit the behaviour and consciousness being expressed differently. To conclude from
the presence of a criterion behaviour that the species is fully conscious, one would have
to establish that the observed behaviour is not produced by a consciousness-unrelated
mechanism (strict necessity is unlikely for biological traits; Polger, 2007; A. K. Seth,
2009). Examples of apparently complex behaviours that are better explained as in-
stincts evolved for specific purposes are the communication of bees by waggle dance
and the anticipation of dragon-fly larvae for their prey to reappear on the other side
of an obstacle (Sjo¨lander, 1997). The difficulties with behavioural criteria differ with
the generality of the criteria (e.g., mirror self-recognition vs. behavioural complexity)
and increase with the phylogenetic distance between species. My purpose here is not
to question criteria for consciousness, on which all evaluated means of inquiry have to
rely, only to point to potential difficulties in their generalisation to distantly related
species. Most behaviour comparisons mitigate these problems by the simultaneous
use of multiple criteria.
The availability of relevant data depends a lot on the particular aspect of conscious-
ness under investigation, which influences the choice of criterion behaviours, animal
species, and type of evidence. Much evidence is available from fields such as ethology
and anthropology, so there should be sufficient initial input for the strategy to be pur-
sued (7). Published behaviour comparisons on the evolution of consciousness support
this assessment, yet more specific data on the chosen criteria for consciousness will
need to be collected and may not be available within a decade. The main steps in using
this strategy are locating and analysing evidence on criterion behaviours of potentially
many different species and relating the evidence to the corresponding phylogenetic in-
formation. Because the strategy makes use of published results in the first instance,
its resource cost is low (7). Altogether, the comparison of animal behaviours is highly
promising for increasing knowledge about the evolution of consciousness (7.8).
Brain evolution. Comparisons of those features of animals’ brains that are thought
to be associated with consciousness are at least as popular for answering evolution-
ary questions as are behaviour comparisons, and they resemble each other in many
respects. Here I concentrate mainly on their differences, starting with a brief look at
some applications of the comparative method to human and nonhuman brains. A ba-
sic introductory example is Thomas Huxley’s (1874) argument that lower vertebrates
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have a less developed equivalent of the human organ of consciousness and therefore
most likely a proportionally lower level of consciousness, “which, more or less dis-
tinctly, foreshadows our own” (Huxley, 1874/1882, p. 233). He believed the anterior
division of human and, by analogy, nonhuman brains to be the organ of consciousness.
What is being compared in applications of the comparative method has changed and
expanded since Huxley’s time—a trend I expect to continue with the neuroscience of
consciousness having become a very active research area—yet the strategy of brain
comparisons in this area has essentially remained the same.
Which brain features are compared depends on the aspect of consciousness invest-
igated, the approach taken, and often also on the theory of consciousness entertained.
For example, A. K. Seth et al. (2005) identified three empirically established indic-
ators of human consciousness in mammal brains, namely the presence of fast, irregu-
lar, low-amplitude electrical activity, cortex and thalamus, and widespread activity.3
D. B. Edelman, Baars, and Seth (2005) considered related criteria for primary con-
sciousness in birds and octopuses, based on G. M. Edelman’s (1989) biological theory
of consciousness. Grossenbacher (2001) inferred that consciousness has not evolved
recently in humans from evidence that the cingulate cortex, hypothesised to be the
central consciousness structure in his access mediation model, has an ancient cytoar-
chitecture and similar connectivity in other mammals. Taking a different approach,
Roth (2001) searched for brain features among tetrapods that would correlate with
the complexity of previously established cognitive abilities including consciousness
and reflect “the factual or alleged superiority of humans regarding cognition and con-
sciousness” (p. 575). After considering features such as overall brain organisation and
the absolute and relative size of the brain, cortex, and prefrontal cortex (or homo-
logues), he concluded that the best candidate feature is the number of cortical neurons
and synapses, along with the brain’s maturation period and Broca’s area. Unsurpris-
ingly, the structural and functional features in brain comparisons are virtually always
premised on human consciousness as a model.
Despite having the same aim as behaviour comparisons and sharing many of their
properties, brain comparisons are more relevant to the research goal (9). This is
because they can be applied to aspects of consciousness that are apparent in behaviour
and to those that are not, which is attractive if we are not just looking for adaptation
3This paper is primarily concerned with criteria for consciousness for use in comparative studies.
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explanations of consciousness. Brain comparisons are in principle applicable to all
aspects of consciousness that are generated by neural processes (in interaction with
their environment), but whether this will be practicable, and if so when, is too difficult
to estimate at this point. The evidential strength of brain data is also higher (9) than
that of the input to behaviour comparisons. Brain comparisons have been defended
as a good starting point for comparative studies because the corresponding criteria
are more easily testable (particularly for homologues structures; A. K. Seth et al.,
2005) and lead to more concrete results (A˚rhem, Lindahl, Manger, & Butler, 2008).
Nevertheless, assigning a score of 10 is not justified, as the input to brain comparisons
may be about functional equivalents in distantly related species or about historical
brains.
The other subevaluation scores of brain comparisons are the same as those for
behaviour comparisons (8–7–7), even if some of the reasons differ. Regarding the
procedure of brain comparisons, the search for structures that are associated with
consciousness in humans risks missing evidence of consciousness associated with other
structures, especially in distantly related species. That is, similar-looking homologous
structures might be identified but not analogous structures. One should therefore look
for functional equivalents of human consciousness indicators (e.g., D. B. Edelman et
al., 2005). Moreover, the presence of a (homologous or analogous) structure that is
associated with consciousness in humans does not mean that the structure has the
same functionality in other species. Until we have something approaching a unique
marker for a particular aspect of consciousness, it is important to use several indicators
at once, as the authors of most published brain comparisons have done. The reasons
given for the scores assigned to the availability of data for and the resource cost of
behaviour comparisons transfer to behaviour comparisons. In sum, then, using the
comparative method on the brains of different species is a highly promising strategy
for investigating the evolution of consciousness (8.4).
Applications of the comparative method can be made even more promising by
integrating evidence on the brains and behaviour of animals, thus pursuing a syn-
thetic approach to the study of animal consciousness (D. B. Edelman et al., 2005;
D. B. Edelman & Seth, 2009). It is encouraging that the majority of researchers who
have utilized the comparative method in research on consciousness have attempted to
do so, even if findings from the different criteria often do not agree well. A nice ex-
ample of an integration of historical behaviour and brain data is Welshon’s (2008) use
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Figure 5.2. Phylogeny of consciousness based on a synthetic approach.
Behavioural, anatomical, and physiological data suggest that primary
consciousness emerged independently in the mammalian, avian, and
possibly cephalopod lineages. Higher-order consciousness is present in
modern humans. mYr = million years. From “Identifying Hallmarks
of Consciousness in Non-Mammalian Species,” by D. B. Edelman, B.
J. Baars, and A. K. Seth, 2005, Consciousness and Cognition, 14,
p. 174. Copyright 2005 by Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.
of archaeological evidence (viz., of componential tool construction) and paleoneuro-
logical evidence (viz., of differences between humans and monkeys in specific parietal
gyri and associated connectivity and of nonallometric parietal and frontopolar expan-
sion in the human lineage). He argued that the implicated enhancement of human
working memory in the last 1.5 million years resulted in changes to access conscious-
ness. The complexity of brain and behaviour comparisons, including inconsistencies
between them, is apparent in A˚rhem et al.’s (2008) discussion of four basic scen-
arios of the evolutionary origin of consciousness: emergence in humans, in mammals,
in mammals and birds independently, or in reptiles. According to D. B. Edelman’s
(2009) comparative analyses, primary consciousness may even have evolved at least
three times (see Figure 5.2): in mammals, birds, and cephalopods.
157
5 Evolutionary means of inquiry into consciousness
Table 5.1
Subevaluations of Evolutionary Means of Inquiry for Use on Consciousness
Relevance
Efficacy Practicality
Promise§ Means of inquiry Input Procedure Avail. Cost
5.1 Natural method 6.5 10 7 6 6 7.2
5.1 Deflationary method " " " " " "
5.2 Reverse engineering 6 9 5 8 7 6.7
5.3 Ontogenetic parallels 7 8 6 7 7 7.0
5.4 Comparing behaviour 8 8 8 7 7 7.8
5.4 Comparing brains 9 9 8 7 7 8.4
Note. All means of inquiry in this table are strategies. § = section; Avail. = data availability; Cost
= resource cost.
Conclusion
For ease of comparison, the evaluation results of the six means of inquiry discussed
in this chapter are given in Table 5.1 and illustrated in Figure 5.3. All of the means
belong to one of the two highest relevance categories: The means in the first two
sections are aimed at identifying evolutionary function/s of consciousness and those
in the last two sections at discovering its evolutionary origin and development since.
All of these evolutionary strategies have a high efficacy (7.0 to 8.5), though there
are some concerns with the procedures of reverse engineering and the ontogenetic-
parallels strategy. The practicality of the means of inquiry is moderate to high (6.0
to 7.5). Because none of them contain or are data collection methods, the means take
published research studies as input, with attendant consequences on the available
input and resource cost. The evolutionary strategies’ promise scores span almost the
entire range of the high label (6.7 to 8.4). Thus, despite some differences between
them that are worth noting, they are all highly promising means of inquiry into the
evolution of consciousness.
What, then, are the main factors that determine whether these highly promising
evolutionary strategies reach their potential? First, the better a strategy is imple-
mented, the better it tends to work. The quality of implementation in turn depends,
among other things, on the expertise and competence of the researchers and the avail-
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Figure 5.3. Dimensional promise profiles of the six evolutionary strategies eval-
uated in this chapter.
able resources. Second, the discussion of the comparative method has highlighted
the centrality of reliable criteria for determining consciousness in other human and
nonhuman animals. Third, the biggest limitation on the strategies’ success is the
inaccessibility of needed evidence, in particular historical evidence, as already poin-
ted out in the introduction to this chapter. R. C. Richardson (2001, 2007) argued
strongly against evolutionary psychology, narrowly construed, that evolutionary hy-
potheses about human mental traits will remain unconstrained speculation, because
the required evidence will most likely never become available. However, even if an
acceptable explanation of the evolution of consciousness by evolutionary biology’s
standards is unlikely, it is much too early to give up: The means of inquiry in the
present chapter, along with the evidence that is or could soon be available, promise
more than mere speculation. Finally, I have evaluated the strategies as they have
been employed in consciousness research so far; employing more sophisticated ver-
sions of them should improve their success. I take a closer look at the evaluation and
its implications in the next chapter.
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and the future
The purpose of this thesis was to determine not only what means of inquiry are avail-
able for studying the biological evolution and function/s of consciousness but also how
good they are or, more specifically, how promising they are with respect to the research
goal of giving a scientifically respectable evolutionary explanation of consciousness.
This required the construction of a suitable tool for evaluating the promise of means of
inquiry. The evaluation tool I constructed has three dimensions—relevance, efficacy,
and practicality—with two criteria each, which are assessed independently (except
for the relevance criteria) and synthesised into dimensional and promise scores. This
tool served to evaluate 23 means of inquiry that have been used in, or suggested to be
used for, the investigation of the evolution of consciousness, including its adaptation
status and evolutionary function/s.
The first task in this final chapter is to bring together the evaluation results from
the three previous chapters in order to compare all evaluated means of inquiry and
to derive recommendations for their use in consciousness research. To add to these
recommendations, I then look to evolutionary psychology, as a wider field of the evol-
utionary study of mental traits, for methodological insights, warnings, and advice
that can be usefully transferred to research into the evolution and function/s of con-
sciousness. In the following section of this chapter, I examine the performance of
the promise evaluation tool in the evaluations carried out in the three application
chapters. The evaluation of the tool is important because it indicates how much
confidence we can have in the evaluation results and, at least as importantly, how
the evaluation tool can be improved for future use. The thesis ends with a summary
of both the contributions it makes and my methodological recommendations for the
evolutionary study of consciousness as well as for evaluations of means of inquiry.
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6.1 Comparison of evaluated means of inquiry
When looking over the 23 evaluated means of inquiry, two things stand out even be-
fore consulting their evaluation results. The first is that they are all either arguments
(Chapter 3) or strategies (Chapters 4 and 5). The second is that their aims, at least
according to the evaluation, belong to one of the three evolutionary research subgoals.
In particular, all arguments in Chapter 3 are aimed at showing that consciousness is
an adaptation (an adaptation category), half of the strategies in Chapters 4 and 5 are
aimed at identifying the evolutionary function/s of consciousness (what adaptation),
and the other half at identifying its evolutionary development (origin and history).
The an-adaptation arguments in Chapter 3 were grouped exactly according to these
two criteria, an-adaptation and arguments, but the other means of inquiry were not
selected in this way. I did, however, specify in section 2.4 that I would not evaluate
means of inquiry aimed at showing that consciousness has a function, which explains
their absence in the evaluation. I suspect that the popularity of evolutionary spec-
ulations has meant that even those means of inquiry whose proper domain is the
identification of current function/s have been employed for evolutionary purposes.
Assigning them to the highest reasonable relevance category is consistent with my
instruction to do so, which was motivated by the present research goal. The fact
that the remaining means are all more or less general strategies might be a sign of a
relatively young field of inquiry but probably has more to do with trying to answer
big historical questions.
The promise scores of the evaluated means of inquiry vary substantially, especially
considering that these means have been deemed fit for purpose by some researchers:
from the 4.2 of the argument from apparent adaptedness to the 8.4 of brain com-
parisons.1 In addition, three arguments are completely unpromising: the argument
from evolution, the generalisation argument, and the argument from evolutionary his-
tory, only the last one of which might fare better in future evaluations. As long as
these arguments are unpromising, I advise against their use. But note that although
researchers should prefer the most promising means of inquiry, they should also re-
frain from abandoning means with low promise scores prematurely. Low promise does
not imply uselessness: Such means may, for instance, be appropriate in certain spe-
1For names and subevaluation scores of all evaluated means of inquiry, see Tables 3.1, 4.1, and 5.1
in the Conclusion sections of the respective chapters.
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cific research situations or for triangulation. The large differences in the promise of
means of inquiry (i.e., in their potential contribution under ideal circumstances and
with present-day practicality) support my claim about the great differences in the
usefulness of means of inquiry into the evolution and function/s of consciousness (see
section 2.2). These perceived differences led me to conceive and pursue the evaluation
project presented in this thesis.
Researchers might, quite likely, decide to focus their work on a particular subgoal
and could then look for the most relevant means of inquiry in the corresponding
category. The recommendations derived from the present evaluation for the three
evolutionary subgoals are the following, with promise scores given in parentheses:
• An adaptation. The most promising arguments for showing that consciousness
is an adaptation are the arguments from species comparisons (6.5), complex
design (6.3), and biological cost (6.2).
• What adaptation. The most promising strategies for identifying evolutionary
function/s of consciousness are contrastive analysis (7.2), exclusion (7.2), and
the natural method / deflationary method (7.2).
• Origin and history. The most promising strategies for identifying the evol-
utionary origin of consciousness and its development since are brain compar-
isons (8.4), behaviour comparisons (7.8), and inferences from models or theor-
ies (7.3).
Whether researchers compare means of inquiry in relation to the research goal or a
subgoal, they should consult the tables with subevaluation scores (see Footnote 1)
and the accompanying text in order to choose one or more means of inquiry that are
best suited to their research situation.
The discrepancy between the moderately to highly promising means of inquiry and
their mostly unconvincing applications in the literature has repeatedly come up. It
would have been easy to criticise the specific applications one by one, but I wanted
to pursue a more productive approach instead. By weeding out unpromising means
of inquiry and rating others and by pointing out their strengths and weaknesses,
researchers who are aware of this information are likely to make better method choices.
The evaluation has shown that the means of inquiry can work well if they are applied
properly. The challenge therefore is to take the evaluation results as an encouragement
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to try to come closer to the evaluated ideal circumstances, not to become (even more)
blase´. In the next section, I mention other possible ways of improving the execution
of evolutionary studies in consciousness research.
6.2 Learning from evolutionary psychology
Additional pointers for improving evolutionary studies of consciousness can come
from the consideration of evolutionary psychology, broadly construed. Developments
in this field of inquiry as well as methodological publications can highlight important
issues and provide new ideas of how to address (aspects of) the evolution of con-
sciousness. The suggestion to consult evolutionary psychology is just an instance of
looking outside one’s immediate expert area or focus of study to other areas with sim-
ilar problems. In the face of frequent poor knowledge of evolutionary theory among
consciousness researchers, I give some brief examples of fairly general pointers and
reminders here, simply to highlight another source of information and, one could say,
of hope:
1. Several articles in recent years have outlined how psychological adaptations can
be identified. For example, Andrews et al. (2002) discuss six standards of evid-
ence and mention additional criteria and techniques for identifying adaptations.
2. Because developing hypotheses is an essential part of science, and a wealth of
ideas is good for an emerging research area, a story-telling situation may not be
problematic. Rossano (2003) suggested that “it may even be a sign of healthy
vigor” (p. 45). On the other hand, an unconstrained “proliferation of adaptive
hypotheses” (Griffiths, 1996, p. 516) is likely to be counterproductive. It is thus
imperative that at least some of the hypotheses, after having been advanced,
are developed further.
3. It is worth repeating here that it is vital to consider alternative explanations,
including different evolutionary hypotheses on the function/s of consciousness,
nonevolutionary explanations of consciousness, epiphenomenal explanations and,
importantly, hypotheses about the less conscious competitors over which con-
scious organisms could have been selected.
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4. Evolutionary approaches to mind and behaviour offer methods which have not
yet been applied to the evolutionary study of consciousness such as, for example,
analyses of cost-benefit trade-offs.
5. Additional methodological help can come from modern evolutionary biology.
For instance, methods for determining the level of adaptation could assist with
identifying how specific potential adaptive aspects of consciousness are likely to
be.
6. Multimethod approaches are called for by many contemporary evolutionary psy-
chologists (e.g., Durrant & Haig, 2001; Schmitt & Pilcher, 2004), and they are
particularly relevant to methodologically difficult areas such as the evolutionary
study of consciousness. Findings from different methods should be combined
because each method has its strengths and weaknesses.
There are more lessons to be learned from evolutionary psychology. A focus on the
possible adaptive problems that consciousness may have solved, and showing that
consciousness can be subject to natural selection, for instance, could lead to important
insights.
6.3 Evaluation of the evaluation tool
To see how accurate the evaluation tool is, we would need to know the promise of the
means of inquiry already, but we do not. If some results have been surprising to readers
(one supervisor commented on the promise score of the ontogenetic-parallels strategy
“This high?”), their task is to try to locate the error in the tool (e.g., criterion missing,
inadequate rubric, bad synthesis procedure) or reconsider their own assessment. Here
I focus on difficulties that have come to my attention while applying the tool to the
23 means of inquiry. Before listing some of them according to dimensions, it is worth
pointing out that the evaluation tool generally seems to agree with our expectations.
For example, comparisons of brain and of behaviour were most promising, and none of
the arguments for consciousness being an adaptation scored higher than the strategies
aimed at identifying the evolutionary function/s or history of consciousness.
• Relevance. The relevance dimension does not take enough account of how
well-supported expected content is likely to be; the rubric does not mention it
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at all. In general, the weighting of this dimension seemed rather too low than
too high. The fertility bonus is much less likely to be assigned to the higher
relevance categories, and the less relevant means in Chapter 3 that have received
such a bonus may not have deserved it; they seem to have received it for their
input without contributing anything themselves. The relevance dimension thus
needs some fine-tuning.
• Efficacy. One of the main difficulties in applying the evaluation tool is caused
by the specifics of how I tried to evaluate arguments and strategies with the same
tool. The principle of charity in specifying arguments is responsible for them
scoring full points on the procedure, whereas strategies struggle much more with
this point. My recommendation is either to not evaluate these different types
of means of inquiry with the same tool or to combine the input and procedure
criteria into one. However, this point only means that the input and procedure
criteria are more or less reversed for arguments and strategies, but their efficacy
scores are probably hardly affected.
• Practicality. The two criteria, data availability and resource cost, are not
independent (i.e., the more readily available input is, the lower the resource cost
of obtaining the input). I accepted this because it reflects their relationship, but
there could be a solution that works better with the synthesis procedure.
It was to be expected that the tool would require some changes. However, none of
these difficulties are insurmountable. After the suggested changes to the tool have
been made, the improved tool could be trialled with the problematic cases in the
present evaluation. Overall though, as stated above, the tool’s performance in this
first proper round is reasonable. Among such things as providing absolute and relative
subevaluation scores with verbal explanations, the tool has revealed many important
weak spots of the evaluated means of inquiry and was able to allay some specific
concerns with them.
The satisfactory performance of the evaluation tool indicates not only that its use
is practicable and worthwhile but also that the tool is worthy of further development.
In addition to the specific improvements suggested above, further evidence concern-
ing the tool’s validity and reliability should be collected. Of particular importance in
this respect is its application by independent researchers who are knowledgeable in
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evolutionary and consciousness studies. Support for the validity and reliability of the
evaluation tool would increase its psychometric credibility and hence its acceptability
among psychologists. However, although the acceptance and use of the tool and its
results are key to the success of this research, and validity and reliability in general are
essential properties of good research tools, it is also important to keep development
efforts in line with the characteristics and purpose of the tool: The present tool’s
application is not meant to create binding recommendations for all researchers (with
the exception of recommendations against using completely irrelevant or inefficacious
means of inquiry); this is because researchers differ in their research situations, ap-
proaches, personal strategies, and interpretations, and because plurality of employed
means of inquiry is desirable. Instead, the tool’s findings are meant to provide a first
indication of the promise of means of inquiry to those researchers who would benefit
from such methodological advice.
6.4 Contributions and recommendations
The last section in this chapter gives an overview of the contributions and recom-
mendations of the thesis.
Major contributions. The two main components of the thesis, the construction
of the evaluation tool for means of inquiry and its subsequent application to argu-
ments and strategies used in the evolutionary study of consciousness, form the basis
of its major contributions. The components each contribute two different kinds of
knowledge, namely knowledge for instrumental use and knowledge for conceptual use
(Cousins & Shulha, 2006; Rich, 1977), which are also called knowledge for action and
knowledge for understanding. An overview of the contributions of the thesis can thus
be structured as follows:
• Tool–conceptual. To construct the evaluation tool, I needed to determine
what it means for a means of inquiry to be promising in the present context.
The answer makes up a theory of the promise of means of inquiry, that is, an
evaluative theory (Scriven, 2007b), which underpins the evaluation tool. Note
that this was necessary because there was no suitable evaluation system or
theory available. As such, the tool will, once published, be a significant contri-
bution to the literature on the evaluation of means of inquiry. Because the tool
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is not specific to the content area (except for the tool’s relevance rubric, which
depends on the research goal) but to the content area’s level of development,
the evaluative theory would need to be adapted if applied at a different level of
development either in the same area or a different one.
• Tool–instrumental. The tool may be used by any researcher who wants to
evaluate means of inquiry. By supplying a tool, I hope to encourage researchers
to evaluate means of inquiry in their fields. However, unless the evaluation is
at roughly the same level of generality and development of the field, the criteria
will most likely need to be modified.2
• Evaluation–conceptual. The evaluation of the 23 evaluations of arguments
and strategies in this thesis provides new knowledge about them and thus in-
creases our understanding of their strengths and weaknesses on all evaluated
criteria and, where additional criticisms were discussed, beyond. This know-
ledge may then be used instrumentally to improve the means of inquiry and to
apply them better.
• Evaluation–instrumental. The promise evaluation results themselves, along
with the resulting recommendations about which means of inquiry to use and
for what subgoal, are meant to—and hopefully will—help advance research on
the biological evolution and function/s of consciousness. Whether they will do
so depends, among other things, on their dissemination and uptake.
Together, these are the major contributions of this thesis.
Summary of recommendations. The most important recommendations, covering
present findings and future research, that have come out of this research are summar-
ised below:
• Use of evaluation results. To select, justify, or judge a means of inquiry
into the evolution or function/s of consciousness, consult the promise evalu-
ation results, including the subevaluations in numerical values and words. Far
from being ultimate truths, these evaluations should be considered points for
discussion and critical thought.
2In an interactive presentation to members of the Aotearoa New Zealand Evaluation Association
(Upper South Island regional symposium, Hanmer Springs, July 2010), the tool was a very useful
starting point for discussing the overlap with essential criteria of evaluation methods.
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• Means of inquiry. Improve the evaluated means of inquiry where possible and
needed most, as shown by the evaluation. Look for additional means of inquiry
to be used in the evolutionary study of consciousness and evaluate them. Review
the evaluation of these means every decade, unless it seems expedient to do so
sooner.
• Evaluation tool. Improve the evaluation tool according to the suggestions
made in the previous section. For example, it would be worth checking its
interrater reliability, which could suggest further improvements. Future research
could also attempt to test an adapted version of it on a past research situation
in order to compare the tool’s promise results with the actual outcome. (Note
though that the most promising means of inquiry are not necessarily the ones
that succeed, but they should do well on average.)
My final recommendation is more personal, though with potentially important con-
sequences on consciousness research. It has to do with the subjective centrality of
consciousness, which may or may not be an evolutionary adaptation (I mentioned
this possibility in section 3.2). I argued for the prevalence of a centrality (and adapt-
ation) bias in Chapter 3. Given that this bias seems to negatively influence research,
it might be worthwhile, for example, to remind ourselves every now and then that we
each consist of much more than consciousness. And maybe an occasional perspective
change (see Fig. 6.1) could help us to better apply those means of inquiry into the
biological evolution of consciousness.
169
6 Conclusion: Means of inquiry, the tool, and the future
Figure 6.1. A different perspective on consciousness: that annoying time between
naps. From Purry Logic, by J. Seabrook, 2008, Auckland, New Zealand: Hodder
Moa. Copyright 2008 by Seabrook. Reprinted with permission.
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